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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Aim and Importance of the Dissertation 
 
The present dissertation aims at exploring and analysing the influence of horizontal retail 
alliances on the marketing strategy and performance of member retailers. 
 
Both in domestic and international retailing, retail alliances are gaining territory. Strategic 
alliances tend to gain more and more ground both in domestic and international retailing. 
In the year 2002 the first five places of the domestic grocery retailing toplist were 
occupied by strategic alliances, 3 of which were ones incorporating domestically owned 
retail groups (CBA Hungary Network, Co-op Hungary Plc., Honiker Buying Group). 
One after the other, the independent retailers, whose situation was deemed hopeless 
recently, come to discover the new opportunities offered by buying groups, franchise 
system or the combination of the two and more and more of them are joining one of 
these voluntary chains in the hope of market survival and becoming more competitive.  
 
In domestic retail journals and in workshops on retailing, the phenomena of retail 
alliances and their market success are hot issues. However, there seem to be  too few 
analyses of their activities and empirical researches which make an attempt to measure 
their influence on member firms are scarce, too. A particularly interesting research 
question is, whether joining an alliance indeed improves the retailer's performance and 
profitability and if yes, along what strategic dimensions it does so. 
 
The Economic Importance of the Dissertation 
 
The research problem is strongly related to the field of interfirm relationships and to 
researches on strategy-performance. 
 
The marketing literature related to interfirm relationships (co-operation, strategic 
alliances, partnerships, networks etc.) primarily focuses on the vertical relationships, thus 
analysing the co-operative behaviour of companies at various levels of the value chain. 
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Contrasted to this, the present dissertation wishes to give an insight into the relevant 
components of horizontal co-operation highlighting the similarities and differences 
between vertical and horizontal co-operations.  
 
There is a wide spectrum of literature on strategic alliances. However, comparatively few 
pieces of research have adopted the point of view of the member firm to examine the 
influence of the alliance on the strategy and performance of the participating firm. 
Similarly, in retail literature, the impact of the alliance on performance is an important 
issue for there are only a small number of empirical researches which try to quantify the 
retailer's performance on a more aggregate (store or corporate) level. 
 
The international retail literature focuses mostly on the  econometric analysis of scanner 
panel data at present. My dissertation would like to contribute to the research body about 
more complex strategic questions. In the empirical research, I identify the marketing 
strategy elements influenced by retail alliance and its performance consequences. 
 
Scientific and Managerial Relevance  
 
The scientific importance of the thesis is that the empirical research combines traditional 
quantitative methods with cognitive techniques which play not only a methodological 
part but a theoretical role in building causal models. The method of cognitive maps is 
used for understanding the complex research topic and for the validity improvement of 
the causal model. In strategic management literature, cognitive methods are widely 
employed but these techniques are heavily neglected in marketing and especially in 
retailing research. 
 
Small number of studies have been conducted about Hungarian retail companies and 
chains and about how both operate. Based on the empirical findings, valuable 
implications can be drawn for the hub firms of retail alliances and the members of the 
alliances. Earlier empirical work has justified that the small- and medium-sized, privately 
owned retail firms are less professional in managing their business and usually fail to 
quantify the antecedents and consequences of their decisions. 
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The Structure of the Dissertation 
 
As the context of the research problem is made up of interfirm relationships, co-
operations, the theoretical part starts with the definition and discussion of the main types 
of co-operative relationships between firms. 
 
In the second chapter, strategic alliance as a subtype of co-operation are discussed 
including  an overview of the literature on horizontal alliances. Furthermore, the most 
common types and tendencies of retail alliances are described in detail. 
 
The third chapter includes the main theoretical approaches concerning retail alliances and 
co-operations. First of all, the theory of relational contracting is introduced, which helps 
characterise retail alliances as an interfirm relationship emerging from a series of 
transactions. Then, within the framework of transaction cost analysis the different 
governance mechanisms will be discussed. Finally, I review the literature of the resource 
dependence theory which is the most relevant concept from the point of view of the 
research problem. By discussing each theory, literature and empirical work linked to 
distribution channels and retailing play a prominent role. 
 
The fourth part deals with marketing strategy options pursued by retail companies. 
Relevant papers concerning the components of retail mix and how strategic alliance 
might influence the elements of the retail strategy are reviewed. 
 
Chapter 5 presents the definition and quantification difficulties of corporate performance 
particularly in the case of retailing. The possibilities of measuring alliance performance 
and the performance consequences for the member firms is a part of great concern in the 
chapter. Furthermore, I identify possible performance measures. 
 
After reviewing and analysing the literature, the next chapter contains the research 
concept. The main tendencies of Hungarian grocery and fast moving consumer goods 
retailing are briefly summarised. Also, the profile of the group of retailers which are 
subject to the empirical research are given. 
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The profile is presented on the basis of earlier empirical research and secondary data. 
Thereafter, based on the literature review, the context of the empirical research, the initial 
model and the research questions are defined in detail.  The second part of the chapter 
illustrates the main results of the content analysis. Then I show how the results received 
from the content analysis and cognitive technique modify the initial theoretical model. 
This chapter also includes the research questions, the assumed connections between 
constructs of the causal model and the hypotheses.  
 
The last chapter contains the results of the quantitative analysis. First, I examine the 
structure and the representativity of the sample.  Before analysing the causal model, it is 
necessary to compare the groups of allied and independent retailers whether the 
difference in marketing strategy and performance variables depends only on the alliance. 
The next subchapter includes the descriptive statistics of the causal model’s observed 
variables, the reliability and validity analysis of the latent constructs. The second part of 
the data analysis focuses on the interpretation of the structural equation models that 
enables to prove the hypotheses of the research concept. Finally, I summarise the main 
results of the quantitative analysis drawing the most important conclusions and 
implications of the survey findings. At the end of the dissertation, I outline the future 
research possibilities. 
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1. DEFINITION AND MAIN TYPES OF CO-OPERATION 
 
Since the research problem focuses on the impact that co-operation has on retail strategy 
of retail companies, first I wish to define the term of co-operation, describe its main 
types and clarify what theoretical approaches it is best characterised by (Exhibit 1.1.). 
 
Exhibit 1.1. 
Definitions of co-operation 
Authors Definition 
Högberg (1977) Co-operation is an explicit, long term agreement between two or more 
companies which are independent from the point of view of ownership 
from one another. 
Ring&Van de Ven (1992) Co-operative relationships are joint efforts to build up repeated contract 
based transactions of idiosyncreting assets with the same organization. 
Varadarajan (1986) Co-operation is participation of two or more business units and/or 
pooling of resources in an effort to achieve profit growth or goals of 
other nature relying on the joint opportunity, in order to promote the 
mutual benefit of all participants. 
Stern&Reve (1980) In the process of co-operation, the channel member co-operate and 
work together to achieve their individual goals. 
Anderson&Narus (1990) The working partnerships of a distributor and a manufacturer is defined 
as the extent to which there is mutual recognition and understanding 
that the success of each firm depends in part on the other firm, with 
each firm consequently taking actions so as to provide a coordinated 
effort focused on jointly satisfying the requirements of the customer 
marketplace. 
Anderson&Narus (1991) Partnering is a process where a customer firm and supplier firm form 
strong and extensive social, economic, and technical ties over time, with 
the intent of lowering total costs, and/or increasing value, thereby 
achieving mutual benefit. 
Andaleeb (1995) Intent to cooperate is defined as the inclination of a party to engage  in 
concerted/joint action with another party to achieve individual or joint 
goals.  
Sriram&Krapfel, Spekman 
(1992) 
A collaborative exchange relationship is one in which trading parties 
develop a long-term cooperative effort and common orientation toward 
meeting their individual and mutual goals. 
Mohr&Spekman (1994) Partnerships are defined as purposive strategic relationships between 
independent firms who share competible goals, strive for mutual 
benefit, and acknowledge a high level of mutual interdependence. 
 
In economics and strategic management but also in the literature of marketing, co-
operation as a corporate strategy has been a recurrent research issue. A wide range of 
terms are used by researchers describing co-operative activities, such as co-operation, 
interfirm relationships, strategic alliances, networks, or vertical marketing relationships 
etc. of whose individual definitions have been somewhat debated. 
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In my approach, co-operation is the collective term for all the above mentioned forms of 
co-operation. Thus, I aim at exploring the definition of co-operation first. (For the sake 
of a holistic view, I have to note that not every researcher shares the view to treat co-
operation as a strategy but a behavioural trait of a partnership. (Cannon&Perreault 
[1999], Dabholkar&Neeley [1998]1). 
 
Although the definitions reflect different theoretical approaches, they have a common 
element i.e. co-operation is based on an interfirm agreement which does not necessarily 
mean a contractual agreement, but regularly repeated transactions. Co-operation may be 
formed between partners who are independent from one another from the point of view 
of ownership, with mobilising resources through joint efforts, having mutual interests in 
view. The co-ordination and addition of company activities are realised with retaining the 
legal independence of co-operation partners. 
 
Contract-based interfirm relationships can operate in the form of strategic alliances, 
partnerships, coalitions, franchise, various types of consorciums (Ouchi&Kremen-Bolton 
[1988]), and networks (Jarillo [1988], Ring&Van de Ven [1992]). There appear a growing 
number of articles about relationship marketing in marketing literature. As Carman 
(1980) puts it, aiming at the taming of the market, more and more companies create 
vertical marketing systems, tighter client-supplier relationships (Dwyer&Schurr, Oh 
[1987]) and interfirm strategic alliances (Anderson&Narus [1990], Heide [1994]). 
 
It is important to make a distinction between the concept of co-operation and network 
because the network of organisations and the network organisation do not have the same 
meaning (Möller, Rajala, Svahn [2002]). Networks are not equivalent to the networks of 
co-operating firms but to the sets of connected relationships between firms 
(Anderson&Håkansson, Johanson [1994], Achrol [1997]). In the case of networks, the 
unit of analysis is not the firm but the relationship (Thorelli [1986], Johanson&Mattson 
[1989]. According to the research question, I focus on the participating firm in the co-
operation, not on the relationships between member firms.   
                                                 
1 Dabholkar and Neeley (1998) understand negotiation strategy between two partners under the term ‘co-
operative behaviour’.  
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2. STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 
 
In strategic management literature, there is a wide range of definitions applied by 
strategic alliance researchers. In the present dissertation, the concept of strategic alliances 
is treated as a subtype of co-operations. In my view, strategic alliances are long-term co-
operations established by autonomous companies. Exhibit 2.1. illustrates the further 
variety of possible definitions of strategic alliances. 
 
Exhibit 2.1.  
Definitions of strategic alliances in strategic management and marketing literature 
Authors Definitions 
Devlin&Bleackley (1988) Strategic alliances take place in the context of a company's long-term 
strategic plan and seek to improve or even dramatically change a 
company's competitive position. 
Lei, D. (1993) Strategic alliances may be thought of as coalignments between two or 
more firms in which the partners hope to learn and acquire from each 
other technologies, products, skills, and knowledge that are not available 
to other competitors. 
Parkhe (1993) 
Young&Gilbert, McIntyre 
(1996) 
Relatively enduring interfirm co-operative arrangements involving flows 
and linkages that utilize resources and/or governance structures from 
autonomous organizations for the joint accomplishment of individual 
goals linked to the corporate mission of each sponsoring firm. 
Faulkner (1995) Interfirm relationships that require substantial investments in the view 
of long-term relationship and fulfilling joint goals. 
Tari Ernő (1999) Strategic alliances are mutually beneficial, long-term co-operations in which the 
relatively autonomous partners integrate their activity to a certain extent 
through unifying and complementing the knowledge and resources 
shared by the allied firms. 
Leunissen&Pieters, 
Reijnders (1996) 
Spekman&Sawhney (1990) 
Strategic alliances are types of interorganisational exchange relationship 
in which suitable partners make substantial investments in developing a long-
term collaborative effort and common orientation toward individual and 
mutual goals to respond to changes and competitive pressures. 
Coughlan et. al (2001) In strategic alliance, two or more organizations have connections (legal, 
economic, interpersonal) that cause them to function according to a 
perception of a single interest, shared by all parties. 
 
Strategic alliances are more specific than co-operations because - apart from mutual 
coalignment and common goals - they assume long-term co-operation, as well as mutual 
investments. Unlike them, co-operations may be based on the harmonisation of short-
term and operative activities. Mutual investments might not only include tangible assets 
but also knowledge-transfer and sharing resources already available. 
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Besides taking the common objectives set by the alliance into account, the companies 
primarily expect to build new and/or keep existing competitive advantages (Porter 
[1993], Devlin&Bleackley [1988], Doz et. al [1989], Lei [1993], Faulkner [1995]), which is 
made possible by exploiting synergic effects emerged between the allied firms. 
Consequently, according to the paradigm, competitive advantages should lead to better 
market and financial performance (Day&Wensley [1983]). Recently, several forms of co-
operations have appeared in retailing among small- and medium-sized retailers in an 
effort to make up for their competitive disadvantages (Tietz [1993], Leunissen et. al 
[1996]).  
 
There is a research stream in strategic alliance literature (Varadarajan&Cunningham 
[2000], Sheth&Parvatiyar [2000], Buzády [2000], Tari [1999]), which focuses on the 
motivational (corporate, industrial, and environmental) factors of creating strategic 
alliances in detail. The incentives to form retail alliances will be discussed later in the 
subchapter concerning retail buying groups2. 
 
2.1. Types of Strategic Alliances 
 
The literature enumerates several approaches that attempt to classify strategic alliances. 
One is e.g., Contractor and Lorange (1988)’s who have examined three main alliance 
types (joint ventures, autonomous and non-autonomous alliances)3 from which further 
subgroups have been created. One such subgroup is that of retail alliances which 
comprise present and potential competitor alliances whose activity includes joint 
purchasing and sales. Faulkner (1995) has created a taxonomy based on the complexity of 
task carried out by the alliance, on whether the alliance leads to a joint venture, and on 
the number of participating firms. Sheth és Parvatiyar (2000) have identified four 
different types of alliance depending on whether the alliance focuses on the co-
ordination of the strategic versus the operative activity, and whether it is formed by 
competitors vs. non-competitors.  
                                                 
2 See Exhibit 2.4.! 
3 Contractor and Lorange's view about strategic alliances differs from the approach of this dissertation. The 
difference lies in the assumption that allied firms remain independently owned. This view is supported by 
Cravens and Cravens (2000) who consider co-operative activities as strategic alliances when the allied 
companies are autonomous. 
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Varadarajan and Cummingham (2000) have described alliances within industry, between 
industries and international ones, and alliances classified according to their function i.e. 
product development, joint production and marketing. 
However, the most common classification is the distinction made between vertical and 
horizontal alliances. It is based on the level of the value-added chain occupied by the co-
operating firms. 
 
Vertical alliances integrate businesses to manage the flow of goods and services along 
some part of or the entire value-added chain in order to achieve systemwide economies 
of scale (Johnston&Lawrence [1988]). For small retailers, however, vertical integration is 
not a suitable option because they usually suffer from lack of capacity (Leunissen&Pieter, 
Reijnders [1996]). Companies entering vertical strategic alliances complement each 
other's operation. 
 
Horizontal alliances are lateral relationships between firms at the same level of the value-
added chain i.e. between competitors (Doz et. al [1989], Bucklin&Sengupta [1993], 
Dussauge&Garrette [1997], Cravens&Cravens [2000]). Horizontal alliances are not 
necessarily thought of as new phenomena, for co-operatives can be regarded as such 
formations, too. Their novelty therefore does not lie in their existence but in their 
institutionalisation and international power (Bailey et. al [1995]). 
 
Cravens and Cravens (2000) interpret horizontal strategic alliances as components of the 
corporate strategy since the alliance becomes part of the management control system of 
the organisation. The alliance's strategic role is that it enables the company to co-operate 
with other firms in order to be able to create customer value. In the authors’ view, 
horizontal coalignments are more complex than are traditional vertical relationships 
(supplier-manufacturer) because the alliance becomes integrated in the organisational 
structure of the partners, whereas vertical partnerships rely on already existent supplier-
vendor relationships. 
 
According to the literature, it is the strategic alliances in which the partners complement 
each other's operation that prove to be the most successful ones (Bleeke&Ernst [1995], 
Bucklin&Sengupta [1993]). Complementary activities are more feasible in vertical than in 
horizontal alliances.  
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The majority of marketing papers studying interfirm relationships tend to focus on 
vertical relationships. However, some articles have been published about the topic of 
horizontal alliances and co-marketing alliances recently. 
 
Still, the concept of horizontal coalignments as such, is not a new phenomenon in 
marketing literature, Adler (1966) being the first to conceptualise it as symbiotic 
marketing4. The empirical work of Bucklin and Sengupta (1993) has illustrated how an 
alliance between IT-companies  – as a new organisational structure – can most efficiently 
be managed and what significant management challenges might emerge. 
Venkatesh&Mahajan, Muller (2000) have investigated the dynamics of horizontal 
alliances formed in entertainment business. Robson&Dunk (1999) have examined Pan-
European horizontal alliances in fuel market. 
 
2.2. Horizontal Retail Alliances 
 
Exhibit 2.2. illustrates the basic types of the possible connections between members of 
the distribution channels. Combinations of the dyadic relationships depicted in the 
exhibit are not by any means excluded. In distribution channels therefore, highly 
complex, multilevel alliances might emerge through co-operation possibilities being 
accumulated. From the point of view of the research problem, horizontal co-operations 
between retailers are of most notable interest. 
 
In the European retail sector, Pan-European buying groups and marketing co-alliances 
gained ground in the nineties, most often through the mergers of national buying groups 
with huge retail chains. Recently, they have been expanding their activity into creating 
and distributing store brands while constantly increasing their purchasing power (Fernie 
[1992]). 
Dawson and Shaw (1992) have defined retail strategic alliances as "co-operation between 
two or more retail companies whereby each partner seeks to add to its competencies by 
combining the own resources with those of its partners". 
                                                 
4 Symbiotic marketing refers to mutual co-operation between independent companies or business units 
which mutually exploit the benefits and growth opportunities emerging from synergy (Adler [1966]).  
Successful implementation of symbiotic marketing can supplement the capabilities of the company, ensure 
economies of scale and scope, exploit the synergistic relationships between products and services, 
overcome resource constraints (Varadarajan&Rajaratnam [1986]). 
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Exhibit 2.2. 
Co-operation possibilities in the distribution channels 
Manufacturer-
retailer
Supplier-
manufacturer
Wholesaler-
retailer
Vertical
co-operation
Within
manufacturers
Within
retailers
Within
wholesalers
Horizontal
co-operation
Co-operation
in distribution
channels
 
The effects of horizontal co-operation between retailers have been modelled by 
Leunissen et. al (1996) in clothing retailing. In their work, they have defined retail 
strategic alliances as "all activities in which a retailer forms relationship with one or more 
partners, for the specific purpose of engaging in some form of joint activities". 
 
Retail strategic alliances co-ordinate and support several activities (purchasing, marketing, 
market research, counselling, branding) by offering services to the allied retailers, which 
enables its members to build up long-term sustainable competitive advantages (Bailey et. 
al [1995]). 
 
Just as in strategic management literature, retail alliances have been classified in a number 
of ways; in terms of the type of functions provided and the closeness of the links 
between member firms of the alliance. 
 
The Institute of Grocery Distribution in the UK (1992) has distinguished four groups. 
The first category includes buying groups whose members co-ordinate only purchase in 
order to improve their negotiation power against manufacturers. Alliances, which co-
operate on particular projects, most often like market entry, belong to the development-
based group. 
 
In the case of capability-based alliances, retailers share their knowledge and expertise with 
each other. Multifunctional alliances can be interpreted as the combinations of the former 
three groups in which retailers gain strategic advantages through sharing information and 
resources. 
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Bailey et. al (1995) pursued the attempt at a more comprehensive taxonomy that is able 
to classify all types of retail alliances (Exhibit 2.3.). In their study, they have examined 
and grouped British retail strategic alliances with international operation in terms of the 
scope and tightness of co-operation between member firms.  
 
Exhibit 2.3.  
Types of retail strategic alliances 
Types Description 
Loose Affiliations These are defined as organisations whose primary function is to act 
as a focal point. These are trade bodies engaged in research and 
dissemination of market data as well as political lobbying. 
 
National Buying Club Buying organisations exist for the benefit of their members, 
predominantly within one nation-state, whose main purpose is the 
procurement of merchandise and maximisation of purchasing 
power. 
 
Co-Marketing Agreements Co-marketing alliances are a form of working partnership that are 
defined understanding that the success of each firm depends in 
part on the other firms (based Anderson&Narus [1990]). 
 
International Alliances with 
Central Secretariat 
These are retail groups which form an international alliance and 
create a central secretariat for the purpose of co-ordinating  
operational activities (buying, branding, expertise exchange and 
product marketing). 
 
Equity Participating International 
Alliances 
These types of alliance involve two or more members each of 
which has an equity stake in its partners, and the alliance is formally 
constituted. The rationale for such an alliance is to achieve wider 
and more strategic goals than the operational focus of a buying 
alliance. 
 
Joint Ventures Joint ventures are business agreements where two or more owners 
create a separate entity (Harrigan [1988]) with purpose of entering 
new markets. 
 
Multiple Alliances Retail alliances often pursue multiple alliance strategies and 
strategic goals and appear as combinations of different alliance 
types. 
 
Source: Bailey et. al (1995), pp. 30-36
 
Bailey' classification also reflects the magnitude of the difference in ownership because the 
closer the co-operation and co-ordination between the allied retailers are, the more 
confounded the ownership relations are. 
 
Considering the research problem, the most relevant category is that of multifunctional 
alliances, for Hungarian strategic alliances in grocery retailing run as the combinations of 
retail buying groups and horizontal co-marketing alliances. The partners partly or entirely 
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harmonise both their purchasing and marketing activities. These alliances are typically 
established on a contractual basis within the frame of traditional supply agreements, 
franchising, licence and various forms of concessions. 
 
Retail strategic alliances provide numerous benefits for their allied partners e.g.: 
representation of interests, economies of scale, better purchasing conditions through 
increased buying power, brand- and image transfer, acquiring new capabilities and skills 
employing outlet types, promotional activity and information technology of the alliance. 
The alliance might protect its members against new market entries and improve 
competitiveness (Bailey et. al [1995], Barth [1996]). 
 
Retail strategic alliances can be characterised by a threefold goal system: the objectives of 
the alliance, the objectives of the allied members, and the pursued goals of the potential 
members. In the case of alliances/groups of firms the focus is on achieving an interfirm 
goal compromise (Tietz [1993]). 
 
The objectives of the alliance members might cover several fields of operation, such as 
increasing the efficiency of marketing tools, maintaining and increasing competitiveness 
against alternative forms of co-operation, enhancing market position, reducing risks, 
reducing investments costs, increasing market transparency and entering new markets 
(Tietz [1993]). 
As far as the internal structure of strategic alliances is concerned, undifferentiated and 
segmented retailer groups are to be distinguished. Segmentation might be aimed at by 
member firms, for which it is easier to achieve their goals through segmentation. 
Segmentation has a beneficial effect on the alliance, as it is in the retailers’ interest to 
have partners that help them achieve their individual aim (Tietz [1993]). 
In the next subchapter, I wish to introduce the two main components of contractual 
agreements (buying groups and franchise5) which play an essential part in the grocery and 
FMCG retailing of Hungary.  
                                                 
5 There is a fierce discussion in the strategic management literature to which extent franchise chains can be 
considered as retail strategic alliances. Since the franchisee’s autonomy and thus its room for strategic 
decision have become very limited (Tari [1999]). In grocery retailing, the components of franchising are 
playing an important role in the strategic alliances. However, the presence of franchise elements have not 
led to a fully integrated franchise system. So, they do not threat the strategic autonomy of the member 
firms. By the analysis of strategic alliances in grocery retailing, we can not avoid to discuss the features of 
franchise systems. 
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2.3. Contractual Agreements in Retail Strategic Alliances  
2.3.1. Buying groups 
 
In their original forms, buying groups are initiated by retailers and/or wholesalers on the 
purpose of joint purchases of merchandise. However, buying groups as strategic alliances 
often take a step further than only co-ordinating their purchasing activity. In most cases, 
they expand their operation and evolve into offering a comprehensive service package 
for the allied retailers (Tietz [1993]).6
 
Hardy and Magrath (1987) have analysed the evolution process of buying groups. In their view, it 
is in the industries which are characterised by price competition and margins under 
pressure that the creation of buying groups is most encouraged. Intermediaries are thus 
forced to purchase merchandise at the most favourable prices possible. 
 
At the first stage of the evolution, the firms belonging to a buying group strive for 
surviving the competition against more capitalised competitors. In the next step, the buying 
group starts to provide its members with logistical support to decrease costs of interest 
rate and improve inventory turnover. Then (Step 3) the scope of the co-operation is 
usually extended into promotional and advertising activities. In the fourth step, the group 
starts to develop its own product line manifested in store brands that increases customer 
added-value and ensures a higher margin for retailers. Finally, the buying group becomes 
an integrated marketing system which mainly engages in marketing planning,  geographic 
and product diversification. 
 
A very similar course of evolution could have been observed in Hungarian grocery 
retailing. At first, retailers have only aimed at purchases under more favourable 
conditions but then they have started to integrate more and more retail functions. Quite 
soon, it has become obvious for them that joint purchasing activity alone would not 
ensure their market survival and success, for the other main advantage of multinational 
retailers lies in the chainwide marketing strategy (store layout, price and promotional 
                                                 
6 Buying groups can operate in the form of partnerships and co-operatives but in both cases there is a 
central organisation (a hub firm) that is responsible for the co-ordination. Buying groups manage 
warehousing, merchandise transportation, accounting, sales representation and dispatching. Furthermore, 
the hub firm organises agreements with third parties: traditional supplier agreements, offerings of the 
supplier, merchandise recommendation, bank covers, guarantors, central government (keeping the 
accounts of members) (Tietz [1993]). 
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policy) they apply. Thus, besides purchasing, buying groups have started to co-operate on 
marketing and sales, exercising joint marketing activity, whereby market entries and sales 
activity are promoted. Purchases are performed and administered centrally. It is not 
unusual to take immediate liability for one another within the group. They sometimes 
engage in joint training activity and apply the same layout in the stores. (Bauer&Agárdi 
[2000]). 
 
Multinational retailers have certainly recognised the importance and benefits of buying 
groups as well. For example, the largest European retailer, Metro has launched a buying 
group in form of a joint venture with Spar and they purchase merchandise under the 
name of Metspa jointly. The French hypermarket chain Cora, has formed a buying group 
called Provera with Csemege/Match and Profi. Since each multinational chain has its 
well-defined identity, they can easily do without adjusting their marketing activities to one 
another’s. 
 
The recent innovations of the buying groups of domestic retailers now show a tendency 
towards developing their own store brands, a higher level of co-operation and joining 
international, mostly European buying groups. 
 
Shaw, Dawson and Harris (1994) have summarised the benefits offered by buying groups and 
the direction of changes, all illustrated in Exhibit 2.4. Primarily, they have considered 
aspects of economies of scale and scope when evaluating the advantages of buying 
groups. 
 
Retailers are basically interested in achieving more favourable buying conditions through 
large volume purchasing. A general trend is that the initial benefits are essentially 
connected to economies of scale but the changes reveal a tendency towards satisfying 
local and different customer needs at a higher level and thus combining economies of 
scale and scope. 
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The authors give a comprehensive overview about the advantages of buying groups. 
However, the benefits are strongly interrelated and overlap each other. E.g. joint 
marketing activity (pricing) implicitly includes the economies of scale provided by buying 
volume and the same is true for the economies of scope. 
 
As it is concluded from an earlier survey7, Hungarian retailers are of the view that the 
main advantages of buying groups are as follows: favourable wholesale and consumer 
prices (45%), professional management of purchasing (24%), co-operation and 
favourable transportation and warehousing conditions (16%). As drawbacks of buying 
groups unreliability and incorrectness of the hub firm (13%), the limited purchasing 
opportunities (13%), the obligation of carrying certain merchandise (10%), and the fear 
of losing autonomy (8%) have been mentioned. 
 
The development of buying groups does not only produce positive changes but members 
should be prepared to encounter substantial costs with the tightening of integration. If 
the group tries to compensate for the costs by increasing membership fees, in a short 
while one or two members will no doubt drop out. This, however, may lead to liquidity 
problems, then, in the most extreme case, to the dissolution of the group. The same may 
be observed if a firm with a great purchasing volume leaves the group (Hardy&Magrath 
[1987]). A good illustration for this case is the Hungarian buying group Honiker which 
lost its most important partner, “Kisalföld Fűszért” in 2002. The large volume founder 
company left the group and entered another alliance which offered more benefits, 
particularly in the field of marketing. 
 
2.3.2. Franchising 
 
Another important component of retail strategic alliances is franchising, or more 
precisely the presence of franchise elements in the co-operation when members of retail 
alliances have some obligations regarding pricing, selection, promotion, and store layout. 
This understanding can be typically found in Hungarian grocery and FMCG retailing.  
 
 
7 GfK Hungary Ltd. (1997): Survey on Retail Buying Groups 
Exhibit 2.4. 
Benefits Sought by Retail Buying Groups and Directions of Change 
Benefit Incentive to form group Direction of change 
1. Economies of scale 
1.1. Buying volumes Dependent on the size of discounts, which vary by sector 
and distribution 
Economies among members 
 
Strong case to maximise size of alliance to achieve full 
benefits 
 
Extent of alliances will depend on competition 
Especially from voluntary chains and non-aligned 
wholesalers 
Growth of corporate chains increased pressures for independents to form groups but 
varies by sector. 
 
Local differentiation provides alternative strategy to compete with multiplies. 
 
 
Growth in national corporate chains increases territorial coverage necessary for groups 
but strong voluntary chains in some sectors limit scope for groups, as does the falling 
number of independents. 
 
Manufacturers concerned at growth of retail concentration may seek to limit discounts 
to discourage chains and groups, but success will depend on relative power in channel. 
 
Consumer demand for variety and global product sourcing has increased the need for 
professional buying skills, the cost of which is more easily sustained through groups. 
 
Increase in manufacturer concentration results in larger volumes of business with major 
retailers which increases the importance of volume-related discounts. 
1.2. Marketing economies e.g, retail 
brands, product testing, advertising, 
promotion 
Large volume sales allow use of more effective marketing 
and reduce costs per unit 
 
Shared costs of marketing innovation 
 
Greater need to be aware of what other retailers are doing to 
enable faster diffusion of new concepts is encouraged by 
larger organisations 
Rise in emphasis on retail marketing by corporate chains leads to increased importance 
of retailer image. Source of potential competitive weakness for non-aligned 
independents. 
 
Requirement to introduce marketing innovations faster places a premium on marketing 
information about competitors. 
 
Increased costs of retail brand development with moves away from "me too" brands 
weakens the competitive position of medium-sized retailers. 
Source: Shaw et. al (1994), pp. 87-88 
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Exhibit 2.4. (continued) 
Benefits sought by retail buying groups and directions of change 
Benefit Incentive to form group Direction of change 
1.3. Economies in operations, 
systems, financial, legal and 
personnel services 
Bulk purchase can reduce costs but competition is present 
from alternative providers 
 
Moves to meet the specific demands of local markets encourage local 
managerial control within alliance-type organisations. 
2. Economies of replication 
2.1. Recurrent costs e.g. product 
ranges, operating systems 
Where benefits in competitiveness through improved 
marketing and lower unit costs by replication across outlets. 
The more direct the competition with corporate chains, the more 
important this becomes but market fragmentation may mean that highly 
distinctive adaptation to local market conditions is an alternative. 
 
But this may require high levels of retail skill which independents may not 
posses and at which corporate chains have become more adept. New 
information and control systems allow varying product assortments among 
stores. 
2.2. Fixed and capital costs, e.g. 
equipment provision, format design 
Spreading costs across members. Retail technology systems 
costs are responsive to replication economies. 
Increased importance of store design and layout and efficient operating 
have increased the importance of these economies. 
3. Economies of scope 
3.1. Combinations of product 
ranges and services 
Main advantages are the consumer attractions of different 
assortments together with opportunity for lower costs 
through joint overheads. 
Trend to more specialist  retail formats and product ranges in some sectors 
reduces importance of this factor in those sectors. 
 
Where wide range needed because of convenience elements in shopping, 
this may have strengthened case for alliances. 
3.2. Promotion Economies of scope widely used to underpin promotional 
activity. 
Economies of scope become more important as pressures increase to raise 
shelf space and floor space productivity. 
Source: Shaw et. al (1994), pp. 87-88 
 
However, there are, strictly speaking, no such things as real franchise systems in 
Hungarian grocery retailing (apart from Co-op Hungary Plc.) since the obligations are 
addressed to a certain part of the retailer's operation and do not eliminate the autonomy 
of the member firm. 
 
The main difference between franchise systems and buying groups can be found in the 
intensity of co-operation fixed in the franchise contract. In the case of franchising, the 
advisory and supporting services are much more emphasised than with buying groups. 
The success of the system fundamentally depends on drawing up the boundaries between 
the partners, which is accepted by both the franchisor and the franchisee. The franchisee 
retains its autonomy within the frame of the franchise contract and the ability to build up 
its own business. 
 
A franchise contract is a governed, long-term coalignment between independent partners. The 
franchisee pays (entrance fee and royalty) for being allowed to use the resources/rights of 
an another company (franchisor) under certain conditions (Tietz [1993]). The right to 
produce or market the franchisor's brands or use the trademarks, names, know-how, and 
employing certain production and marketing techniques developed by the franchisor are 
all established in the contract (Coughlan et. al [2001]). The franchisor supports the 
franchisee in launching and creating its business and in the ongoing management, when 
the franchisee is using the rights set in the franchising contract. 
 
In retailing, a distinction is to be made between authorised franchise systems and 
business format franchising (Tietz [1993], Coughlan et. al [2001]). Authorised franchise 
systems (merchandise-related franchising) aim to produce and/or distribute a product or a 
brand for the purpose of generating profit from the product directly. 
 
The contract usually contains the restrictions concerning the main distribution channels. 
(It may be  a horizontal ‘licence’ or a vertical ‘manufacturer – wholesaler/retailer’ 
agreement. Vertical agreements can also function in multichannel distribution systems.) 
 
Business format franchising is the licencing of an entire range of business under a brand 
name that includes detailed regulations regarding the purchasing and marketing 
conditions. The subject of the contract is a marketing system or a store format. This type 
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of franchising is usually established by hub firms in FMCG or service industry. A similar 
agreement was entered by two Hungarian retail companies where a buying group (Sláger 
Ltd.) purchased the business format of another retailer (Co-op Hungary Plc.) enabling its 
members of its own retail chain to join in the Coop network. 
 
Similarly to buying groups, the issue of sharing costs and profit are the most critical 
points in franchising, as well as the selection and monitoring of the franchisees. The 
performance of the franchise system depends on the "quality" of the franchisee and the 
stability of the franchise system (Tietz [1993]). 
 
Since this dissertation focuses on the impact of alliances on the member firms, it is worth 
to consider what benefits and drawbacks a retailer might face when the alliance 
incorporates franchise elements in the co-operation (Exhibit 2.5.). 
 
Exhibit 2.5. 
Benefits and Drawbacks from the Point of View of the Franchisee 
Benefits Drawbacks 
Opportunity of distributing branded products or 
services  
Using market research information 
Benefit from the advertisement of the brand/ 
service 
Start-up and regular training programs 
Sharing increasing costs 
Economies of scale in purchasing and logistics 
Legal and financial background 
Opportunity of substitution 
Payments (entrance fee) 
Unreliable franchisors damage the reputation of the 
franchisee's business 
Limited source of merchandise  
The franchisor does not provide supporting 
services for the franchisee 
Single source purchasing  
Inflexible pricing if prices are set by the franchisor  
 
Source: Mai piac 1997, Nr. 11-12, pp. 12-18 (Hungarian retail journal) 
 
In real market situations the elements of franchising and buying groups mingle. The two 
forms of contractual agreements have thus induced the creation of voluntary chains (Tietz, 
1993). 
 
Voluntary chains are retail alliances where the distribution functions are jointly managed 
by retail (and sometimes wholesale) companies mostly under one chain brand or logo. 
Most of the retailers I have studied belong to strategic alliances operating in the form of 
voluntary chains. In Hungary, it was the second largest retail group (CBA) to have 
launched the first voluntary chain but more and more strategic groups (Reál and Honiker 
for instance) have opted for this way of co-operation. 
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3. THEORIES ON CO-OPERATION 
 
Theoretical approaches are overlapping in the case of both vertical and horizontal co-
operations. Researches concerning interfirm relationships and strategic alliances can be 
grouped into three main theoretical approaches: relational contracting, transaction cost 
analysis and resource-dependence theory, each of which is given a summary about in the 
following subchapters. 
  
The individual approaches may be applied for both vertical and horizontal co-operations, 
as they primarily explore the economic and behavioural dimensions of the transactions. 
Differences, however, do arise from the fact, that companies supplement each other’s 
operation in vertical relationships, whereas they are on the same level of the value-added 
chain in horizontal ones, thus in other words, the co-operating parties are at the same 
time one another’s potential competitors.  
 
3.1. Relational Contracting 
 
Relational contracting has been first described by Ian Macneil (1980). It challenges the 
long-dominant paradigm of promise-based contracts. Transactions were treated as 
discrete, single events by classical contract law theory, whereas companies started to 
engage more in long-term co-operation forms. Macneil believes that any theory of 
contract has to recognise the vast array of social relations.  
 
The basic assumptions of Macneil ‘s theory are as follows: 
 One of the primal roots of contract is society because people are not totally isolated 
and because they share common needs and tastes with others, from the satisfying of 
which contracts arise.  
 Each person of the society is not self-sufficient, but they display a specialisation of labour and 
through exchanges they get in touch with one another. 
 Choice has an important role as well because if people do not have a choice, then 
contracts become irrelevant. 
 Awareness of the future: if people are not aware of the future, they do not need 
contracts, because all contracts attempt to project into the future.  
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 Macneil (1980, p. 4) defines contract as “no more and no less than the relations 
among parties to the process of projecting exchange in the future”.  
 
Norms8 that describe how the parties to a contract can, and indeed should, behave in a 
contractual relationship, make up the focus of his theory. Norms are defined as 
expectations regarding behaviour represented by at least a part of decision-makers. 
(Thibaut&Kelley [1959]). 
 
Norms may certainly differ from one another in a number of aspects (Heide&John 
[1992]), thus different levels of norms (social, group) may be distinguished. Interfirm 
transactions are also governed by normative structures (Stinchcombe [1986]). 
Thibaut&Kelley (1959) have observed that moving from individual aims to collective ones, norms 
may display considerable differences from one another.  
 
Macneil (1980) distinguishes discrete and relational transactions based on these very 
observations. He identifies eleven components of contracts, in terms of which all types 
of relational exchanges can be described. He points out mutuality as one of the most 
important and general relational norm, when all participants believe fulfilling the contract 
benefits them individually. Since exchange in the absence of mutuality is stealing or 
coercion, legitimate contractual exchange requires mutuality. In discrete transactions, 
planning, implementation and contribution are relevant. In contrast, in relational 
contexts, role integrity, preservation of relation and harmonisation of relational conflict 
are emphasised. Other types of norms are the ones that draw a parallel between relational 
exchange and society, such as norms on distributive justice, human dignity, social 
equality, flexibility and transferability. (Gundlach [1996]). 
 
Dwyer et al. (1987) have compared discrete and relational transactions on the basis of 
Macneil’s norms, summarised in exhibit 3.1. Norms represent a continuum, whose two 
endpoints are recognised as highly discrete transactions and modern contractual relations 
respectively. Discrete transactions are characterised by very limited communications and 
narrow content. The identity of parties to transactions are ignored. 
                                                 
8 The concept of norms stems from psychology which gained ground in several disciplines such as social 
psychology (Thibaut&Kelley [1959]), law (Macnail [1980]), economics (Bendor&Mookherjee [1990]). 
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Partners pursue strategies that help them achieve their individual goals (Heide&John 
[1992]). Relational exchange transpires over time: each transaction must be viewed in terms 
of its history and its anticipated future. The basis for future collaboration may be 
supported by implicit and explicit assumptions, trust and planning (Dwyer et. al [1987]). 
Relational exchange participants can be expected to derive complex, personal, non-
economic satisfactions and engage in social exchange. Because duties and performance 
are relatively complex and occur over an extended time period, the parties may direct 
much effort towards carefully defining and measuring the items of exchange 
(Lusch&Brown [1996]).  
 
3.1.1. Studies from the Field of Marketing Channels 
 
As we have seen, Macneil’s approach may easily be applied for the study of interfirm 
relationships. Therefore, one should not be surprised to find several articles studying 
relational contracting in distribution systems literature. 
 
In their pioneering work, based on Macneil’s theory, Dwyer, Schurr and Oh (1987) 
investigate antecedent conditions and processes influencing buyer-seller exchange 
relationships and define the phases of the development of relational transactions 
(Exhibit3.1.). 
  
Most of the publications analyse norms that are responsible for partners’ behaviour in 
certain interfirm relationships and the extent to which they influence the relationships 
(Kaufmann&Dant [1992], Dwyer et. al [1987]). Young and McIntyre (1996) have 
analysed relational norms (solidarity, role integrity, flexibility, limitation of power) 
operative in different interfirm relationships (traditional supply agreements, just-in-time 
relationships, horizontal and vertical strategic alliances). From their research they have 
concluded that role integrity and limitation of power are among the most efficient norms 
in horizontal marketing systems. 
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Exhibit 3.1. 
A Comparison of Discrete Transactions and Relational Exchange 
Contractual elements Discrete transactions Relational exchange 
Situational characteristics 
Timing of exchange 
(commencement, duration, termination of exchange) 
Distinct beginning, short duration, and sharp ending by 
performance 
Commencement traces to previous agreements, exchange 
is longer in duration, reflecting an ongoing process 
Number of parties Two parties Often more than two parties involved in the process and 
governance of exchange 
Obligations (sources of content, sources of obligation, 
specificity) 
Content comes from offers and simple claims, obligations 
come from beliefs and customs (external enforcement), 
standardised obligations 
Content and sources of obligations are promises made in 
the relation plus customs and laws, 
obligations are customised, detailed, and administered 
within the relation. 
Expectations for relations (concerned with conflicts of 
interest, the prospects of unity, and potential trouble) 
Conflicts of interest (goals) and little unity is expected, 
but no future trouble is anticipated because of cash 
payment  
Anticipated conflicts of interest and future trouble are 
counterbalanced by trust and effort at unity 
Process characteristics 
Primary personal relations (social interaction and 
communication) 
Minimal personal relationships, 
ritual-like communications predominate 
Important personal, noneconomic satisfaction derived, 
both formal and informal communications are used 
Contractual solidarity (regulation of exchange behaviour 
to ensure performance) 
Governed by social norms, rules, etiquette, 
an prospects for self-gain 
Increased emphasis on legal and self-regulation, 
Psychological satisfactions cause internal adjustments 
Transferability (the ability to transfer rights, obligations, 
and satisfactions to other parties) 
Complete transferability, 
It doesn’t matter who fulfils the contractual obligations 
Limited transferability 
Exchange is heavily dependent on the identity of the 
parties 
Co-operation (joint efforts at performance and planning) No joint efforts Joint efforts related to both performance and planning 
over time, adjustment over time is endemic 
Planning (the process and mechanisms for coping with 
exchange and conflicts) 
Primary focus on the substance of exchange, 
No future is anticipated 
Significant focus on the process of exchange, 
Detailed planning for the future exchange within new 
environments and to satisfy changing goals, tacit and 
explicit assumptions abound 
Measurement and specificity (calculation and reckoning of 
exchange) 
Little attention to measurement and specifications, 
Performance is obvious 
Significant attention to measuring, specifying, and 
quantifying all aspects of performance, including psychic 
and future benefits 
Power (the ability to impose one’s will on others) Power may be exercised when promises are made until 
promises are executed 
Increased interdependence increases the importance of 
judicious application of power in the exchange 
Division of benefits and burdens (the extent of sharing of 
benefits and burdens) 
Sharp division of benefits and burdens into parcels, 
exclusive allocation to parties 
Likely to include some sharing of benefits and burdens 
and adjustments to both shared and parcelled benefits 
and burdens over time. 
Adapted from Macneil (1974, 1980) in Dwyer, Schurr, Oh (1987) 
Paswan and Young (1999) have examined the connection between relational norms 
(solidarity, role integrity, mutuality) and channel support areas (advertising support, trade 
allowance, promotional material, etc.) within the context of Indian buyer-seller 
relationships. They have found that trust between partners and belief in long-term co-
operation correlates with the support mechanisms of the company’s strategic and 
marketing activities.  
 
The connection between interdependency between partners and contractual norms has 
been investigated by Lusch&Brown (1996), who state that interfirm relationships are 
formed by the norms operative in the relation, as these are the ones to define the parties’ 
behaviour. Implicit and soft contracts are made between the members of the distribution 
channel through a set of mutual expectations and understandings. Lusch and Brown 
refer to these as normative contracts. They examine if the dependence between parties 
(either of a mutual or a one-way nature) promotes explicit or implicit contracts and how 
partners’ behaviour and the performance of the interfirm co-operation is affected by it.  
 
Retail alliances comprise contractual and noncontractual relations. In contractual 
relations it is formally stated in terms of explicit rules how parties to the contract should 
behave over time or else they may expect to encounter some legal consequences (explicit 
contracts). On the other hand, an explicit contract may not be able to see into the future 
and specify all events that may occur. Thus, members join implicit contracts which are 
based on tacit agreements and expectations. 
 
Strutton et al.(1995) study the psychological climate of franchise systems, wherein mostly 
the connection between the franchisor’s solidarity i.e. the most relevant norm of 
contracting and the psychological climate perceived by the franchisee have been 
examined. 
  
Cannon&Achrol and Gundlach (2000) consider the performance of certain co-operation 
forms, including contractual agreements and relational norms in situations with different 
levels of uncertainty and relation-specific adaptation. 
 
Stern&Reve (1980) argue in favour of a multidimensional analysis of interfirm 
relationships, as transactions appear as the combination of economic, social and political 
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dimensions. Two types of co-operation are investigated by them: one based on legal 
contracting, the other on co-operative norms (flexibility, solidarity, mutuality, 
harmonisation of relational conflict, limitation of exercising power). The results of the 
empirical research show that both in relations with high, and with low uncertainty, co-
operative norms demonstrably affect performance in a positive way.  
  
3.1.2. Macneil’s Critics 
 
Macneil’s theory proves to be of great relevance in studying the forms of interfirm co-
operation. However, there seem to be too many overlapping constructs (Gundlach 
[1996], supposedly owing to the fact that when creating the theory, the operationalisation 
of the contract norms was not a set aim by the author (Macneil [2000]). 
 
Gundlach (1996) criticises the fact that researchers tend to pull a small subset of contract 
norms out of the theory’s nomological net of norms and elements. The danger of this 
common practise is that contextual elements that are relevant in the contractual context 
become excluded. Too often, researchers simply presume to know the nature of the 
exchange context of the type of co-operation investigated, in order to justify their use of 
measurement of a specific norm. 
 
3.2. Transaction Cost Analysis 
 
Transaction Cost Analysis is based on the studies of organisational theory, economics 
and modern contractual law in an attempt to explain why economic actors choose certain 
structures to conduct their transactions (Dwyer&Oh [1988]). The foundational point of 
the theoretical approach is made up by the transactions between economic actors, which 
all trigger certain costs (Williamson [1975]). Whether the transaction is carried out by the 
market or the company, will define the degree of costs.  
 
In real market situations, there are always some costs to be found9, which emerge in 
connection with preparing transactions (searching for the right partner, evaluating  
                                                 
9 From assuming, what might be theoretically possible, i.e. there are no transaction costs, follows that there 
is no need of companies whatsoever, for transactions can be conducted with a simple market exchange. 
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offers), carrying out the transaction, and ascertaining whether contractual compliance has 
taken place (Picot [1986]). 
 
Williamson (1975) is of the view that certain dimensions of transactions (such as 
transaction-specific investments, internal and external uncertainty, transaction complexity 
and duration and performance evaluation complexity) increase transaction costs so that 
market mechanisms become inefficient. The efficiency criterion is an essential element of 
the theory; it recognises economic exchange as an efficient contractual relation.  
 
3.2.1. Governance Forms in Transaction Cost Analysis 
 
In Transaction Cost Analysis, two governance forms are differentiated: 1) markets, where 
there is governance through price mechanism, and 2) hierarchies, through forward or 
backward integration, conducting transactions within an organisation (Williamson [1975], 
Heide [1994]). 
 
The main assumption of TCA is that there are potential costs associated with carrying 
out transactions (safeguarding, adaptation, and evaluating processes). Williamson (1975) 
suggests vertical integration as an alternative governance form of the market. However, 
recent business practice has not justified his notion, since vertical integration, too 
imposes a considerable amount of costs on firms, paving the way for long-term interfirm 
relationships to come in the focus. 
 
This is the phenomenon studied by Stinchcombe (1985), drawing attention to the fact 
that safeguarding mechanisms guaranteed by vertical integration may be simulated by 
explicit market contracts, as well. Thorelli (1986) suggests that TCA has overly polarised out 
attention and that it treats the wide variety of interfirm relationships (i.e. relational 
exchanges) that lie between the extremes of market and hierarchy very skimpily. 
Dwyer&Oh (1988) dub interfirm relationships “largely neglected middle ground” in 
TCA. Later Williamson (1985) himself studies governance forms between market and 
hierarchy, which gained ground in the eighties. These mean, co-operations that do not 
necessarily suppose an entire ownership commitment but they are able to reduce market 
uncertainty. 
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Based on company practice, several authors have considered the possible combinations 
of market and hierarchical governance forms. Heide (1994) describes market vs. non 
market (unilateral/hierarchical and bilateral) integration. Coughlan et al. (2001) 
distinguish classical market transactions, quasi vertical integration (a relational 
governance form) and vertical integration. Gosh&John (1999) study relational 
transactions besides market and hierarchical transactions. Ring and Van de Ven (1992)’s 
classification seems to be the most thorough one, as they recognise recurrent contracting 
and relational transactions within hybrid transactions, which is displayed in Exhibit 3.2. 
in detail. 
From the point of view of the research question, the two ‘intermediate’ or hybrid (Heide 
[1994]) governance forms are of specific interest, namely the case of recurrent 
contracting and relational contracts. The strategic alliances of retail companies are best 
characterised by relational contracts. 
  
Relational contracts usually include long-term investments, which develop in the course of 
regular transactions between partners who are legally equal and autonomous. Jointly 
developed and marketed property rights contain specific investments to a great degree. 
Consequently, relational contracting is much riskier than are market or hierarchical 
transactions. Conflicts are resolved through internal mechanisms in order to preserve co-
operation, keeping the realisation of the outcome stemming from partnership heavily in 
mind. The relationship is characterised by a bilateral governance form (Ring& Van de Ven 
[1992]). 
 
Other theorists have studied organisational structures instead of classifying governance 
forms. Traditional supply agreements, just-in-time relationships, vertical strategic 
alliances and horizontal marketing alliances have been analysed by Young et al. (1996) 
from the point of view of ‘relationalism’ (Kenesei [1998]) characteristic of the co-
operation. Dwyer&Oh (1988) examine decision-making structures and competitive 
position of wholesalers, retailing buying groups and independent retailers in the hardware 
market place from a transaction cost perspective. 
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Exhibit 3.2. 
Governance Forms in Interfirm Relationships 
 Forms 
Distinguishing 
characteristics 
Discrete market transactions Hierarchical managerial 
transactions 
Recurrent contracting transactions Relational contracting transactions 
Nature of exchange One-time transfer of property 
rights 
On-ongoing production and 
rationing of wealth 
Episodic production and transfer 
of property rights 
Sustained production and transfer of 
property rights 
Terms of exchange Clear, complete and monetised, 
sharp in by agreement, sharp out 
by pay 
Authority structure superior 
hires subordinate obeys quits 
the employment relationship 
Certain, complete contingent on 
prior performance, plans for 
experimentation on safeguards 
Uncertain, open and incomplete, plans 
for bilateral learning safeguards and 
conflict resolution 
Transaction-specific 
investment 
Non-specific Idiosyncratic Mixed Mixed and idiosyncratic 
Temporal duration of 
transactions 
Simultaneous exchange Indefinite Short to moderate term Moderate to long term 
Status of the parties Limited, nonunique relation 
between legally equal and free 
parties 
Structural functional 
command-obedience role 
relationship between legally 
unequal parties 
Unlimited, unique relation between 
legally free and equal parties 
Extensive, unique, social-embedded 
relation between legally equal, and free 
parties 
Mechanisms for 
dispute resolution 
External market norms and 
societal legal system 
Internal conflict resolution by 
authority 
Norms of equity and of reciprocity 
and societal legal systems 
Endogenous designed by the parties and 
based on trust 
Relevant contract law 
and governance 
structure 
Classical contract market 
governance 
Employment contract unified 
governance 
Neoclassiccal contract market 
governance 
Relational contracts bilateral governance 
Source: Ring&Van de Ven (1992), p. 486 
 
3.2.2. Constructs in TCA 
 
The fundamental concern of TCA is to develop satisfactory safeguards against the hazards 
of the opportunism of the market partner. In Heide and John (1988)’s view, transaction-
specific investments are the principal safeguarding mechanisms against opportunistic 
behaviour. The assumption of opportunism has been heavily criticised (by e.g. 
Rindfleisch&Heide [1997]), questioning whether opportunistic behaviour correctly 
describes human behaviour and if it is indeed opportunism that interfirm relationships 
are motivated by (Wathne&Heide [2000]). Fein&Anderson (1997) represent a different 
approach, attributing transaction-specific investments to the credible commitment of the 
partner, which reduces the possibility of the partner behaving in an opportunistic way. 
  
Transaction-specific investments, assets: resources invested in business relationships that 
cannot be redeployed or can only be redeployed on a limited scale in transactions with 
other economic actors (Coughlan et. al [2001]). Domestic buying groups require serious 
commitment from entering retail companies. Members are to pay an entry fee, a deposit 
(for incidental unsettled bills), a monthly contribution to warehousing costs and a royalty. 
The enterprise may occasionally be prone to audit (equipment of store, expertise of the 
sales personnel, liquidity of the firm), it is expected to participate in joint promotions and 
the products of the company’s suppliers are to be represented in a certain percentage in 
the assortment and that same products should be sold at the same price by the stores 
(Bauer&Agárdi [2000]). 
 
Ring and Van de Ven (1992) criticise the assumption of TCA that economic actors are 
opportunistic. Their basic assumption is that governance mechanisms are primarily 
determined by trust.  
 
TCA studies the issue of market power, as well. The role of power is extended by 
Stinchcombe (1985) who believes the nature of hierarchical elements within market 
contracts are being shaped by market power.  
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3.2.3. Criticism of the Theory 
 
In TCA, besides the discussion of hybrid forms of the governance of repeated 
transactions being somewhat neglected, and the problems concerning opportunism, there 
appear to emerge some further critical remarks, as well.  
 
Company managers are not always sure to consider efficiency criteria exclusively. Other 
motivational sources may also exist (e.g. equal contribution of the partner) but they are 
generally ignored by the theory. Added to this, co-operative arrangements involve 
repeated transactions, during which the contexts are continuously changing. Managers 
thus confront decisions in dynamic contexts, while TCA remains static. (Ring&Van de 
Ven [1992]). 
 
In hybrid governance forms, hierarchy is simulated by the contract. Partners establish 
safeguarding mechanisms in the contract that ensure safeguards against opportunistic 
behaviour. However, in hybrid organisational forms (relational contracting), smaller firms 
cannot enforce such safeguards on partners with a high level of bargaining power 
(Stinchcombe [1985]). On the contrary, they become defenceless in the face of the more 
powerful partner due to transaction-specific investments (Heide [1988]), since, in the 
contractual agreement, – having no sufficient bargaining power – they cannot restrain the 
opportunism of the partner. In sum, TCA fails to give satisfactory explanations in the 
case of partners whose powers are not balanced. 
 
3.3. Resource-Dependence Theory  
 
This type of theoretical approach first appeared in sociology, but since then has gained 
territory in management and marketing literature in studying interfirm interactions. 
Emerson (1962) is credited with formulating dependence theory through social exchange. 
Social actors are in possession of limited resources, and thus not being self-sufficient, are 
driven into exchanges with other members of the society. Exchange, however, results in 
dependence between social actors which may be defined as follows: 
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“The power of A over B is equal to, and based upon the dependence of B upon A … The dependence of 
actor B upon actor A is (1) directly proportional to B’s motivational investment in goals mediated by A, 
and (2) inversely proportional to the availability of goals to B outside of the A-B relation (Emerson 
[1962], p. 32). 
 
The measure of dependence depends therefore on how important the relationship is for 
me and what other possibilities I have to carry out the transaction. While Emerson 
applies resource-dependence for the members of society, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) 
have generalised it at the organisational level, saying that companies establish exchange 
relationships because they are in the need of resources to function in full measure. They 
suggest that organisations respond to the demands of organisations that control critical 
resources. The key to organisational survival is the ability to acquire and maintain 
resources.  
 
The resource-dependence model regards the environment a source of scarce resources and, 
therefore, on which organisations depend. Dependence triggered by transactions also 
means that a clear boundary between the environment and companies is beginning to 
dissolve. According to this conceptual framework, environment is primarily a social 
construct, as, when establishing a relationship, one firm gains a certain amount of 
influence over the other firm while giving away some of its independence at the same 
time (Anderson&Narus [1990]). It is clearly reflected by vertical and horizontal 
relationships in distribution systems. Co-operations between manufacturers and retailers 
reduce external uncertainty, internalise a part of their environment but develop 
dependence between one another and internal uncertainty increases, which appears as a 
consequence of co-ordination of harmonising activities and contrasts of interests.  
 
Pfeffer és Salancik (1978) argue that dependence comprise three elements: 1) importance 
of the resource 2) the extent to which the other party has discretion over the resource 
and 3) the number of alternatives. Considering these three components, there appear to 
be several means to increase dependence over the other partner: 
 When outcomes obtained from a relationship are important or highly valued (or the 
magnitude of the exchange is high) 
 When outcomes from a relationship are comparatively higher or better than the 
outcomes available from alternative relationships (role performance, or comparison 
of outcome levels); 
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 When fewer alternative sources of exchange are available, the difficulty of replacing 
the incumbent exchange partner may arise.  
 
Companies aim at minimising their dependence while maximising their power. 
Cook&Emerson (1978) suggest that exchange relationships are interdependent, i.e. 
exchange in one relation is contingent upon exchange in the other relation.  
 
Dependence may be symmetric and mutual. If, however, resource-dependence evolves 
only with one partner, being one-way, non mutual, then there develops an asymmetry 
between firms. Dependence, consequently, creates a power differential between trading 
parties, which may be exercised by the stronger party over the weaker one if it means to 
act on his interests. Power as one of the most significant phenomena of interfirm 
behaviours is discussed later in greater detail. Here I only wish to point out the fact that it 
derives from dependence (Emerson [1962], Frazier&Summers [1984]). 
 
In a company context, dependence is directly proportional to the importance of the item 
of exchange (transaction importance) and is inversely related to the availability of 
alternative sources of supply. Importance is a function of the criticality of the resource to 
the firm’s operation and survival (Pfeffer&Salancik [1978]). Where therefore, few 
alternatives exist and resources are critical to the firm, a state of dependence is created 
between the exchange partners. And as for dependence, it may influence partners’ 
behaviour (Hallén et al. [1991]). 
 
It is important to mention the notion of relative dependence. It can be defined as a firm’s 
perceived difference between its own and its partner firm’s dependence on the working 
partnership (Anderson&Narus [1990]). From it follows how parties perceive power 
relations in the co-operation, which leads on to the questions of influence and power. 
This particular consequence of relative dependence is studied later in the subchapter of 
the theoretical constructs.  
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3.3.1. Possible Approaches of Measuring Dependence or Evaluating Partnership  
 
The perspective of social exchange explains how to evaluate partners’ performance in a 
relationship based on dependence. 
 
Thibaut and Kelley (1959) posited two standards for evaluation of partnership efficiency, 
represented as rewards obtained minus costs incurred: 
 comparison level (CL): the standard that the person has come to expect from a given 
relationship, based upon knowledge and past experience;  
 comparison level for alternatives (CLalt): the standard that represents the quality of 
outcomes that are available from the best alternative exchange relationship. Sheturaman 
et al. (1988) have analysed CLalt in a vertical (manufacturer – distributor) relationship 
and have come to the conclusion that it can be viewed in a marketing channel as the 
lowest level of outcomes that a manufacturer (distributor) firm will accept, given its 
knowledge of potential alternatives.  
 
If, in a strategic alliance, a general opinion that a partner is not contributing sufficiently 
to performance (its performance approximates or falls below CLalt) is shaped about a 
party, then the alliance will find it increasingly difficult to justify that party’s remaining in 
the relationship.  
 
Based on Emerson’s theory (1962), two other main approaches have been used to 
evaluate relationship efficiency, being also suitable for establishing the degree of 
dependence. The sales and profit approach has been developed by El-Ansary&Stern (1972). 
Sales and profit are two extremely important goals for all for-profit business 
organisations. In this approach, the greater the percentage of sales and profit contributed 
by the source firm to the target firm is, the greater the target’s dependence on the source 
becomes.10 Many researcher have applied the sales and profit approach (Brown et. al 
[1983], Anderson et. al [1987]). Kale (1986) makes a contribution to the approach by 
considering, in addition to sales and profit levels currently contributed by the source 
firm, the target’s expectations of the sales and profit levels that will be generated by the 
source firm in future. 
                                                 
10 I.e. the goal mediation component of dependence identified by Emerson (1962). 
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Frazier (1983a), based on earlier research efforts by El-Ansary&Stern (1972) and Stern 
(1972) is credited with creating the role performance approach. The role performance of a 
firm refers to how well it carries out its role in a channel relationship with another firm. 
When the level of a source firm’s role performance is perceived as being high, the target 
should be highly motivated to maintain the exchange relationship. Furthermore, the 
higher the perceived role performance of a source is, the fewer the alternatives that 
should be available to the target to replace it sufficiently are (Frazier [1983a]). Role 
performance theory exhibits several similarities to that of comparison levels described by 
Thibaut&Kelley (1959) (CL és CLalt). The distribution channel role may correspond to 
comparison level and target replacing to comparison level for alternatives.  
 
In addition, what may be worth considering from the point of view of the research 
question is how dependence affects the performance of a given firm. Seemingly, it is no use 
contemplating it, for it is generally thought of as a negative association. I.e. the more 
dependent a company upon its partner is, the more exposed it is, and it is going to 
influence its performance in an unfavourable way. This effect is closely supported by the 
findings of Porter (1993)’s industrial model where the increasing bargaining power of 
suppliers and buyers reduces firm profitability. 
 
Heide and John (1988) however, criticise the resource-dependence theory of not being 
able to offer unambiguous performance implications. In general, firms are assumed to be 
motivated to reduce dependence and this motivation is not linked explicitly to 
performance consequences. 
 
Beier and Stern (1969) argue that dependence in an exchange situation makes one party 
susceptible to power and may want to influence the other party. The more powerful 
partner is in a position to create more favourable terms of trade for itself and may divert 
profit from the less powerful party. The result should be a negative relationship between 
dependence and profit. Beier and Stern (1969) nevertheless present yet another 
possibility: in a co-operation those with the greatest power are able to manipulate other 
members in order to achieve greater positive results for the system. The result should 
then be greater profit for every partner (of higher and lower bargaining power equally). 
Concerning Beier&Stern (1969)’s example, it is worth noting that in the first case it is 
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about the relationship of two companies, whereas in the second about increased profit 
performed by the system. How this profit is distributed among partners is not elaborated 
on, therefore I am not personally convinced that a negative relationship between 
dependence and profit is to be excluded when it is about the relationship of two firms. 
 
3.3.2. Constructs in Resource-Dependence Theory 
 
Theorists fundamentally derive the notion of power from dependence between parties. 
Dependence and power seem to be negatively associated (Emerson [1962], Leunissen et. 
al [1996]), which is a logical consequence of the Emersonian definition. 
 
Power originates from one party possessing resources or control over resources that the 
other does not. In this case, the structure of their relationship is developed into one 
when the one with more resources is able to influence its partner (Gaski [1984]). Power 
may be present both in asymmetric and symmetric dependence relations in interfirm 
relationships. While the first is that of an unbalanced type of power relation, the latter 
may be viewed as a balanced one. 
 
The presence of power is certainly not the same as exercising power (Coughlan et. al 
[2001]). French and Raven (1959) have specified five types of power11: reward, coercive, 
legitimate, referent and expert power. Several researchers have concluded that the mere 
presence of power is of less importance than how it is perceived by the partner 
(Thibaut&Kelley [1959], Beier&Stern [1969]).12 Consequently, power depends on to what 
extent it is perceived by the party influenced. 
 
Some researchers (Cook&Emerson [1978]) observe that actors of society tend to prefer 
exchanges with similarly or equally powerful actors because there are fewer costs 
                                                 
11 1) Reward power: B’s perception that A has the ability to mediate rewards for B. 2) Coercive power: B’s 
perception that A has the ability to mediate punishments for B. 3) Legitimate power: B’s perception that A 
has a legitimate right to prescribe behaviour for B. 4) Identification power: A has the ability to make B 
identify with A. 5) Expert power: B’s perception that A has some special knowledge or expertness. 
(French&Raven [1959]) 
12 „The power of O depends on the perceptions of P in terms of O’s ability to satisfy P’s desires” 
(Beier&Stern 1969). „ Person A’s promise of reward to B will be effective in changing B’s behaviour only if 
he perceives that A can truly deliver the promised outcomes” (Thibaut&Kelley 1959). 
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attached to the exchange process. Drawing upon these observations, Bucklin and 
Sengupta (1993) point out that the performance of a horizontal alliance ought to be 
dependent on partners’ ability to mitigate any power imbalance among them.  
 
Commitment is a logical consequence of the theory. The degree of dependence or power 
depends on partners’ motivation, which means they invest emotional and physical 
resources into establishing and maintaining the relationship. Cook&Emerson (1978) 
consider commitment a central variable in distinguishing social from economic exchange.  
 
Moorman et al. (1992) characterise commitment to the relationship as an enduring desire 
to maintain a relationship. Relationship commitment exists only when the relationship is 
considered important. 
 
Morgan&Hunt (1994) define relationship commitment on the basis of the resource-
dependence theory. The authors specify commitment as an exchange partner believing 
that an ongoing relationship with another is so important as to warrant maximum efforts 
at maintaining it, that is, the committed party believes the relationship is worth working 
on to ensure that it endures indefinitely. In Morgan and Hunt’s view commitment is 
established in a relationship going on for a longer period, i.e. parties are on the level of at 
least repeated or relational transactions. 
Establishing a long-term relationship entails dependence, in which trust among partners 
plays a crucial role. In TCA, a similar construct, opportunism appears and is negatively 
associated to trust. In resource-dependence theory, trust emerges as a decision factor to 
the quality of dependence relationship.  
 
Dependence and asymmetric dependence above all, is likely to cause conflicts among 
partners. In a strategic alliance, both among actual and potential member firms there are 
differences of opinions between bigger and smaller companies. Firms with less 
performance may feel at a disadvantage comparing themselves to companies with greater 
performance even when they are enjoying all the benefits provided by the alliance. Bigger 
companies, however, are afraid of their contributions not being exploited in the best 
possible way. Growth opportunities of member firms, discounts at purchasing prices and 
adaptability are important reference points.  
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The most relevant consideration is whether it is inside or outside a group, that a firm is 
able to achieve its targets. A further problem between the hub firm and a member firm 
may arise when deciding what fields their co-operation ought to include, what objectives 
of development (individual growth or the expansion of the alliance) and the intensity of 
development the alliance ought to set for itself. Again a significant aspect is admitting 
new members into the alliance. It is usually in the alliance’s interest to take on new 
members but member firms from inside the group may not always be in favour of 
enlargement (Tietz [1993). It is particularly true for horizontal alliances where potential 
partners are the competitors of the allied members at the same time.  
 
3.3.3. The Criticism of the Theory 
 
As far as the research question is concerned, it seems highly relevant to point out that 
contrasted to TCA, resource-dependence theory does not include an unambiguous 
efficiency criterion (Heide [1994]), resulting in the fact that dependence may affect 
company performance either in a positive or a negative way.  
 
3.4. The Relevance of the Different Theoretical Approaches in the Research 
Question  
 
Relational contracting (Macneil [1980]) analyses the role of norms in co-operational 
forms. Studying relational norms is not the aim of the present research, it is much more 
about investigating the effect of ongoing co-operations or strategic alliances. Though, 
Macneil’s theory bears relevance in the respect of putting co-operations among 
Hungarian grocery retailers into the context of interfim transactions.  
 
Transaction Cost Analysis also focuses on how governance forms evolve and 
safeguarding mechanisms against the partner’s opportunism. To apply TCA for smaller 
firms with less bargaining power may not be very feasible (Heide&John [1988]), since the 
approach here is not able to give a satisfactory explanation. In an asymmetric 
relationship, the party with less bargaining power is not in possession of the influence 
needed to introduce safeguarding mechanisms against opportunism of the partner.  
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To explore the behavioural part of the research question, resource-dependence theory 
seems to be the most suitable approach, for companies joining co-operations are usually 
small in size and the development of a unilateral dependence is of relevance for them.  
 
From the aspect of the resource-dependence theory we can say that retailers join alliances 
to have a share of synergic effects of resources such as economies of scale and 
economies of scope and thus be at a competitive advantage against independent retailers 
(Shaw et. al [1994]). In exchange for the resources provided by the alliance, they 
renounce part of their independence and so dependence is established between the 
retailing company and the alliance.  
 
The theory makes it possible to study the degree of dependence and its further 
behavioural consequences (trust, commitment, conflicts, power).  
 
Besides the degree of dependence, however, it is also important to specify what fields it 
concerns, which parts of the member firm’s strategy are affected by belonging to an 
alliance. The next chapter discusses retail strategy, with special reference to strategic 
elements that may be influenced by the alliance. Retail strategy at the same time helps 
eliminate the questionable spot of resource-dependence theory, i.e. measuring the effect 
on performance.  
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4. RETAIL STRATEGY 
 
Co-operation becomes an integral part of corporate strategy in horizontal alliances 
(Morgan [2000], Cravens&Cravens [2000]). Retail companies that establish a strategic 
alliance with their competitors, harmonise their core activities in order to achieve 
successful co-operation. Co-operation affects the firm’s retailing activities (purchasing, 
logistics, optimising assortment, promotion, etc.) Consequently, horizontal alliances 
determine the retail strategies of member firms.  
 
However, before the study of retail strategies, it is worth devoting some space to the 
definition of retailing and retail companies.  
 
By the term retail we mean all activities that include the sales of goods and services 
directly to end-consumers (private individuals, families, households or not on a business 
purpose). Retail has to bridge a temporal, a qualitative, a quantitative and a geographical 
gap between manufacturers and consumers. As it is linked to end-consumers, numerous 
and small-sized transactions are usually associated with high transaction costs (Anderson 
[1993]). 
 
Retailers or retailing stores are business enterprises, more than a half of whose business is 
made up of retail activity. Diverse business enterprises may engage in retail activities, 
such as manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers (Anderson [1993]). The scope of the 
dissertation excludes manufacturers and wholesalers, being restricted only to retailers.  
 
4.1. An Overview of Retail Strategy Researches 
 
Retail strategy shows what resources are concentrated by companies in order to realise 
their goals. It also identifies target markets, upon which retailers focus their resources, 
defines merchandise and services offered by retailers to satisfy target market demands, 
and demonstrates how long-term competitive advantages are established against 
competitors (Levy&Weitz [2004]). 
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Literature on retail strategy has the Porterian generic strategy as its main premise13 
(Dwyer&Oh [1988], Porter [1993]). Wortzel (1987) separates three types of strategies 
when discussing retail companies: 1) price leadership: retail companies that permanently 
identify lower prices than fellow competitors; 2) merchandise differentiation: retail companies 
that offer a unique assortment; 3) service-oriented strategy: retail companies that offer 
convenience, consulting and an attractive environment. This is the classification adopted 
by Smith&Venkatraman, Wortzel (1995), when investigating the effect of strategic fit 
between retailers and manufacturers on retail performance. They fundamentally 
distinguish between price leadership and merchandise differentiation strategies.  
Leunissen et al. (1996) stress the porterian cost leadership and differentiating strategy in 
their study whose benefits can be combined in a strategic group and are available for 
small-sized companies, as well.  
 
Lewis&Thomas (1990) study strategic groups in British grocery retailing on the level of 
retail chains. Groups have been classified in terms of the size of retail chains on the one 
hand, on the other hand in terms of five variables (number of stores, average size of 
stores, advertising expenditure related to turnover, number of product lines, proportion 
of own-label lines). 
 
A similar survey has been conducted by Hawes and Crittenden (1984), in an attempt to 
establish homogenous groups of supermarkets where components of marketing strategy 
involve target market, product, promotion, pricing and purchasing policies. In the 
empirical research, the authors separate groups of aggressive initiators, conservative 
prospectors and defenders. Hawes&Crittenden’s typology displays a number of similar 
features with the prospector strategies introduced by Miles&Snow (1978). 
 
Barth [1996] has produced the most thorough summary of marketing strategies feasible 
for retail companies. In it, he combines the porterian generic strategies (Porter [1993]) 
with product-market strategies (Ansoff [1965]) and possible ways of diversification. As a 
basic premise, Barth (1996) differentiates between one-segment and multisegment14  
                                                 
13 Cost leadership, differentiating, and focus strategies (Porter [1993]). 
14 Retail companies aiming at a multisegment marketing strategy, may engage in market standardisation, market 
differentiation and diversification (Barth [1996]). 
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marketing strategies. In the case of one-segment strategies, retail companies set out to 
position themselves upon one market niche or supply niche. The difference between the 
latter two concepts is, that the capacity of a competitor on the given market alone may 
not suffice for meeting the demands of the given market or segment. Areas or 
municipalities in Hungary that lag behind in terms of infrastructure might set an example 
for this, as their grocery and FMCG supply is shared among several smaller stores.  
Grocery retail companies in Hungary entering strategic alliances primarily opt for a one-
segment strategy, positioning themselves – in most of the cases geographically – on 
supply niches.  
 
Joining an alliance, however, opens up advantages of scale economy, and as a result, they 
may be orientated towards a cost-driven strategy. Voluntary chains formed in this way are 
to be regarded as market followers15 (Agárdi&Bauer [2000]). 
The principal goal of companies in strategic alliances is to gain competitive advantages in 
the market through a conscious harmonisation of their activities (Porter [1993], Doz et. 
al [1989], Varadarajan&Cunningham [2000]). Day&Wensley (1988) enumerate factors 
leading to competitive advantages. The sources of competitive advantages lead to an 
improved market position and as a consequence, to performance growth. Competitive 
advantages are reflected in the retail strategy applied by the firm, or more exactly, in the 
elements of the retail mix (Leunissen, Pieters, Reijnders [1996]).  
 
In Anderson (1993)’s understanding, retail mix is a subgroup of marketing mix, which 
includes product policy, pricing, promotion, distribution and service. Levy and Weitz 
(2004) approach the issue more specifically, and in their interpretation, retail mix is the 
enforcement of retail strategy, helping the retailer meet the demands of his target market 
on a wider range than can his competitors. 
                                                 
15 Levitt, T. [1966]: Innovative Imitation. Harvard Business Review, (Sept-Oct. 1966), p. 63: Three types of 
follower strategies are described by him: 
1) Close following: a company follows the leader in as many market segments and areas of marketing mix 
as possible. It almost acts like a challenger, but provided it does not offend the leader’s interests, a direct 
clash can be avoided.  
2) Following from a distance: the follower has its own individual features in some aspects, but market is 
fundamentally defined by the leader. A distant follower may achieve growth by incorporating its 
competitors by force that are smaller than it.  
3) Selective following:  the company partly follows the market leader, partly it establishes its own strategy 
(in Kotler, Ph. [1991]: Marketing management. Műszaki Kiadó, pp. 292-293 
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Retail mix comprises merchandise management, pricing, advertising and promotion, 
location selection, store layout, service policy and personal selling.  
 
For the sake of a clearer understanding of the effect of strategic alliances imposed on 
marketing strategy, I wish to review the literature related to the components of retail mix.  
 
4.2. Merchandise Management 
 
The profile of a retailer is greatly defined by the merchandise, this being a strategic question 
at the same time, too (Mulhern [1997]). Retail companies try to optimise their 
merchandise and ensure a breadth of merchandise16 and a depth of merchandise17, from 
which better sales, better turnover, higher margins and, as a result, bigger profit are 
derived (Tietz [1993], Levy&Weitz [2004], Barth [1996]). 
 
One of the main tool of market positioning is retail mix (product lines, brands, services). 
One of the chief challenges of merchandise policy is having to carry a broad merchandise 
variety in order to be capable of serving more consumer segments (Kopp et. al [1989]), 
while having to consider costs of inventory management, as well. 
 
Retail companies of strategic alliances purchase a large percent of their merchandise in a 
centralised way, about which the hub firm decides. Consequently, the merchandise policy 
of the member firm is greatly determined by the merchandise policy supported by the 
alliance. Added to this, supplier agreements often contain product assortment standards 
during promotions or with regards to a certain product line. By means of buying groups, 
retailers are able to realise scale of economy and a broad merchandise variety i.e. scope of 
economy (Shaw et. a. [1994], Leunissen et. al [1996]).  
 
The fact that brand and merchandise variety has a positive effect on consumer 
behaviour, has been studied by several researchers. Hoch et. al (1999) examine how 
consumers perceive variety in retail merchandise and how it affects their store 
preferences. 
                                                 
16 Breadth of merchandise: the number of product categories kept in a store (Levy&Weitz [2004]). 
17 Depth of merchandise: the number of articles within a given product category. However, retail 
companies are in possession of limited physical (selling space) and financial resources (Levy&Weitz [2004]). 
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The empirical results justify the assumption that consumers are more satisfied with and 
are more likely to choose stores, in which they judge merchandise to be more varied and 
signs and merchandise display more structured.  
 
Bergen, Dutta, Shugan (1996) with applying econometric modelling have shown that 
brands displaying a number of varieties attract consumers more and make retailers admit 
the brand in their merchandise and support those with their services. The increasing 
number of brand variants makes comparisons between the supply of different stores 
more and more complex and increases the searching costs of the consumers. Van Ryzin 
and Mahajan (1999) have modelled the advantages of increasing merchandise and its 
effect on inventory costs. Although increasing retail merchandise triggers much less 
indirect costs than increasing manufacturer supply, retailers are still limited by the space 
at their disposal and implicit costs of stock out and overstocking. High margins 
encourage retailers to make their merchandise variety and assortment more sophisticated, 
but rising margins correlate with a decrease in sales, increasing the volume of unsold 
products and the risk of overstocking. Broader merchandise variety also reduces the rate 
of non-buyers. The authors distinguish between an independent population model and a 
trend-following population model18 which define the effect on performance made by 
merchandise increase.  
 
Bawa et al. (1989) have found consumers of stores with a smaller merchandise to be 
more likely to remain loyal to the store. Whereas stores with a greater merchandise 
exhibit higher rates of effectiveness in promotion.  
 
The other principal component of merchandise management is the decision on store 
branding. Aggressive store branding from the part of the retailers is most often caused by 
competitors offering the same products to consumers and in that case, store brands may 
be the tools of differentiation (Wortzel [1987]). As a consequence, they also influence 
store choice (Mulhern [1997]). 
                                                 
18 In case of an independent population model, aggregate demand is the result of a series of independent 
choices from a heterogeneous population of consumers. In the trend-following population model, 
aggregate demand is the result of a series of dependent choices from a homogeneous population (van 
Ryzin&Mahajan [1999]). 
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In many cases, co-operation may be a beneficial tool for retail companies because most 
chains develop their own brands, which not only ensure a reasonable consumer price, but 
also high margins. Mulhern (1997) agrees that store brands tend to secure higher margins 
than do manufacturer brands, but the total profit of the store will also be defined by the 
turnover of each item, thus profit being not always the highest with store brands.  
 
There seems to be a principal focus on the competitive interactions of manufacturer and 
store brands in literature (Cotteril et. al [2000], Halstead&Ward [1995]). Halstead&Ward 
(1995) state there may be a 10-40 percent price difference between store and 
manufacturer brands, however, with their own brands, retailers are able to enforce 5-50 
percent higher margins. Store brands are getting more and more advertising support, 
which increases retailers’ costs and reduces their margins, for they are not able to 
represent the increased costs in their prices owing to the image of store brands already 
formed in consumers’ minds and competitive pressures.  
 
Sheturaman&Mittelstaedt (1992) relates the market share of store brands to several 
descriptive variables. After having analysed a number of food categories, he concludes 
that the market share of a store brand is higher if there is little price difference between 
the manufacturer and the store brands, if manufacturer brands are not promoted 
regularly, i.e. manufacturer brands are less likely to apply couponing or they are not 
advertised, and if the price elasticity of the product category is low.  
 
Hoch&Banerji (1993) explore the success factors of store brands. In their research, they 
have assumed that in a given product category, a wide range of manufacturer 
merchandise and intensive advertising of manufacturers will not favour store brands. 
They have found a strong correlation between market share and quality, i.e. quality is also 
important for consumers besides price, so it is high quality store brands that are most 
worth being offered to consumers. Apart from this, a close relationship has been 
disclosed between gross margins, the concept of product category and market share of 
the store brand, which means that in product categories ensuring great profit (high 
margins) store brands are less likely to succeed against manufacturer brands.  
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Sayman, Hoch and Raju (2002) extend the above analysis into maximising the profit of 
the total product category, or how retailers should best position their store brands19 in 
order to achieve a maximum category profit. Results show that if store brands are 
positioned directly next to manufacturer brands, then the wholesale price of both market 
leader and market follower manufacturer brands will decrease, retailers will introduce 
higher margins with manufacturer brands, realise higher profit with store brands, which 
altogether increase the profit of the total product category compared to other (trading 
down store brands) positioning strategies.  
 
Some other authors (Nandan&Dickinson [1994]) are of the view that store brands, 
similarly to store types, describe a wheel of retailing, i.e. trading down is followed by 
trading up. The profit of a retailer is influenced by the trading up with store brands. The 
weaker a manufacturer is, the more profit is accumulated with a retailer.  
 
4.3. Pricing 
 
Pricing is another predominant element of retail marketing strategy that is reflected in 
defining margins. Margins depend on purchasing conditions on the one hand and 
consumers’ price sensitivity on the other. Wholesale price, discounts offered by suppliers 
and paying conditions determine the cost of items sold. Demand presents a barrier from 
the other part, because consumers’ price sensitivity influences the margins to be 
introduced.  
 
Pricing is a component of retail strategy which can be changed in a short time and has an 
immediate effect on the sales of retailers (Levy&Weitz [2004]). Retail pricing looks as 
though it would be something not very complicated, for it is only about pricing stock 
keeping units. In effect, however, it is indeed complicated, because each SKU to be 
found in a store is at the same time each other’s substituting, as they all compete for the 
consumer resources (Mulhern [1997]). 
                                                 
19 Sayman et. al (2002) understand aiming at a given category’s manufacturer brand by positioning store 
brands. 
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Furthermore, each SKU is each other’s substituting in the sense that they can be 
purchased at the same time. Retail pricing must consider the interconnections of 
demand, i.e. the substituting and complementary effects between items 
(Vilcassim&Chintagunta [1995]). 
 
Mulhern and Leone (1991)’s research is based on the above; but they study the effect of 
pricing on product bunches, not on individual products. The authors suggest that pricing 
may not be narrowed down to one single product category. They show that price 
promotions have a positive effect on the sales of substituting products if the discount 
increases consumer numbers. Its precondition is a display which promotes the buying of 
substituting products. Another important result is, that even if discounts affect the sales 
and profitability of a product category negatively, the increase in demand for 
complementary products induced by discounts may compensate for it, making it possible 
for retailers to realise profit thus.  
 
From the part of member firms, the formation of retail strategic alliances is typically 
encouraged by increasing their buying volume, through which they may get access to 
more beneficial buying conditions, which consequently affects their pricing in a 
favourable way.  
 
In retailing, there are primarily two types of pricing to be found: one is the policy of Every 
Day Low Pricing, the other being High-Low Pricing (Mulhern [1997]). The policy of Every 
Day Low Pricing levels the difference between regular consumer prices and big 
discounts. This, however, is likely to mean a steady retail price, rather than the lowest 
possible price. The main concern of this pricing policy is that it reduces price wars 
among retail companies, it needs less advertising, improves services provided to 
consumers due to diminishing demand fluctuations, reduces stock out, makes a beneficial 
effect on inventory management and, last but not least, increases profit. Even if price 
level is lower, there are no big discounts which would take sales away from groups of 
goods securing higher profit. High-Low Pricing: retailers do not normally sell at discount 
prices but they frequently apply advertising and promotions to boost sales. Promotions, 
for the most part, rely on supplier agreements (Levy&Weitz [2004]). 
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The benefits of High-Low Pricing are that the same merchandise may be sold to target 
groups with different levels of price sensitivity, it raises motivation, mobilises inventory 
and there is a strong emphasis on quality and service (Levy&Weitz [2004]). 
 
However, between discounts introduced in order to stimulate sales, and pricing which 
communicates quality and high margins there is a trade-off. EDLP is a popular pricing 
strategy because it increases sales but it does not necessarily lead to profit growth. 
Consumers easily get used to discounts and low price levels, and after a while, they will 
not be attracted by them any more (Subrahmanyan [2000]). Mulhern and Leone [1991] 
empirically justify that the effects of discounts differ with premium brands and low-price 
brands. Low-price brands appear to be more vulnerable as against to premium ones, as 
promotions of premium brands distract sales from low-price brands. On the other hand, 
EDLP prepares the right price context for store brands.  
 
Hoch et al. (1994) analyse the effects of EDLP and High-Low Pricing on sales and profit 
in their experiment. They conclude from their investigations that EDLP produces loss 
for retailers in most cases, for low prices do not induce enough growth in sales to 
compensate for the loss derived from low margins. Mulhern (1997) and Hoch et. al 
(1994) all seem to emphasise that low costs are the key to EDLP’s success, low prices 
alone will not make market success.   
 
The price levels of co-operating retail companies decrease because their cost levels are 
reduced by more favourable buying and operational conditions, which may be passed on 
to consumers in the shape of lower price levels. Researches concerning retail price changes 
mostly take consumer demand functions as their premise and analyse price elasticity.  
 
The focus of Kim et. al (1995)’s article is on establishing an optimal retail price with 
special attention to the heterogeneity of consumer price sensitivity. Price changes are 
analysed on the level of product categories and the demand for a category is defined with 
the help of substitutability between categories and within category.  
 
Mulhern et. al (1998) study the impact of retail pricing decisions on consumers’ price 
sensitivity. In their econometric analysis they reveal that price elasticity is higher with the  
brands that are promoted more frequently and have a higher market share.  
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Litvack et. al (1985) investigate the connection between temporary, short-term 
unpromoted price changes and sales in the context of grocery retail. They find that 
changes of price and sales can be described by a negative correlation which is also 
influenced by the stockability of the product in question. Stock-up goods can be 
characterised by a higher price elasticity while with non-stock-up goods discounts are less 
likely to influence sales. Based on their research results it seems feasible to say that it is 
best to combine selective price reductions of stock-up goods with raising prices of non-
stock-up goods.  
 
4.4. Advertising and Promotion 
 
Advertising and promotion seem almost inseparable from retail pricing policy (Mulhern 
[1997]). Retailers communicate with consumers by way of advertising, sales promotion, 
PR activity, store atmosphere and personal selling (Levy&Weitz [2004]). But since there 
is some overlap between certain elements of retail strategy, such as store atmosphere and 
personal selling presented as separate components, here I only wish to focus on 
promotion and the advertising activity related to it.  
 
Concerning the promotions of retailers within strategic alliances, one is to recognise retail 
promotion20, provided by retailers for their consumers and trade promotion, provided by 
manufacturers for the alliances and thus its retailers. 
 
Trade promotions are special incentive programs offered by manufacturers21 to 
marketing channel members (Blattberg&Neslin [1990]). The individual types of retail 
promotions are given an overview of in Exhibit 4.1.  
                                                 
20 Types of retail promotions: price discounts, display, promotion related advertisements, free goods, retail 
coupons, and gifts. (Blattberg&Neslin [1990]). 
21 The manufacturer wants the retailer to offer the consumer the price discount and, merchandise the 
product through displays and advertising . (Blattberg&Levin [1987], Chevalier&Curhan [1976]).
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Exhibit 4.1.  
Forms of Trade Promotions 
Trade Promotions Description 
Off-invoice It gives the retailer a discount for every item purchased during a fixed period of 
time. 
Bill-back Bill-backs are similar to off-invoice except that the retailer computes the 
discount per unit for all units sold bought during the promotional period and 
then bills the manufacturer for the units sold and any other promotional 
allowances that are owed after the promotional period is complete.  
Free goods Free goods takes the form of extra cases at the same price. (For example, buy 3 
get 1 free is a free good offer.) 
Cooperative advertising 
allowances 
The manufacturer should contribute to the advertising costs of the retailer. The 
retailer must demonstrate that the advertisement ran. 
Display allowances The manufacturer wants the retailer to display a given item when a price 
promotion is being run. To induce retailer to do this and to help defray the 
costs, a display allowance is offered. 
Sales drives Sales drives are intended to offer the brokers and wholesalers incentives to 
push the trade deal to the retailer. For every unit sold during the promotional 
period, the broker and wholesaler receive a percentage or fixed payment per 
case sold to the retailer.    
Terms of inventory 
financing 
The manufacturer gives a longer term of payment period for the retailer, thus 
increasing the profitability of the retailer who does not need to borrow to 
finance inventories. 
Count-recount or scan-back Rather than paying retailers on the number of units ordered, the manufacturer 
does it on the number of units sold. The manufacturer can avoid situations in 
which the retailer sells the goods bought discounted on regular price. 
Slotting allowances Slotting allowances are a fixed payment to the retailer for accepting and testing 
a new product. 
Street money Fixed fee paid by the manufacturers based on the amount of support (feature 
advertising, price reduction, and display space ) offered by the retailer. 
Sources: Blattberg&Neslin (1990), pp. 318-319 
 
The effectiveness of trade promotions has been investigated by several empirical researches. 
Abraham and Lodish (1987) for instance, have measured the effect of promotions 
provided for retailers and consumers by means of a promotion evaluation system 
(Promoter). The system evaluates the joint effect of trade and consumer promotions by 
estimating the sales and profit generated by them. The effect of promotions on sales is 
related then to a normal level of sales (no promotions) and also considers shipments. 
 
Similarly to the above, Blattberg and Levin (1987) have also studied the effectiveness and 
profitability of trade promotions – how retailers behave once being offered some 
promotions by manufacturers and why may promotions typically not be profitable. The 
two models differ in their way of estimation. Promoter estimates the effect of 
promotions on sales on the basis of normal level of sales, the Blattberg&Levin model on 
the basis of manufacturer shipment. 
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A significant number of the researches related to retail promotions investigate how retailers’ 
sales and profit are affected by different discounts. Broh (1983) measures promotion 
success on the level of stores and regards sales and profit growth generated by 
promotions (Levy&Weitz [2004]) and gaining new consumers as the most important 
indicators. The success of discounts may be quantified according to some further 
indicators such as customer awareness of promotion, purchasing frequency, number of 
items purchased, amount spent, attitudes induced by promotions (Broh [1983]). Levy and 
Weitz (2004) enumerate furthermore the additional inventory costs and the loss caused 
by the discounts by extracting sales from products that are not promoted but would have 
ensured higher profit otherwise. 
 
Moriarty (1985) analyses the effect of retail promotions on sales data within brands and 
between brands. Promotion seems to be beneficial for retailers if the sales of the given 
brands increases. However, promotion may affect retail performance negatively if a 
promotion period with low margins extracts sales from non-promotion periods with 
higher margins (purchasing in advance), low margin brands extract sales from higher 
margin brands (substituting). 
 
Kumar and Pereira (1997) analyse the competitive effects of promotions. They explain 
the different performance rates of brands in each retail chain with the different types of 
promotions applied. They are of the view that performance differences of the individual 
brands are influenced by the types, timing and length of retail promotions. In their 
empirical research it is demonstrated that it is market share and price level differences 
that seem to contribute mostly to the asymmetric competition of brands.  
 
Different types of retail sales incentives may have a different effect on retailer 
performance. Walters and MacKenzie (1988) examine the impact of three kinds of 
promotion (loss leader22, double coupons23, in-store price specials) on store performance 
(in terms of store sales, profit and store traffic). On the basis of their empirical research 
they conclude that most loss-leader discounts do not directly affect store profitability; 
they lead to a small increase in store traffic and sales. Contrasted to this, double coupon 
                                                 
22 Loss-leader is the price of the product most often is at or below retailer’s marginal cost, thus the retailer 
incurs the loss on the sale of these items, and heavily advertises them (Lal&Matutes [1994]). 
23 Retailers reimburse consumers using coupons an amount that is a double of the manufacturer’s coupon 
face value. (Krishnan&Rao [1995]). 
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promotions increase profitability through the growth of sales of the given products, they 
tend to leave, however, store traffic unaffected. It is in-store price specials that prove to 
be the least effective technique, for they fail to affect any performance indicators.  
 
Applying double coupons may also lead to effects of substituting, which induces 
competitive interactions between brands and retailers. If a retailer uses double 
couponing, then, because of the substituting effect between brands they will reduce the 
non-couponed products’ price more often. In order to optimise the other retailer’s profit, 
they will reduce the price of the product, which is couponed by their competitor 
(Krishnan&Rao [1995]).  
 
Loss-leader products encourage consumers to buy in the store. As consumers wish to 
treat their resources economically, they go to stores for discounted products. Once, 
however, there, they buy the other products, too, compensating the store for its loss 
derived from loss-leader products. Walters and MacKenzie (1988) in contrast state that 
most loss-leaders fail to influence profit and little increase store traffic. 
 
Lal&Matutes (1994) have justified in their empirical research, that loss-leader products 
boost store traffic. They find the most suitable goods for it are the ones that have a high 
purchasing frequency and are difficult to stock. In spite of their findings they still believe 
this type of retail promotion not to be able to influence company profit significantly. 
 
Chevalier and Curhan (1976) investigate how trade promotions offered by manufacturers 
influence the promotions offered by retailers. Retailers often apply temporary 
promotions just to increase store traffic and sales. In their background, however, there 
are frequently promotions offered by manufacturers to be found. The authors have 
empirically justified that periodic promotions increase the sales of discounted products, 
but have a doubtful effect on profit as:  
 the margin of discounted products decreases, consequently, profit lessens, 
 discounted products divert profit from other products with a higher margin, 
 consumers accumulate discounted products and delay buying till the next 
promotions, 
 besides discounted products, other items are also bought by consumers.  
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Walters (1991)’s conclusions have been similar. His basic assumption has been that the 
effect of retail discounts is ambiguous, for there are substituting and complementary 
effects operating within store and between stores. Discounted brands do increase 
economic loyalty and sales, but also lead to the decrease of sales of brands not 
discounted. Profit, however, is left unaffected or, worse, affected negatively by discounts. 
They ultimately depend on the terms, under which retailers have purchased the products.  
 
Chevalier and Curhan (1976) conclude that retail promotions that are the most likely to 
influence profit in a favourable way, are the ones, where manufacturer allowance has 
been greater than what are passed on to consumers (Blattberg&Levin [1987], 
Blattberg&Neslin [1990]). 
 
4.5. Location Selection  
 
Selecting the location of the store seems to be one of the most momentous decisions, as 
one of the most important factor as regards consumers’ store choice, is the accessibility 
of the store, on the other hand, location might be a strategic advantage (Mulhern [1997]). 
Elements of the retail mix are comparatively easy to change in the short run, apart from 
location (Brown [1994]). Location determines the circle and number of consumers 
belonging to the trade area of the store. It is thus not surprising to find that most 
researches concerning locations focus on defining the right location.  
 
There are two main theories about location selection in the literature. One is Hotelling’s 
principle of minimum differentiation, the other is bid rent theory. Hotelling introduces it 
in a relatively abstract model24 that an equilibrium is established if neither seller can 
increase profit by changing their prices. Whereas if one seller may move their location, it 
can maximise its profit by locating their store next to the other store. It follows from 
consecutive steps that locations become arranged near the middle of the market (Brown 
[1994]). The other theory focuses on the returns derived from property utilisation. It 
assumes that the meeting point of transportation networks is to be found in the centre of 
the city, and similarly, the maximum market potential is also to be found there, in terms 
                                                 
24 Dealing initially with two profit maximising firms, selling identical products with zero production costs at 
f.o.b. prices, from fixed locations in a bounded linear market where transport rates are constant, demand is 
completely inelastic and identical, utility maximising consumers are evenly distributed, and patronise outlets 
solely on the basis of delivered prices (Brown [1994]). 
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of both consumers and workforce. It is what competition is for; a location with a 
maximum market potential and as a result, it is the ones who are able to produce the 
highest possible profit out of a given location, that are the most likely to be able to get 
hold of the location.  
Literature on location primarily defines location on national, regional or local levels but 
relatively few studies have been conducted about the micro level, i.e. location in a trade 
agglomeration (shopping centres, city centres suburban trade zones, trade parks) (Brown 
[1994]). 
 
Researches may be classified into three main groups. The first branch is that of 
researches that focus upon which geographical areas a retailer should enter. In this case, 
there is a definite stress upon evaluating the market potential of geographical regions. 
Mahajan et. al [1988] suggest that retailers prefer entering markets where retailing has not 
reached a saturation level. Cliquet (1996) considers the effect of the geographical 
expansion of retail networks on performance. According to his surmise, the geographical 
expansion of a retail network is a momentous growth strategy. Geographical strategy in 
fact means establishing new retail units. A retail company may expand in two possible 
ways: once it can increase store size, second, it may open new stores. Location strategy is 
equal to the planned spatial expansion of the chain (Gosh&McLafferty [1987]). 
 
The second group is the studies concentrating on directly the location selection of a 
store. Several papers have appeared in connection with optimising location. A number of 
location selection decision models have been set up (Gosh&Craig [1983], 
Hernandez&Bennison [2000], Clark&Rowley [1995]), which aim at establishing an 
optimal store number and defining location attractiveness.  
 
Thirdly, a number of researches have focused on analysing the composition of 
consumers in a trade area of a certain location. They are trying to improve the forecasting 
power of location models by separating certain demographic and ethnographic segments 
and considering individual consumer characteristics (Green [1995], Mulhern&Williams 
[1994]). Davies (1995) describes two aspects in connection with retail location selection. 
In the traditional approach, a retail store’s task is to attract customers to the location. 
Alternatively, a retail unit is to be located to the place where customers are to be found.  
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As far as locations are concerned, sales are influenced by several factors: substitutability 
of merchandise with the primary activities of customers, how easy it is for them to step 
out from their primary activities, how they perceive the amount of time at their disposal, 
the concentration of customers.  
 
Joining a strategic alliance will not in fact influence the location of the member firm’s 
stores, as these are to regarded as settled already. However, location affects company 
performance (sales and profit), consequently it is not in the least indifferent to the 
relationship between marketing strategy and performance. 
 
4.6. Store Layout & Display 
 
These days when it is getting more and more difficult for retailers to distinguish 
themselves from others in terms of merchandise, pricing, promotions or location; stores 
may become a significant differentiating element, influencing consumer behaviour and 
store preference (Mulhern [1997]). 
   
Store atmosphere is the joint effect of the physical aspects of the store (architecture, style, 
symbols, display, colours, lighting, temperature, scents and sounds), under which a store 
image is formed in the mind of the consumer. Atmosphere communicates a number of 
information about the service, prices and merchandise of the store (Levy&Weitz [2004]). 
 
In grocery retailing independent retailers do not tend to use many differentiating 
elements apart from names. Member firms of strategic alliances do, however, often apply 
display elements that enhance their belonging to the chain and distinguish them from 
independent stores at the same time.  
  
Researches concerning retail display mostly investigate the issue from the viewpoint of 
consumers, i.e. retail image. Success factors in retailing25 have been studied in great detail, 
but in empirical surveys only a few, operative factors have been included (Hildebrandt 
[1988]). Hise et. al (1983) have analysed 132 clothes stores in terms of their reversible and 
irreversible factors (store and management attributes, competitive factors, features of 
location). 
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Mazursky&Jacoby (1986) identify several components of the image: merchandise quality, 
merchandise pricing, merchandise assortment, locational convenience, sales clerk service, 
service general, the store atmosphere, and pleasantness of shopping. Hildebrandt [1988] 
also studies store image and he finds – similarly to other variables – store atmosphere 
(style, sales personnel) displays a significant correlation with store level performance 
indicators. 
Grocery retailers in Hungary that enter strategic alliances are normally to adjust their 
external and internal appearance to that of the alliance.  
 
4.7. Services 
 
Retail services are approached from two aspects in literature. Broadly speaking, retailing 
activity is also a kind of service in itself and all components of the retail mix contribute to 
this. In Levy&Weitz (2004)’s interpretation, here are to be enumerated all the activities 
and programs of retailers that are valuable for consumers and make the shopping 
experience more pleasant. In a stricter sense, however, under the same term we mean 
consumer services offered by the store (Mulhern [1997]) and it is also an important 
means of differentiating.  
 
A significant part of researches centre upon consumer evaluation of service quality. A lot 
of them use Parasuraman, Zeithaml, Berry (1985)’s model of service quality as their 
resource in which service quality is an indicator of how far the service offered by the 
company is able to meet consumer expectations. Dabholkar et. al (1996) drawing on 
Parasuraman et al.’s theoretical model extend it to retail companies and have developed a 
five-dimensional retail service quality scale26. This model by Dabholkar has been used by 
Mehta&Lalwani and Han (2000), who have adapted it to the retailing of electronic 
devices. During the survey, the dimensions of service quality (service staff, physical 
aspects, merchandise, trust and parking facility) have been validated. 
                                                                                                                                            
25 Success factors are key variables that are to regarded as the empirical indicators of performance 
(Hildebrandt [1988]). 
26 Dimensions of service quality model developed by Dabholkar et. al (1996) are: physical aspects, 
reliability, personal interaction, problem solving, business policy related to service quality. 
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In the present dissertation – to avoid overlaps –, I wish to apply the narrower approach 
of retail services which includes special services offered to consumers (parking facility, 
credit card acceptance, home delivery, etc.).  
 
4.8. Personal Selling 
 
It is sales personnel that creates a relationship between a retail company and consumers. 
Retailers are to communicate with consumers to stimulate their needs, provide them with 
information about products and encourage them in their buying decision process. It all 
takes place with the help of advertisements, sales promotion, PR activity, sign and 
displays and sales personnel. Sales personnel serve consumers with more detailed 
information than do advertisements and they also conduct purchases (Levy&Weitz 
[2004]). 
 
Retailers continuously aim at improving sales personnel performance in order to increase 
sales effectiveness. Effective sales may be greatly enhanced by the sales personnel’s 
knowledge about consumers. Sharma et. al (2000) establish an analytical framework in 
which the relationship between sales competency and performance is explored on the 
basis of knowledge structures of sales personnel. The higher the declarative knowledge 
(number of categories, richness of category description, category distinctiveness and 
description of physical characteristics) and procedural knowledge (richness of procedural 
knowledge, distinctiveness of sales strategies, information acquisition focus, level of 
abstraction) of sales personnel is, the higher sales effectiveness appears to be.  
 
 Strategic alliances, by and large, accumulate more competency, they provide member 
firms with training and workshops. As it is apparent from the above, joining a strategic 
alliance may improve service quality, member firms may introduce new services (paying 
by credit card) and may contribute to the training of sales personnel.  
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5. PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT OF THE ALLIED RETAILERS 
 
From the viewpoint of the research topic, performance measurement of allied retailers is 
an issue of crucial importance. It has already been stated in a number of studies that one 
of the main motives of creating a strategic alliance is better financial and economic 
performance. (Gulati [2000], Weitz&Jap [2000]). Therefore it follows that it is only worth 
giving u p its autonomy to a certain extent for an otherwise independent retailer if it is 
able to achieve better corporate performance within the framework of a strategic alliance.  
 
Gulati’s review (2000) about strategic alliances, has suggested that performance 
consequences of alliances should be explored with regard to both the alliance itself and 
its member firms. Related to this, two interconnected questions are to be answered: 1) 
what factors influence alliance success and 2) what effect the alliance has on member 
firm performance (Varadarajan&Cunningham [2000]). In view of this, the present 
chapter discusses performance measurement in two subchapters. First, researches about 
corporate performance evaluation, second, performance measurement of co-operations, 
more exactly strategic alliances and the variables used in the researches are going to be 
studied.  
 
The greater part of studies and articles on company management include performance 
consequences in their investigations, however, relatively few authors attempt to define 
what they mean by the term ‘performance’. I understand corporate performance as the 
quantification of efficiency and effectiveness (Neely&Gregory, Platts [1995], Stern et. al 
[1996]). Efficiency reflects the output achieved by exploiting resources (Stern&El-
Ansary, Coughlan [1996]). Effectiveness expresses the extent to which goals are achieved.  
 
In Goldman (1992)’s view distribution systems may be classified in terms of a positivist,  
normative or an institutional, ecological approach. In the first one, the distribution 
system is assessed in terms of its closeness to the ideal, the last one, however, takes the 
environmental context of the distribution system into account in which it has been 
established and being operated. Performance measurement is thus regarded as context-
specific, being based on certain input-output criteria and the different elements of the 
distribution channel.  
 62
In the institutional approach, the role of norms, traditions, routines, social and political 
convictions is emphasised. The individual variables are examined as parts of an integral 
unit not separated.  
 
The significance of performance measurement is normally agreed on by authors, the 
views on how to do it, greatly differ, though. Soehadi&Hart (2000) stress the need to 
rethink retail performance and criticise traditional performance measurement for its 
retrospective nature.  
 
5.1. Corporate Performance Measurement 
 
In literature, indicators are classified as being one- vs. multidimensional, financial vs. 
non-financial, absolute vs. relative and subjective ones.  
 
5.1.1. One- versus Multidimensional Performance Measurement  
 
Kumar et. al (1992) introduce three main theoretical approaches related to performance 
measurement. In the least intricate case, performance is described along one dimension 
(Gaski&Nevin 1985, Heide&John 1988). Others (Noordewier et. al 1990) seem to prefer 
to quantify performance along more than one factors, but each of which is measured 
independently from the others (Lewis&Thomas [1990])27 or with the index of weighted 
or unweighted performance variables. The authors, nevertheless, apparently miss a 
performance approach which would define performance systematically, on the basis of a 
theoretical concept and would identify definite indicators to make company performance 
operationable (Dess&Robinson [1984]). 
 
Eccles (1991) has pointed out that a growing number of companies tend to apply a 
measurement system with a wider scope, as indicators included in traditional financial 
reports are not appropriate any more for detecting company performance. 
                                                 
27 Lewis and Thomas (1990) aim to identify strategic groups in the U.K. grocery retail industry. For 
analysing the performance difference between strategic groups, they have applied different performance 
measures such as: ROS (Return on Sales), ROCE (Return on Capital Employed), PER (weighted index of 
growth in the price/earnings ratio). 
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The author states that instead of individual variables, the need is for a comprehensive 
measurement system (Neely et. al [1995]).  
 
On the basis of Kaplan and Norton (1998)’s balance-score card concept, Slater and 
Olson (1997) develop a strategy-based measurement system. Four types of strategy are 
distinguished by them (product leader, consumer closeness, brand leader and operational 
excellence) and accordingly, different types of measurement systems are suggested by 
them with which it is possible to detect how far each strategic goal is achieved.  
 
Wimmer (2001) is also in favour of a multidimensional approach when measuring 
performance and success. She applies financial, market and operative indicators for 
measuring manufacturer companies’ performance. 
 
5.1.2. Financial versus Non-financial Performance 
 
Earlier researches have primarily measured financial performance variables when 
quantifying corporate performance, which are contained in financial reports. Strategy 
group research, analysing the relationship between strategy and performance along 
company databases, typically applies financial indicators, such as turnover, profitability 
and return on investment.  
 
Capon et al. (1990) have identified financial performance with the help of meta-analysis, 
drawing on 320 published articles and studies. For measuring financial performance they 
apply the terms profitability, growth and reduced variability. As a result of their 
investigations, definite positive correlation has been found between performance and 
industry concentration, growth in sales and assets, market share, size, advertising intensity 
and capital investment intensity respectively. 
 
Financial variables reflect the extent to which the goals of a company are achieved. Slater 
and Olson (1997) suggest in their study that it is not only financial performance that 
should be taken into account when measuring performance, for it is to be regarded as a 
“final product”. There is a need for indicators that are able to forecast in what directions 
financial variables will be likely to develop in order for the management to intervene in 
time (Eccles&Pyburn [1992]). 
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Soehadi and Hart (2000) regard non-financial variables as antecedents of corporate 
financial performance and justify causal relationships between financial and non-financial 
variables in their empirical research.  
 
Brown&Laverick (1994) enumerate possibilities28 which reduce financial outcome. 
Methods in accounting to reduce financial performance, however, give only distorted 
information about real company performance. Company goals do not only involve profit 
maximisation but express thinking for a short term. 
 
Eccles&Pyburn (1992) imply that financial indicators are not only problematic due to 
their manipulative, “final product” nature, but also because they express a focus on the 
internal processes of the company. But financial indicators may also help check the 
validity of the business performance model. From the point of view of measurement, 
conceptualising a strategy always includes the planning of a business performance model, 
while implementation of the strategy focuses on detecting the results achieved within the 
framework of the given model.. 
 
5.1.3. Absolute, Relative and Subjective Performance Variables 
 
Direct measures express company performance in absolute numbers e.g. sales or profit. 
Conant&White (1999) quantify retail companies’ performance in relative performance 
terms comparing results to similar stores of competitors. They measure profitability, 
labour productivity (sales per person employed) and sales growth of the pervious 3 years. 
                                                 
28  Underevaluation of assets (for example switching from current valuation of assets to historical costing). 
Profitability can be influenced by provisions because companies make general provisions when business is 
successful, only to write back the provisions during difficult periods, thereby making profits, earnings look 
better. The accounting of capitalisation of costs is not consistent, either. Some companies may include it in the 
balance sheet, others may put them in the profit and loss account. Depreciation determines the costs of the 
company and therefore it does so with the financial performance, too. Including the company’s goodwill into 
the balance sheet rewrites the financial performance as well. Companies will try and put as much as 
possible into goodwill because it is written off immediately to reserves on the balance sheet. High goodwill 
means lower reserves, lower capital employed and an improved ROCE figure. Brands can be included as 
intangible assets in the balance sheet that might result in a significantly higher value of the assets. Off balance 
sheet finance (removing assets and liabilities) will lead to an improvement in the company’s gearing ratio. 
Added value (company’s operating profit – amount of capital employed): several companies give a penalty to 
the business unit due to the amount of capital equipment it employs. The penalty is equal to what the firm 
would have to pay in order to borrow the money for the assets it uses (Brown&Laverick [1994]). 
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Being compared to competitors, however, expresses relative performance. Relative measures 
reflect contingent productivity as they consider the performance of other similar firms 
and further environmental factors (Donthu and Boonghee [1998]). Sheth and Sisodia 
(2002) suggest that marketing efficiency is difficult to quantify because marketing 
produces intangible assets. This is a statement valid for all activities of service, and so, for 
retailing, too. In their opinion, absolute measures are useless, for performance is at all 
times to be compared to alternatives, to competitors. Such a multidimensional relative 
performance measurement tool is DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis), which evaluates 
the output and productivity factors of a store or retail company comparing them to the 
output and productivity factors of similar units.  
 
Similarly, in Bonoma (1989)’s approach, the evaluation of marketing performance 
contains a number of subjective elements, performance being more than a mere absolute 
index number. Subjective measures are based on perception, i.e. a subjective evaluation.  
 
From the viewpoint of the present theses, it is not only company performance of notable 
interest, but also how it is affected by joining a strategic alliance for a retailer. In the next 
subchapter I am studying performance concepts which explore the effects of co-
operation upon performance.  
 
5.2. Evaluating the Effects of Co-operation Upon Performance 
 
Co-operation agreements to some extent mean giving up one’s economic, legal or 
sometimes social independence. Thus it is only worth tightening bonds of co-operation if 
economic and non-economic utility derived from it exceeds that of operating 
independently. Tietz (1993) distinguishes between two approaches for evaluating co-
operation members’ performance, as shown in Exhibit 5.1. 
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Exhibit 5.1. 
Evaluating Methods of Co-operations 
 Economic approach Behavioural approach 
 Classic Neoclassic Static Dynamic 
Criterion of co-
operation 
Profit= 
Turnover/costs 
Contribution to 
the objectives = 
contribution/pay 
off 
Net utility= 
Incentives/ 
Contributions 
Long-term net utility 
=dynamic 
incentives/dynamic 
contributions 
Criterion of 
dissolution of the 
co-operation 
Insufficient 
profit ratio 
Low 
contribution to 
the objectives 
Insufficient 
utility 
Insufficient dynamic 
utility 
Source: Tietz, B. (1993): Der Handelsbetrieb. Verlag Vahlen, München, p. 1524 
 
5.2.1. The Economic Approach 
 
The classic and neoclassic theories of the economic approach primarily differ in the duration 
of the goal of co-operation. While the classic one prefers to examine it in the short run, 
the neoclassic one does so in the long run. Both approaches use a strictly one-
dimensional economic criterion, because its goal criterion is profit or the difference of 
contributions and pay-offs.  
 
This type of performance evaluation is represented by Anderson (1993) who suggests 
that the main aim of retailers is that exploiting resources should produce profit.  
 
Luo (1996) explores the problems of evaluating international strategic alliances. In the 
empirical research, he measures member firm performance of alliances as a 
multidimensional construct (along profitability, efficiency, liquidity and financial risk, 
growth opportunity and business indicators) but primarily with the help of economic 
indicators. 
 
Smith, Venkatraman and Wortzel (1995) examine how the strategic fit of manufacturer 
and retailer affects retail performance. They quantify it in terms of return on investment, 
sales and profit growth in percent of the previous 5 years. 
 
The Strategic Profit Model (SPM) measures the financial performance of member firms 
of the distribution channel, considering profit (ROI), liquidity, capital structure, selling 
and profit growth and growth potential. SPM centres upon ROI, as an aggregate financial 
measure used by wholesalers and retailers. SPM finds 3 ways to increase profit: 1) the 
company should increase return on assets (ROA), 2) the company should increase 
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margins, 3) increase leverage, supposing that future cash-flow will cover costs of debt. 
The model harmonises the main areas of corporate decision-making i.e. capital 
management, pricing and finance) in order for a ROI growth (Stern et. al [1996]). 
 
Another widely used evaluation method is Economic Value Analysis (EVA) which 
considers the total cost of capital29 as opposed to Strategic Profit Model. Defining how 
much capital channel members use is in the centre of the method. EVA is able to 
aggregate not only traditional capital investments but all types of investments (such as 
training of sales representatives, IT investments, etc.) which makes it possible to define a 
total of capital costs. EVA measures the profit, attainable by the company beyond what 
has been in fact achieved, should they have chosen another investment with similar risks. 
The method measures the real value-added of the firm, which anyway tends to correlate 
heavily with share price (Stern et. al [1996]). 
 
For quantifying the contribution of individual channel members to the total performance 
there are three methods to be found in the literature: ABC-analysis, Direct Product Profit 
and Efficient Consumer Response (ECR) (Stern et. al [1996]). 
 
In Activity-based Costing (ABC) the costs of individual products are related to the activities 
having produced the given product or service (Cooper&Caplan [1988]). The method 
assumes that every attributable cost should be quantified, so it embraces a number of 
functions (such as logistics, production, services, technology, marketing, sales, 
administration, information resources). It may be applied on the product-level, to judge 
the performance of a single company or even that of a whole channel. The ABC method, 
however, is not chiefly designed to analyse channels with a high proportion of labour 
cost out of the cost total. 
 
The method of Direct Product Profit (DPP) measures the performance of a single product 
within a distribution channel and shows the rate with which the product contributes to 
the profit of a retailer. DPP only includes costs into the analysis that can be directly 
associated with the product, ignoring fix costs. Gross margins may be pretty misleading, 
                                                 
29 Capital cost is the weighted mean of borrowed and one’s own capital. Total capital cost is the 
multiplication of the weighted mean of capital cost and capital invested by the company. EVA = profit 
after taxation –  total capital cost (Stern et. al [1996]).
 68
mostly when it comes to evaluating financial performance, as there is low correlation 
between DPP and the gross margin. It is explained by the fact that gross margins ignore 
direct operational costs and trade allowances, and net profit does not inform one about 
the profitability of the product (Stern et. al [1996]). Using DPP, retailers gain a wider 
range of information about warehousing and inventory costs and space utilisation. At the 
same time, it promotes co-operation between manufacturers and traders, as it identifies 
products of both high and low profit. DPP is rarely applied in practice, though. The 
reason for this is that it needs a significant amount of highly detailed data. 
 
5.2.2. Behavioural Approach 
 
Behavioural approach (both the static and dynamic one) is based on an understanding of 
coalitions as social systems joined freely by partners. Each coalition partner is offered 
some incentives by the system, for which some contribution is expected in exchange. 
Entry and the contribution depend on how much the advantages offered by the system 
are able to compensate for the contribution. In co-operation systems the incentive is a 
member’s quantitative and qualitative contribution to realising the tasks of the system 
(Tietz [1993]). 
 
Sheturaman et al. (1988) regard the success of the co-operation as the benefit of the 
partnership and the benefit of the partnership is measured by comparison levels30. It 
contributes to establishing competitive advantages and enables both companies to create 
value for their consumers and/or reduce their costs. If an impression is formed about a 
partner that it is not able to offer the benefits required, the co-operation will be most 
likely to dissolve.  
 
Mohr&Spekman [1994] apply two types of measurement for the success of a partnership, 
i.e. objective and subjective indicators. A number of researches studying interfirm 
                                                 
30 CL: the standard that the company expects from a given relationship based upon the knowledge and past 
experience. Clalt can be viewed in a marketing channel as the lowest level of outcome that a company will 
accept being aware of the potential performance of an alternate partner (Sheturaman et. al [1988]). The 
authors have built on the comparison levels developed by Thibaut and Kelley (1959). See Chapter 3.3.1.
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relationships use subjective indicators which are strongly linked to behavioural 
constructs. In empirical researches the success of a co-operation is measured by the 
satisfaction with partners.  
 
The most relevant difference between classic and behavioural approaches lies in the 
variables included, part of which can be quantified, part of which cannot. But both 
theories are to be based on economic advantages. Apart from objective criteria, 
subjective criteria also have a share in defining satisfaction with partners, even more so, if 
there is no difference between economic criteria. The more positive is the judgement of 
the behavioural approach from the part of the partner, the more stabile co-operation is. 
In this sense, the measure of satisfaction by the partner shows how much the given 
partner recognises emerging of costs and revenues, sharing the profit and sharing pay-
offs and contributions for the long-term, all stated in their agreement (Tietz [1993]). 
 
Drawing upon the institutional approach of performance evaluation (Goldman [1992]), 
Stern, El-Ansary and Coughlan (1996) have described performance measurement 
dimensions of marketing channels, comprising three components of performance: 
effectiveness, fairness and efficiency. 
 
Effectiveness is an ability of the distribution channel providing a service demanded by 
consumers along with the biggest possible cost-efficiency. The model analyses the 
performance of the distribution channel on the macro level. In the authors’ view, 
effectiveness comprises guaranteeing the right merchandise to meet consumers’ demand, 
offering a proper retail service, right retail pricing, encouraging demand and the 
distribution system’s ability to answer impulses coming from its environment. Fairness, 
the second component expresses that in the given country all actors have equal chances 
to get access to distribution channels. Last, efficiency reflects how cost-efficiently social 
resources are exploited by the distribution channel. In Stern’s model, efficiency involves 
productivity and profitability. Charges against this theory can be that efficiency may be 
regarded more as an antecedent of profitability rather than a consequence of it. In 
literature, furthermore, efficiency and productivity are treated as synonymous terms 
(Ingene [1982]). 
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Economic and behavioural variables are both to be found in researches that study 
performance as a multidimensional construct.  
 
Shaw et al. (1994) considers performance measurement of member firms in international 
strategic alliances. In literature, the definition and operationalisation of performance is 
heavily emphasised, but there is no unanimously accepted view on how performance is 
to be defined and measured. Performance variables are grouped along three principal 
categories: financial variables, objective and subjective variables:  
 financial variables reflect fulfilment of economic goals and are typically measured by 
profitability, ROI and cost indicators (Luo 1996). The drawback of financial 
variables, however, is that they do not reveal the extent to which the short-term goals 
of an international strategic alliance are achieved. Anderson (1990) is of the view that 
financial variables describe merely one dimension of performance, but other, 
qualitative indicators are also to be involved when analysing the performance of joint 
ventures. Geringer and Herbert (1991) have observed in their research that the 
management often deems international strategic alliances unsuccessful, even if the 
alliance produces a good financial performance. 
 Objective variables (such as continuity and stability) are often used to evaluate the 
performance of strategic alliances, too (Contractor et. al [1988], Kogut [1988], 
Geringer&Herbert [1991]). But objective variables are also heavily criticised, as there 
may exist several motives to create international strategic alliances, therefore survival 
for instance may not measure their performance satisfactorily (Harrigan 1988). 
 Thanks to the problems arisen from financial and objective performance indicators, 
authors apparently are growing to prefer subjective indicators (Geringer&Herbert 1991, 
Bucklin&Sengupta 1993). One such indicator, applied most frequently is the general 
satisfaction of the member firm with the alliance. Subjective indicators show how far 
the goals of the alliance become realised. One of their main disadvantage is, however, 
that the evaluation of one’s own companies may become biased. On the other hand, 
several studies have proved (Geringer&Herbert 1991, Venkatraman and Ramanujam 
1986, Dess&Robinson 1984) satisfaction to correlate strictly with objective 
performance.  
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Shaw et al. (1994) use a number of performance indicators (profitability, market share, 
growth, market entry, competitive position, ROI, marketing, cost monitoring, 
technological development, product development, access to distribution channels) which 
assess the success of the strategic alliance and satisfaction with the alliance in the form of 
subjective indicators, on a 5-point scale. In the empirical research, the authors have 
found a strict correlation between performance perceived by managers and the goals 
realised by the alliance, but loose relationship has been found between performance and 
satisfaction. A significant result revealed is that most companies prefer to use ‘traditional’ 
performance indicators (profit, growth, market share) also when evaluating the alliance, 
but these are not necessarily the criteria regarded as the most successful ones in 
connection with the alliance (in an order: market entry, technological development, 
profit, market share, growth, product development, access to distribution channels). 
 
Anderson (1990) studies the performance evaluation of joint ventures. He states that 
founding firms often tend to treat joint ventures as their subsidiaries and evaluate start-
up joint ventures with traditional, formal methods, i.e. financial indicators and ignore 
input indicators. Consequently, they either dissolve the company far too early or the 
commitment of partners decreases. It is more feasible to evaluate joint ventures on the 
basis of a more balanced, less formal, i.e. a subjective performance measurement system. 
The author suggests an input-output continuum with which to measure the performance 
of joint ventures. The input end contains variables which define measurable results. 
Inputs in fact show what the company deals with, how it aims to achieve its goals and 
how the organisation uses its resources, which reflects the strategy pursued by the 
company. Output variables demonstrate the results of the inputs used. Learning for 
example may be regarded as an output, for in this case the company has already achieved 
something that may contribute to its present and future performance. Marketing 
performance variables (market share, customer satisfaction) are reflected in financial 
performance (profit margin, cash flow), too. 
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Kumar, Stern and Achrol (1992) develop a multidimensional scale in which suppliers can 
evaluate the performance of resellers. Kumar et al. have deducted and operationalised a 
scale suitable for evaluating reseller performance31 from theoretical approaches on 
organisational effectiveness. The authors have also examined environmental variables, 
global performance and sales generated by the reseller, duration of the relationship with 
the reseller, the amount of contribution to promotion and number of employees of the 
reseller. 
 
Leunissen et. al (1996) investigate the effect of retail strategic alliances on member firm 
performance. Similarly to the above, retail performance is viewed as a multidimensional 
construct quantified by financial and non-financial indicators and further performance 
variables bearing importance for retailers. They use gross margin as a financial indicator 
and vertical dependence as a non-financial indicator. Vertical dependence grasps how 
future-oriented a retailer is. The extent of future-orientation varies with individual 
retailers and depends on their desire for autonomy and the extent of control. A 
partnership between a retailer and an alliance is effective as long as power – through 
market conditions – turns into control. Control has an important role, as sources of 
power are transformed into a dependent relationship by partners.  
                                                 
31 The authors assessed the reseller performance along the following dimensions: contribution to sales and 
profit, reseller competence, compliance, loyalty, adaptation, contribution to growth and customer 
satisfaction, influence over the supplier, supplier satisfaction, conflict resolution (Kumar&Stern, Achrol 
[1992]). 
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6. RESEARCH CONCEPT 
 
In this chapter I wish to introduce the interaction of theory development and applied 
methodology, i.e. I understand and study the research concept (research problems and 
hypotheses) and methodological questions drawing upon one another and not as separate 
issues. 
 
First, I introduce the relevant changes in the Hungarian grocery retailing of the last 
decade, and the dominant strategic groups and grocery retail strategic alliances. Then I 
define the context of the research proposal. 
 
Further, I describe applied methodology. In stage one, I explain the steps followed at 
content analysis then results gained. I present the results of content analysis in the shape 
of a cognitive map which highlights the causal relationships between performance and 
retail strategic elements influenced by the alliance. I modify my earlier theoretical model 
on the basis of the cognitive maps, followed by possible ways of operationalisation of the 
constructs of the model and the hypotheses that can be formulated in the research 
framework.  
 
The planning of the survey, the sampling and the composition of the sample are also 
included in this part. The chapter is concluded with the quantitative analysis of the 
empirical research, whereby I examine to which extent the hypotheses could be justified 
and the differences between the strategy and performance of independent and allied 
retailers.  
 
6.1. The Main Tendencies and Strategic Groups of Grocery and FMCG Retailing 
 
Grocery retailing has experienced a complete structural transformation in the last decade. 
The process is nevertheless still in progress. Exhibit 6.1. illustrates the phases of 
evolution in the nineties.  
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Exhibit 6.1. 
The Evolution of Grocery Retailing in Hungary 
 
 
 
 
Prior to the change of regimes, state ownership dominated retailing and a separation of 
wholesale and retail functions was to be observed. Privatisation, creating the 
preconditions of market economy reached retailing first. It dissolved the earlier 
monolytic, centralised type of sector, which resulted in a fragmented structure. The 
number of market entities has multiplied, with a predominance of small-sized, privately 
owned retailers. in the middle of the nineties, foreign direct investment appeared in 
grocery retailing, and as a consequence, there developed a more and more sharpening 
price competition. In the third phase, a process of concentration has begun, lasting up to 
these days or even becoming more and more enhanced in the shape of take-overs and 
certain interfirm partnerships.  
ConsolidationConcentrationPrivatisationState 
ownership 
 
In market competition, as a result of concentration processes three types of groups have 
emerged: 1) multinational retail companies, 2) domestic-owned companies having 
entered buying groups 3) independent micro- and small enterprises. Each actor is 
experiencing a growing amount of market pressure. In one of our earlier empirical 
research (Agárdi&Bauer [2000]), we have explored the strategic and operational attributes 
of the individual strategic groups, summarised in Exhibit 6.2.  
 
Exhibit 6.2. 
Strategic Groups in Hungarian Grocery Retailing 
 Multinational retailers Domestic Chains Independent Retailers 
Strategic objective Spatial growth Spatial growth 
/Retaining existing 
position 
Retaining existing 
position 
Strategic Price leader, 
multisegment 
Imitator, follower 
One-segment 
Follower, defenders 
Focusing on supply 
niches 
Outlet type Hypermarkets, 
supermarkets, category 
specialists 
Supermarkets, 
Speciality stores, 
Traditional grocery store
Traditional grocery 
stores, „garage” stores, 
speciality stores 
Field of operation National National, regional local, eventual regional  
Operating efficiency High Medium Low 
Source: Agárdi&Bauer [2000] 
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As the scope of the research comprises the exploration of strategy-performance 
relationship of domestic-owned chains, from now on I wish to focus on this particular 
group of companies. 
 
The emergence of domestic retail chains can primarily be traced back to two phenomena. 
On the one hand, they have survived in the form of transformed retail companies, on the 
other hand, they have evolved as independent enterprises having entered buying groups. 
For the former state-owned grocery retail companies, market competition has proved to 
be far too challenging, their role has been reduced a great deal, and the chains that could 
survive, tend to reduce their operation to one definite region. The creation of alliances 
out of independent retailers has therefore been due to the price competition in the 
sector.  
 
Domestic retail chains mainly pursue a follower or a defending strategy. They aim at 
maintaining their positions achieved already, for few of them are able to expand owing to 
lack of capital. They try to adjust their policies to that of international chains, though, as 
much as possible. 
 
Since the mid-nineties, interfirm partnerships, co-operations have been gaining ground. 
Among them, contract-based partnerships appear to be particularly in the focus, e.g. 
buying groups, franchise, private label strategy. Initially, the only goal was to purchase 
merchandise at more favourable conditions, later, the harmonisation of activities has 
embraced distribution and joint marketing. This is how Co-op Hungary has been formed 
out of the General Distribution Co-operatives, but also with newly emerged groups such 
as Sláger or Reál Hungary Plc. The co-ordination of the total marketing activities is 
highly emphasised.  
 
The toplist prepared by Mai piac (a Hungarian professional retail journal), introducing the 
most significant grocery retailing companies, heavily underlines the relevance of strategic 
alliances. The figures for both 2002 and 2003 show strategic alliances to occupy the first 
places of the list – as illustrated in Exhibit 6.3. Shadowed cells depict domestic-owned 
horizontal strategic alliances, chiefly made up of independent retailers. 
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Exhibit 6.3. 
The TOP 10 Grocery Retail Alliances in Hungary (arranged according to annual turnover)  
2002 2003 
Alliance Turnover 
(HUF Mrd) 
Number of 
stores 
Alliance Turnover 
(HUF Mrd) 
Number of 
stores 
Metspa 388,3 146 Metspa 409 148 
Co-op Hungary Plc. 300,0 3474 CBA Hungary 405 2895 
Tesco 279.8 53 Tesco 354,4 60 
Provera 215,0 364 Co-op Hungary Plc. 335,0 3575 
Tengelmann Group 174,2 168 Provera 214,0 374 
Rewe Group 156,4 150 Reál Hungária Plc. 191,3 2044 
Honiker Ltd. 149,9 2233 Tengelmann Group 174,5 171 
Reál Hungária Plc. 148,0 1943 Auchan 155,1 8 
Auchan 112,4 7 Rewe Group 135 132 
S.E.F.T. 23,1 31 Honiker 131,2 1613 
Source: Mai piac 2003 May, pp. 16-17., 2004 April pp. 18-19 based on the data of AC Nielsen 
 
There is certainly a trend to be observed with also multinational groups to form strategic 
alliances, Metro and Spar setting an example for this or the co-operation of Cora and 
Delhaize. Still, there may be several differences spotted as far as strategic alliances of 
domestic-owned or foreign-owned retail companies are concerned: 
 
 
 
 
The co-operation of multinational firms is generally limited to joint purchasing, while 
Hungarian groups prefer to extend co-operation to their marketing activities, as well. 
Multinational companies normally possess a well-established corporate identity of 
their own, whereas domestic stores have to be turned into a chain, for most member 
firms do not apply any identity elements.  
As regards the size and type of member firm stores, considerable differences are to 
be found between the two groups. Multinational companies are predominant in the 
larger-sized supermarket and hypermarket category while domestic alliances consist 
of smaller-sized, fairly heterogeneous grocery stores to organise them into chains. 
Last, different ownership structures mean different types of management philosophy 
and practice. With multinational companies, firms possess their individual strategic 
goals and a professional management, while alliances of domestic retailers tend to 
build up strong emotional ties to their stores (Agárdi, Bauer [2000]). 
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In the above-mentioned empirical research (Agárdi&Bauer [2000]) we have found 
considerable performance differences between strategic groups, demonstrated in Exhibit 
6.4. The basic premise of the research is the performance difference between 
independent retailers and domestic chains. Domestic chains are mostly made up of 
chains that are in fact independent retailers having joined buying groups. Both in terms 
of turnover and gross margin they significantly perform better than independent retailers. 
Drawing upon this, I assume that differences between the two groups of retailers arise 
due to belonging to a chain and the advantages offered by a strategic alliance.  
 
Exhibit 6.4. 
Annual Turnover and Gross Margin of Domestic Retail Chains and Independent Retailers in  2000 
(HUF Thousand) 
196904,2
21676,6
49075,3
7644,7
0
25000
50000
75000
100000
125000
150000
175000
200000
225000
Annual turnover Gross margin
domestic chain independent retailer
 
Source: Agárdi&Bauer [2000], p. 13.
Cravens&Cravens (2000) give a detailed description of what units of analysis one is to 
choose from when studying horizontal strategic alliances. In the authors’ view, a research 
may wish to focus on the top management responsible for co-operation, the dyadic 
relationship of partners, corporate strategy or the whole alliance. The unit of analysis of 
this research proposal is the retail company as the member of a horizontal strategic 
alliance, whose strategy is influenced by the fact of co-operation.  
 
The research context is depicted in Exhibit 6.5., describing the environment of allied 
retail companies and the possible co-operations between actors of retailing in Hungary.  
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Achrol&Reve, Stern [1983]) divides the marketing environment of partnerships in the 
distribution channel up into several parts. A secondary task environment has been 
distinguished which the firms of the co-operation mainly encounter only indirectly, 
through the hub firm, but which certainly makes an effect on member firms. Primary 
task environment includes immediate suppliers, in the present case, the hub firm and 
consumers. The authors furthermore recognise the macro environment embracing the 
social, economical and political factors of a given country or region.  
 
The research examines interactions between hub firm and member firm within the 
framework of the primary task environment. Member firms chiefly conduct their 
transactions with the hub firm. The role of the hub firm is either filled by one of the 
member firms which is then responsible for joint purchasing and marketing activities. 
Honiker buying group is an example for this, where up to 2002 it was Kisalföld Fűszért 
that co-ordinated the activities of the alliance. Or, alternatively, member firms create a 
hub firm which later starts to develop the chain on its own, winning more and more 
independent retail companies as potential member firms over (e.g. Reál Hungária 
Élelmiszer Plc.). Domestic alliances are for the most part two-level ones, for there is a 
regional organisation inserted between the national centre and the member firms.  
 
After having defined the research context, I would like to give an overview of my 
research methodology and concept. Due to interactions between methodology and 
theory, they are presented in the same chapter, as one part of the methods serve the 
theory development. 
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Exhibit 6.5. 
Determining the Research Context 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 R etailer1 R etailer2 R etailern R etailern+ 1
H ub firm 1
H ub firm 2
Supplier1 Supplier2 Supplern Suppliern+ 1
P
r
i
m
a
r
y
 
t
a
s
k
 
e
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
S
e
c
o
n
d
a
r
y
 
t
a
s
k
 
e
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
 
6.2. The Theoretical Model 
 
In accordance with Chapters 4 and 5, retail marketing strategy is determined by being a 
member of a retail alliance. Marketing strategy comprises retail mix, i.e. choice of 
location, merchandise management, pricing, advertising&promotion, store design and 
layout, services and personal selling (Levy&Weitz [2004]). In the research context, the 
retail strategy elements that may be affected by partnerships are primarily examined. 
Drawing upon literature and results of earlier empirical research we assume that co-
ordination of purchasing and distribution may mostly influence merchandise 
management, pricing, advertising&promotion and retail services in a stricter sense of the 
term. We suppose these retail mix components directly affect the financial performance 
of retail companies.  
 
The connection of retail strategy elements and corporate performance are moderated by 
the competitive environment (dynamism and complexity of environment) and the 
attributes of the company (field of operation, location and size).  
 
The other dimension consists of interfirm processes that emerge in the interaction of the 
strategic alliance and the company. In both marketing and retailing literature, these 
processes are grasped in terms of behavioural categories, contained most thoroughly in 
Mohr&Spekman (1994)’s model. 
 
In the model’s framework, partnership is described along terms such as mutual 
interdependence, trust and commitment, it stresses the factor of communication between 
partners and conflict resolution techniques (forced or non-forced) applied, which 
constructs all influence satisfaction with partners. Mohr and Spekman (1994) assume that 
the more successful the company judges the partnership, the more highly behavioural 
dimensions are valued by it.  
 
We analyse the behavioural dimensions of strategic alliances from the viewpoint of 
member firms: i.e. how they evaluate the relationship with the hub firm. We assume 
these dimensions to affect satisfaction with co-operation directly.  
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Exhibit 6.6. 
The Impact of the Alliance on the Retail Strategy and Performance of Member Firms 
(kiinduló elméleti modell) 
 A ttrib u tes o f th e  
p artn ersh ip
C om m u n ication  w ith  
th e  h u b  firm
C on flic t reso lu tion  o f th e  
h u b  firm
Satisfac tion
R eta ilin g  m ix  
in flu en ced  b y  th e  
a llian ce
P erfo rm an ce   o f th e  
re ta ile r
P ric in g
A d vertis in g
M erch an d isin g
Store  d esig n
Services
M od eratin g  variab les  o f th e  re la tion sh ip  b etw een  
re ta ilin g  m ix  an d  re ta ile r p erfo rm an ce :
•Size  (n u m b er o f s tores, to ta l floo rsp ace)
• L ocation
• In ten sity  o f com p etition
M od eratin g  variab les  o f th e  re la tion sh ip  b etw een  
re ta ilin g  m ix  an d  re ta ile r p erfo rm an ce :
•Size  (n u m b er o f s tores, to ta l floo rsp ace)
• L ocation
• In ten sity  o f com p etition
B ased  on  M ohr& Spekm an 
(1984)
B ased on  L evy& W eitz  (1995 )
In addition, I propose the relationship of strategy and performance is influenced by the 
size, location and competition intensity of the retailer.  
 
The phases of the empirical research are shown in Exhibit 6.7. the aim of content 
analysis is that dimensions identified in the theoretical model (Exhibit 6.6), and possible 
new elements of co-operation could be revealed. For exploring the causal relations 
between dimensions denoting the effect of a horizontal alliances, I am using the method 
of cognitive maps. Based on the results of content analysis and the cognitive map, I 
introduce the hypotheses of the analytical model and the operationalisation possibilities 
of the individual dimensions.  
 
Exhibit 6.7. 
Phases of the Empirical Research 
RESEARCH METHOD  OBJECTIVE 
   
I. Content analysis  Reducing the initial, theoretical model to the 
relevant constructs 
   
II. Cognitive map  Exploring the causal relationships between 
constructs identified by the literature and content 
analysis 
   
III. In-depth interviews with hub firms  Validating the identified causal relationships 
explored by the content analysis, developing the 
analytical model 
   
III. Survey 
 
 Testing the hypothesis of the analytical model with 
quantitative methods 
 
6.3. Content analysis 
 
Studying the method, I first introduce the phases of content analysis, complemented by 
the result received from my own research. Content analysis is an analytical tool of written 
communication, a preferred research method in the field of social sciences, for instance 
politology. Nevertheless, its use is becoming more and more widespread in management 
researches, too. In the field of marketing, it is mainly used for analysing the content of 
advertising messages, newspaper articles and radio programs (Malhotra [2001]).32
                                                 
32 Content analysis is an objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the communication’s 
manifest content (Kolbe&Burnett [1991]). Furthermore, Erdener&Dunn (1990) have distinguished 
between manifest and latent content. The first one explores the use of a particular word or expression 
when the researcher focuses on the word frequency counts and key words in context. The basic 
assumption is that these key words relate to underlying concepts or constructs that are germane to the 
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The process of the content analysis conducted is illustrated in Exhibit 6.8. The research 
question of the present dissertation seeks an answer to how horizontal strategic alliances 
affect the marketing strategy of member firms and thus their corporate performance. The 
research focuses on domestic-owned, allied retailers.  
 
Exhibit 6.8. 
The Process of Content Analysis 
 
Identify research questions and constructs 
Ø 
Identify the texts to be examined 
Ø 
Specify the unit of analysis 
Ø 
Determine categories to be used 
Ø 
Generate the coding scheme 
Ø 
Conduct a pilot study and revise 
Ø 
Collect data 
Ø 
Assess validity and reliability 
Source: Howard, H.. [2001]: Content Analysis of Secondary Data: A Study of Courage in Managerial 
Decision Making. Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 34, 194. old.   
 
As I study the interconnection of retail strategy and performance in a grocery retailing 
context, I have collected articles and interviews which describe co-operation between 
domestic retailers. These are, most typically, articles and interviews with company 
managers published in professional retail journals (Mai piac), that deal with the horizontal 
co-operation and its effects on retail chains in Hungary. The articles fundamentally 
embrace the period of 1996-2002, for this was the time when co-operation between 
domestic retail companies started to intensify. A total of 42 articles (see Appendix 1) 
have been selected. Texts had been previously evaluated in terms of their relevance in the 
research problem and then recorded.  
                                                                                                                                            
research question at hand. However, there is rarely a perfect match, and so the validity of this measure is 
always subject to challenge. 
The latent content analysis unfolds the underlying, deep meaning embodied in a text and therefore it better 
addresses the validity problem. However the coding and interpretation of the meaning depends on the 
subjective judgement of the researcher, latent content analysis has an unfavourable effect on the reliability 
of the results.  This problem is usually addressed to cross-check the coder’s potentially subjective 
interpretation whereby measuring the intercoder reliability with correlation coefficients (Erdener&Dunn, 
1990). 
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The analysis concentrates on the marketing strategy and performance indicators of allied 
member firms and the associative relationship to be found between the two. Units of 
analysis have been words or expressions which could have been found among the 
expressions of the initial theoretical model (Exhibit 6.6.). We have also added new 
marketing strategy and performance elements to the coding scheme which we identified 
in the texts. The coding scheme used for content analysis has been prepared on the basis 
of dimensions and their synonyms of the initial theoretical model and latent content 
analysis (see Appendix 2).  
 
Based on the aboves, I have applied a combination of latent and manifest content 
analysis. One of my aims has been to identify relevant strategy and performance elements 
which occur in grocery retailing in Hungary. Another aim has been to measure word 
count frequency, for domestic co-operational forms are not yet unambiguous and various 
groups of companies harmonise their operation to various extents. Thus I have aimed at 
selecting the most relevant, co-operation – defined factors, that serve to increase the validity of 
the explaining model. 
 
My analysis has been conducted with the help of two other coders, hence preparing a 
coding scheme has been essential. The coding scheme contains the goal of research, the 
research problem, the theoretical model, a short explanation of technical terms used and 
coding rules which have promoted the reliability of results obtained (see Appendix 3). 
When selecting coders, an important aspect has been for them to be greatly familiar with 
retailing in Hungary, for it is an essential precondition if one is carrying out a latent 
content analysis.  
 
In the pilot analysis 5 articles have been chosen, analysed individually, then codings were 
compared and problems that have arisen incorporated in the coding scheme.  
 
In data analysis we have identified key words and expressions and recorded the word 
count frequency, after which we have compared the consistency of codings both from a 
validity and a reliability aspect. From among validity and reliability measures suggested in 
literature (Krippendorf, 1980) we have investigated the face validity33 and the semantic 
                                                 
33 Face validity is the extent that a category appears to measure the construct that is intended to measure. 
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validity34 of results, the stability of results35, and their reliability by comparing them to the 
results which have been arrived at by the independent coders.  In the next phase, I 
summarise the main results of the content analysis. 
 
First I have examined the types of co-operations that are most likely to occur in 
horizontal strategic alliances. In the 42 articles altogether three types of co-operation with 
various intensity have been discovered: buying groups, voluntary chains and franchise. 
Buying groups (21%) fundamentally concentrate on joint purchasing and responsibilities 
derived from it. More than the half of retail companies choose to be members of voluntary 
chains (51%), such as  Reál or Sláger, where besides purchasing some further marketing 
tasks (bounded prices in sales, joint advertising and promotion, harmonising some 
identity elements) are carried out jointly by the allied partners. The proportion of stores 
operating in a franchise system is the lowest (5%), as this is not a truly typical co-
operation form in grocery retailing36 in Hungary.  
 
The main line of content analysis is to explore retail strategy elements influenced by 
being allied in a partnership and whether there can be found any differences between 
individual co-operation forms. 
 
More than half of the owners (54%) have mentioned the appearance of weekly specials 
whereby they mean merchandise mostly sold with discounts. Price promotions appear in 
the texts in diverse contexts. Most retailers have pointed out regularity of promotions 
(weekly, biweekly or monthly) organised by the groups. In contrast to independent 
retailers, the frequency of promotions and the number of products involved in 
promotions increase with allied companies. Another important feature of sales 
mentioned has been a chain-like appearance. Participating in joint promotions organised by 
the strategic alliance, however, is normally obligatory. 
                                                 
34 Semantic validity is the extent to which phrases placed in the same category have similar meanings and 
relate to the category in a similar fashion. 
35 Stability is the degree to which the results of content classification and coding remain consistent over 
time. 
36 It is partly due to the lack of franchise legislation, partly to the fact that integration between retail 
companies has not achieved this level. Franchise is most widespread with retailers of the Coop chain, being 
joined by other groups (thus e.g. Sláger Kereskedőház Ltd. provides Coop’s franchise system for its own 
member firms). Still, some managers claim that there is no real franchise in grocery retailing.  
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It means bounded assortment and prices for member retailers. Lastly, some interviewees 
have suggested that the scope of promotions differs, as the co-operation form may make 
it possible to participate in both national and regional promotions.  
 
The advertising activity of the alliance means distributing flyers advertising the promotions of 
the group. Managers and store owners have highlighted the quality and chain-like appearance 
of flyers, which is a consequence of a chain-level organisation. For promotions and 
advertising are heavily interconnected or there are few advertising tools that would not 
be related to sales. On the basis of the interviews analysed it seems that other forms of 
advertising are not this relevant or ignored by member firms. Honiker’s example, i.e. 
advertising the whole chain and thus creating additional value for chain members, is a rare 
one.  
 
Store identity is an element of retail mix. 43.6% of member firms have mentioned chain 
identity to bear relevance for them. With buying groups and voluntary chains only certain 
identity components appear, such as logo, colours and uniform. Identity elements, 
however, extend to the whole store design and layout when entering a franchise system 
(e.g. Coop chain). Opinions concerning identity have also emphasised chain-like appearance, 
even when it is only true for a segment of identity elements but which also contribute to 
enhancing chain-likeness of retail stores that belong to the group.  
 
The main incentive for creating retail strategic alliances is ensuring more favourable 
purchasing conditions for member firms, enabling smaller companies thus to ensure better 
retail prices for their consumers, which then makes them more competitive against larger 
chains. In the texts I have examined, 41 percent admitted that within the co-operation 
they are able to offer more favourable prices to their consumers. Nevertheless, co-
operation not only means price advantages for member firms but usually bounded prices, 
too. Supplier agreements may determine the suggested retail price to be used by all 
members of the alliance, regardless to their costs.  
 
Co-operations significantly affect the structure of the assortment of the allied retailers, for a 
great part of their turnover stems from jointly purchased goods, usually exceeding 50 
percent, sometimes even soaring to 80 percent of turnover. 
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Consequently, member firms are to oblige themselves to keep a bounded assortment of 
promoted products, store brands having been had manufactured by the group and 
products defined in supplier agreements. Assortment stability with allied retailers is an 
overall advantage in the face of independent retailers. The latter ones are determined by 
‘bargain hunting’ i.e. they always stock products which they can purchase with ad-hoc 
allowances, while allied retailers, through centralised purchasing, are able to get the same 
amount of allowances, enabling them to establish a more stabile assortment.  
 
Offering store brands, in fact, can be understood as part of the assortment. Practically, 
every strategic alliance developed its store brands. Store brands reveal more competitive 
advantages. Interviewees mostly refer to this saying that demand obviously increases for 
store brands sold by the group. Their other main advantage is, that their prices are lower 
than that of manufacturer brands but lower prices do not necessarily mean lower margins 
for retailers in contrast to the promotion of manufacturer brands. Store brands are 
consequently more profitable for retailers.  
 
I have already hinted a few times at the fact that co-operation forms may make various 
effects on marketing strategy. The clearest difference is shown in chain identity. While 
buying groups and voluntary chains exhibit a uniformity with only certain components 
(logo, frontal design, etc.), a chain-like appearance with retail companies of franchise 
systems means to have a uniform store design, layout and assortment. Price level and 
sales are the most frequently mentioned elements with buying groups.  
 
The model (Exhibit 6.6.) not only illustrates effects on strategy but looks at co-operation 
as a behavioural process. There is an intensive communication between member firm 
and hub firm (purchasing and distribution decisions, issues of membership, etc.), there 
are a series of transactions conducted, on the basis of which member firms perceive and 
evaluate their relationship with hub firms or groups of companies (dependence, trust, 
opportunism), and face conflicts. As opposed to views on retail strategy, there have been 
far less references to the quality of the relationship or references found have been for the 
most part positive ones. Supposedly, it is due to the fact that the articles and interviews 
appeared in forums read widely in professional circles and member firms do not wish to 
give a negative opinion of their own group of companies.  
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The most important aspect revealed by the texts I have looked at, has been a correct, 
predictable and stabile co-operation, or reliability as we have termed it. From the viewpoint of 
member firms it reflects the trust put into the partnership.  
 
The problem of autonomy versus dependence have arisen in several texts. Retail companies, 
entering some sort of co-operation, are to give up their autonomy to a certain extent. 
The more areas co-operation embraces (e.g. after a period with harmonising  purchasing 
exclusively, firms usually start to harmonise their distribution and marketing activities as 
well), the more member firms will depend on the group. In contrast to franchise system, 
buying groups leave greater independence to member firms.  
 
The trust of member firms towards hub firms is greatly enhanced by hub firms exhibiting 
competence. Competence is judged along the expertise with which transactions are carried 
out and consulting is provided. 
 
The essence of the theoretical model is the interconnections of marketing strategy 
elements influenced by co-operation and member firm performance. From among 
performance variables, turnover has most frequently (33%) been mentioned, having 
grown as a result of co-operation. Competitiveness has also been emphasised (10%), 
where multinational companies are the primary reference points. Competitiveness is, 
nevertheless, normally identified with survival. I have only found a few occurrences 
suggesting profit, it otherwise being the most relevant variable when evaluating corporate 
performance. The lack of formulating a direct relation is possibly because the effect of 
co-operation on corporate performance is influenced by several other factors.  
 
6.4. Cognitive Maps 
 
In the second phase of the explorative research, drawing upon the results of content 
analysis, I construct the aggregated cognitive map of retailers, on the basis of which the 
theoretical model (Exhibit 6.6.) can be made more precise and the hypotheses of the 
analytical model can be formulated.  
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The method of cognitive maps37 has a central role in the empirical research from the 
point of view of both methodology and theoretical concept. As the interactions of 
strategy and performance are highly intricate (Mintzberg [1987], Mason&Mitroff [1981]), 
it is particularly important to understand the relationships and their nature as perceived 
by decision makers. In strategy management literature there have been conducted a 
number of researches on the information-processing of decision makers and their 
cognitive structures which all affect their decisions on creating a strategy, its 
implementation and corporate performance. Analytical tools examining cognitive 
structures of strategic decision making and cognitive complexity are termed mental maps, 
meta-learning or mindsets (Calori&Johnson, Sarnin [1994]). In accordance with Huff 
(1990), I use the term ‘cognitive map’.  
 
Huff (1990) suggests that cognitive maps are the ‘incomplete interpretations of human 
cognition’. But even if they are entirely accurate, they still appear to influence 
behaviour.38 Strategic maps do not only express spatial relations but temporality (logics, 
consecutiveness, time relations), too.  
 
The manager and the owner of retail companies I have looked at is usually one and the 
same person. They decide on issues that concern the whole firm, for example whether to 
enter a co-operation or not. Hambrick&Mason (1984) claim that the strategy and 
effectiveness of an organisation is the reflection of the values and cognitive bases of 
organisation members in power. Mintzberg (1987) states that strategy is the abstraction 
of the manager’s thoughts which comprise ideas and constructs generated while 
identifying and interpreting a problem. 
                                                 
37 The term ’cognitive map’ originates from Tolman (1962) who has examined maps that help spacial 
orientation. It has also been observed (Neisser [1984], p. 125.) that these maps may be detached from their 
original functions and can be used as independent sources of information. Moreover, it is not only spacial 
orientation we use maps for but for placing all types of events, practically speaking (causal relations, 
taxonomies). According to Weick (1990), humans live in two worlds – the world of events and things 
(territory) and the world of words about events and things (the map). The content of the maps consists of 
distances and differences (Kelly [1955]). 
38 Neisser (1984) demonstrates that while the parts of a cognitve map are made up of schemes, cognitive 
map themselves are schemes, directing information input and changing the maps. Huff (1990) is of the 
view that maps depicting the thinking of managers work the same way. Maps that already exist in the 
minds of decision makers tend to determine their perception, and it results in the fact that they only see 
what they want to see. Still, as distance between outer information and their own ideas grow, they devote 
more attention to their own actual experiences and less to the earlier maps. Maps can then be actualised by 
new information. 
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Decision makers create simplified mental models (March&Simon [1958]) when they are 
to face complex problems. The process is characterised by a selective perception, since 
they are unable to evaluate all variables relevant for the decision at the same time 
(Tversky&Kahneman [1974], Mason&Mitroff [1981]). 
 
The method has some relevant consequences from the aspect of the research topic. My 
aim is to assess (1) how managers of retail firms evaluate interrelations of marketing 
strategy elements and performance indicators and (2) how co-operation affects the 
relationship of strategic elements and performance indicators. 
 
When the manager-owners decide on entering a co-operation, they consider the entry’s 
consequences on further business policy and performance of the chain. It is highly 
relevant that these ‘perceived’ relationships should be revealed, for these are the ones 
determining organisational behaviour and its outcome. One cannot certainly expect these 
maps to be complete and exact but the perceived interrelationships, directing decision 
makers can be clarified.  
 
Mapping methods depicting strategic thoughts can be described along a continuum 
(Weick [1990]). At one extreme of the continuum are mapping methods that are 
relatively simple models of cognition, and verbal expression is taken as a direct indication 
of the mental activity. Content analysis can be classified into this group. At the other end 
of the continuum are methods that interpret the language used and set of words as a 
symbol of the latent content. The manifest content has to be further analysed before the 
cognitive structure could be identified (Huff [1990]). These methods involve 
considerable interpretation from the part of the researcher, and they draw on more 
complicated models of cognition. However, the way of interpreting results may be biased 
by the subjective judgements of the researcher. 
 
Huff (1990) attempts at a more detailed categorisation of cognitive maps and identifies 
five different types of them39. By exploring causal relations i, the closest to the research 
goal I have set is the method of cognitive maps showing influence and causality.  
                                                 
39 Cognitive mapping methods: 1) maps that assess attention and importance of concepts 2) maps that 
show dimensions of categories, 3) maps that show influence, causality, and system dynamics, 4) maps that 
show the structure of arguments and conclusions, 5) maps that specify schemes, frames and perceptual 
codes (Huff [1990], pp. 14-16). 
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Cognitive maps describing causality assume that the image of the world formed in individuals is 
best described by causal relationships, that causality is the most frequent retrospective 
explanatory tool of events, and choosing from possible alternative actions also takes 
place in the form of a causal evaluation. Maps illustrating causal relations are the most 
typical ones in management literature. Reger&Huff [1993]’s research concentrates on 
causal features of organisational performance which are significantly higher or lower than 
an industry average. They argue that poor performance makes managers’ basic premises 
about company operation doubtful. If performance is consistently lower than the 
industry average, there seem to emerge some efforts of the company to reinterpret 
environment and blame external events and actors.  
 
The precondition of the graphic illustration of the causal relationships of constructs and 
the identification of variable nodes is that nodes should possess a bipolar value. The 
direction of causality between two constructs is shown by an arrow. The content of 
causal maps may also be illustrated in a matrix form which would represent the nature of 
causal relationships in cells (Axelrod [1976]). The matrix may be used for analysing 
further causal interconnections. 
 
I apply a particular type of causal cognitive map, i.e. revealed causal mapping, and instead 
of drawing on individual interviews, I have relied on the results of the content analysis. 
The revealed causal maps are therefore based on analyses of the public utterances of 
decision makers. Narayan and Fahey (1990) define these maps as affirmations of causal 
relations declared by decision makers themselves for their environment (market, 
competitors, industry, etc.). Revealed and true causal maps may obviously differ form 
one another, for part of the thoughts and intentions are not of a public nature – even 
more so if they concern strategy. In a context where information may serve as a strategic 
weapon, differences between revealed and true casual maps may be considerable. In this 
research context, revealed and true maps are quite close to each other, consequently, the 
application of the method is justifiable.  
 
Researchers get access to revealed causal maps more easily, because they use pieces of 
public information. Revealed causal maps reflect the wordings of decision makers and 
interviewees. 
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The maps are typically complex networks of components with significant overlaps, 
therefore may well be carrying some redundant information. In order for maps to be 
compared, they have to be brought to a common denominator. There is a need for a 
common language, such as a theoretical framework which would help interpret the 
specific language use of individual utterances and make individual maps comparable 
(Narayan and Fahey [1990]). 
 
I have summarised the results obtained from content analysis, serving as a starting point 
for preparing the aggregate cognitive map (see Appendix 4, 5). It aggregates revealed 
causes and effects. Exhibit 6.9. shows the map prepared on the basis of 42 articles.  
Numbers stand for the ordinals of concepts. Causal relationships between elements are 
denoted by an arrow. Arrows show from cause towards effect. The content of the map40 
and its structure has been analysed with the software Decision Explorer 3.2.6. 
 
When searching for interrelationships, I have primarily focused on dimensions 
discovered in content analysis and elements related to them. The map contains 15 
components, among which interviewees of the articles have formulated a total of 28 
interconnections. The density, or in other words, interconnectedness of the map is 
0,1333 (aggregate relations in the map/aggregate possible relationships). Although the 
map does not contain too numerous elements, still, at first sight, systematising causal 
relationships found among them is not an easy task. 
 
First I have separated constructs that are obvious consequences of joining an alliance 
(arrows only point at them but no arrows start up from them). One of the highest 
number of connections (10) belongs to the consequence element ‘turnover increases’ but 
also a significant consequence of co-operation is the improvement of ‘higher chance to 
succeed’ and ‘competitiveness’ (elements 5 and 6), further, ‘retail margin increases’ 
(element 12). Therefore, as a result of being allied, retailers experience the growth of sales 
and profitability (margins and effectiveness) and, in a broader sense, the increase of 
competitiveness in their companies.  
                                                 
40 The content of a cognitive map can be interpreted with the help of the individual constructs and 
connections between them.  The configuration of the map may be described by complexity (elements 
displayed in the map) and the number of connections between elements (interconnectedness) 
(Calori&Johnson and Sarnin [1994]. 
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The output of the co-operation is mostly promoted by the ‘competence of the hub firm’ 
(element 8), ‘carrying store brands’ (element 11) and ‘regular promotions’ (element 13).  
 
How many connections the individual constructs have, is also a notable aspect. The 
greatest number of connections is that of element 4’s (‘turnover increases’), followed by 
‘joining the alliance’ (element 1) with its 7 connections. ‘Carrying store brands’ is 
connected to five other constructs and ‘competence of the hub firm’ is related to some 
further 4 elements.  
 
A number of methods41 can be applied when analysing cognitive maps. During the 
analysis, I follow the logic of theoretical model (Exhibit 6.6). Namely, which are the 
elements that are directly related to the joining a retail alliance and how can the relation 
system of marketing variables be grasped; and which elements are linked to corporate 
performance, either directly or indirectly.   
 
A direct consequence of having joined an alliance is access to favourable purchasing 
conditions – as put by the interviewees of the articles. It contributes to performance and 
competitiveness growth, too. Initially, retail companies started to ally in order to join 
their powers and achieve more favourable purchasing conditions with manufacturers, 
which then may be reflected in their retail prices and also, which would enable them to 
fight their competitive disadvantages against multinational chains. Many people 
interviewed refer to this benefit of co-operation.  
 
Constructs related to reducing prices highlight that retailers believe the competence of 
the hub firm is essential for being able to offer competitive retail prices, which leads to 
sales growth. 
                                                 
41 Explanation allows you to choose a concept number from which you wish to see explanations. 
Consequence allows you to choose a concept number from which you wish to see consequences.  
Cluster: this menu option performs a cluster analysis on the model. Collapse: This command causes a 
collapse on the named set to occur. This effectively hides all concepts which are not members of the 
specified set, whilst maintaining links (whether direct or going through other concepts) between concepts 
in the set. You can specify up to five sets upon which to collapse. Only concepts in all such sets will be 
displayed. Composite Tails This command traces the path from each tail concept until a branch point is 
reached (i.e. a concept has more than one consequence). Hierarchical domain analysis will list each 
concept in descending order of link density around that concept (i.e. those concepts with the highest link 
density will be listed first). The total number of links around each concept is displayed, not individual link 
type. Hierarchical Set Clustering This command looks around all of the 'root' concepts in the Set 
specified, and traces all of the explanations of each concept until either a tail or another concept in the Set 
is reached. Source: Decision Explorer Help. ©1994-99 Matthew Jones, Banxia Software Ltd. 
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Relying upon the map, a stabile assortment is the consequence of both entering the 
alliance and the competence of the hub firm which, with the improvement of assortment, 
contributes to the sales growth of retailer/store. As a contrast, independent retailers are 
forced to shape their profile corresponding to current weekly specials and favourable 
purchasing conditions.  
 
In the content analysis, the other affected factor of merchandise management has been 
the presence of store brands. Store brands prove to be quite popular with member firms. 
Store brands, as SKUs, not only affect turnover but margins and company effectiveness, 
too. They also trigger consumer loyalty and lower prices and a result that these products 
can be sold at higher margins, improving company profitability (effectiveness) thus, too. 
Store brands, in addition, increase inventory turnover.  
 
The most marked feature of the content analysis has been promotion which involves 
discounts and related promotional fliers. In texts analysed, there has been a particular 
focus on the intensity, uniformity and quality of promotions. Several managers have 
hinted at the positive correlation between promotions and company/store turnover.  
 
The importance of a chain identity created by the alliance has been pointed out in several 
articles. This is a construct with a less extended network of connections. Chain identity 
also fosters the increase of member firm turnover. Uniform identity greatly encourages 
the establishment of a chain-like appearance of autonomous member firms. The 
competence of the hub firm considerably determines the way the assortment, price level 
and identity of member firms develop. 
 
The reliability of the hub firm has been underlined by a number of member firm 
representatives, which reflects the trust of retail companies put into the co-operation. 
Trust is reinforced if the hub firm proves its competence and expertise. The autonomy of 
member firms decreases along with an increase of co-operation intensity for co-operation 
extends to a growing number of fields of company activities. Parallel to this, they start to 
be more and more dependent on the group, i.e. their horizontal dependence increases 
while their vertical dependence (on suppliers) decreases. Trust and a desire for autonomy 
are not directly related to corporate performance, still, by way of the competence of the 
hub firm, determine company turnover. 
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Exhibit 6.9. 
An Aggregate Cognitive Map of Allied Retailers 
 
It is more than evident that on the strength of neither content analysis, nor a cognitive 
map, general conclusions cannot be arrived at. Though, the interconnections found bear 
a high relevance to be used at specifying the initial theoretical model. One aspect, 
however, must be considered when analysing these interviews and articles, i.e. views on 
strategic alliances are generally positive and there is no hint at conflicts, opportunism, 
abusing power or communication problems whatsoever. Thus, the results of content 
analysis may show some distortions which may only be revealed when interviewing the 
hub firms of strategic alliances. 
 
6. 5. Interviews with Experts 
 
I have interviewed the decision makers, i.e. sales and marketing executives of the hub 
firms of four strategic alliances (Honiker, Coop, Reál and CBA). (For the guide line of 
the interviews and data on interviewees see Appendix 6.) Interviews are suitable for 
evaluating the role of strategic alliances from the other part, i.e. how hub firms perceive 
co-operation with allied retailers. It also provides a chance to validate the results of my 
content analysis and causal maps.  
 
Not surprisingly, interviewees have for the most part mentioned purchasing and 
marketing activity as the main areas of co-operation. The necessity to harmonise 
marketing in fact stems from joint purchasing i.e. supplier agreements. Favourable 
purchasing conditions are only valid if allied retailers keep themselves to what has been 
prescribed for them in the contracts with the suppliers. Furthermore, almost all alliances 
provides its members with training and consulting (e.g. introducing HACCP systems).  
 
Within marketing activity, four main areas have been mentioned by respondents: 
harmonising merchandise management, pricing, advertising and promotion, and creating 
a chain identity, which all justify the relevance of dimensions revealed by cognitive maps.   
 
Hub firms try to bring several regulations into force in merchandise management. First, 
each group defines the constituents of a bounded assortment which has to be stocked in 
stores. A part of the bounded assortment concerns the product categories where the hub 
firm has made national or regional contracts, excluding the possibility for retailers to 
purchase merchandise from other sources. 
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The other part of the bounded assortment is made up of store brand products. Alliances 
apply different store branding strategies. Each alliance has its own store brands, well 
representing the name of the chain. However, store brands with their own brand names 
are gaining ground, which can challenge manufacturer brands on the one hand, on the 
other hand they can be purchased by other chains, as they are not linked to one specific 
network. Opinions vary concerning the effect of store brands. A few of the interviewees 
have suggested that they increase turnover and enhance loyalty, rather than affecting 
profit. Others, in contrast, claim that store brands carry 2-3 percent surplus in retail 
margin for retailers. 
 
Answers to the question of approximately how much the bounded assortment of the 
total merchandise of retailers amounts to, have also been highly varied. The most 
integrated co-operation is characteristic of Coop, it can cover the whole assortment for a 
small-sized store (apart from fresh food), while Honiker’s policy is that of a looser co-
operation, where members can freely decide on selling store brands. 
 
One of the material effects of a joint purchasing activity is apparent in prices. All the 
alliances make acts of ‘strategic purchasing’. It means they are able to sell certain items at 
a highly favourable retail price, an option gladly embraced by retailers. A less favourite 
obligation is that of bounded prices for store brands and promoted products. For 
obligatory items, a suggested retail price is defined by the hub firm but in this respect the 
retail company is allowed to retain its autonomy in decision making.  
 
The observation of obligations concerning bounded assortment and prices are 
encouraged by financial incentives (pay-backs) by both hub firms and suppliers.  
 
With two retail companies (Coop and Reál), category management has been introduced. 
It has been a successful initiative in the Coop group, while it had to be stopped with 
Reál, due to the resistance of members. 
 
Beyond favourable purchasing conditions, alliances organise regular promotions for their 
members, thought evidently to be an important advantage by retailers in the content 
analysis.
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Groups normally organise two-level promotions, one on a national, one on a regional 
level, based similarly on supplier agreements. Promotional fliers appear on a biweekly 
basis, with national promotions in the first half of the month and regional promotions in 
the second half of the month, the latter exhibiting more potential to adapt to local 
demands. The advertising of the alliance is composed of promotions and related 
advertisements. They sometimes organise nationwide campaigns and promotional games, 
as well, advertising the whole chain.  
One interviewee has observed that the turnover of stores increases by 20-30 percent in 
promotion periods. 
 
Creating a chain identity is also a process initiated by hub firms because they have 
realised that manufacturers, beyond the amount sold, tend to focus on distribution to 
end-consumers. It is the retail network that appeals to manufacturers a lot, but a uniform 
layout has to be ensured in allied stores. Establishing a chain identity is an evident 
priority with each group, nevertheless, its realisation may vary from alliance to alliance. 
Hub firms have created a detailed corporate identity handbook, containing the 
components of store design and layout. By the present days, applying chain identity 
elements has become a precondition of entry.  
 
Co-operation between hub firm and allied retailer is determined by alliance structure and 
way of decision making. In retail strategic alliances, decision making is also a highly 
similar process. Shareholders, who have invested in creating the alliance make decisions 
on issues concerning the network. Most of the members are associated members, having 
joined the chain later than the others. Interviewees argue that the relationship between 
allied retailers and hub firm is especially influenced by the attitude, competence and retail 
experience of the owner. Despite this, allied retailers are not easily persuaded to co-
operate where the autonomy of their decision making is reduced. It is most apparent 
when harmonising activities and implementing uniform regulations. On top of all this, 
the composition of retailers is greatly heterogeneous in all the four alliances, which makes 
it difficult to create and enforce uniform regulations.  
 
Due to the heterogeneous nature of the composition of the networks, every group 
employs some type of differentiation among their allied retailers. 
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The basis of differentiation may be location, floor space or sometimes even shelf 
capacity. The owners of small-scaled stores and with a worse location have to meet lower 
requirements, but consequently, in direct proportion to this, the allowances they may be 
entitled to, are limited. 
 
The performance of members are typically measured by monthly sales data, declared by 
retailers themselves. Sales are monitored on the basis supplier reports and then financial 
outcome is aggregated from financial reports.  
 
There are some marked differences between the performance of retailers, which may be 
attributed to differences of size and region. Larger-scaled stores can be operated with a 
better scale of economy. The turnover and assortment of stores depend on the region 
and the type of settlement, caused by the differences of buying power and consumer 
habits. 
 
All interviewees shared the view that member retailers who are willing to co-operate and 
exploit advantages offered by the alliance, may obtain considerable profit and reinvesting 
it, may realise significant capital accumulation. Shareholders and large-scale companies 
are characterised by ongoing investments and long-term perspectives, whereas small-
sized companies firstly aim at survival and short-term outcomes, which render co-
operation more difficult.  
 
In view of the content analysis, causal map and results of interviews with experts, I have 
modified my initial theoretical model (see Exhibit 6.6.), shown in Exhibit 6.10. The 
interconnections revealed are described in the next subchapter containing my 
hypotheses.  
 
6.6. Hypotheses 
6.6.1. The relationship between performance and marketing strategy elements influenced 
by the alliance  
 
Content analysis has revealed that retailers’ purchasing costs decrease after having joined 
an alliance, enabling them to introduce a few percents’ price level reductions. Price level 
decrease leads to turnover growth. Mulhern and Leone (1991) have illustrated in their 
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research that, considering several product categories, reducing retail prices produces the 
effect of turnover increase. A similar conclusion has been arrived at by Litvack et. al 
(1995). 
 
H1a) There is a negative relationship between price level decrease influenced by the strategic alliance and 
sales of retailers. 
 
Providing that other factors are invariable, price level decrease alone affects profit in an 
unfavourable way, for it results in a decrease of retail margin (Tietz [1993]). Still, it has 
also been demonstrated by Hoch et al. (1994) that price reductions may make a 
favourable effect if they are coupled with the reductions of purchasing costs (Mulhern 
[1997]). 
 
H1b) Price level decrease influenced by the strategic alliance affect retailers’ profit in a positive way if 
retailers’ costs have decreased since their entry. 
 
The literature review and the results of the content analysis both support the statement 
that a strategic alliance plays a significant part in member firms’ promotional activity.  
 
Most of the empirical researches have recognised the positive effect of sales promotions 
upon turnover (Mulhern [1997]). However, it must be noted that conclusions have 
mostly been described on a product category level and there may arise some substituting 
or complementary effects between brands. It has only been Leunissen et al. (1996) who 
have examined the relationship between allied companies’ advertising intensity and 
performance on a more aggregate level, having found a positive correlation. Retailers 
investigated have suggested that joint advertising with the strategic alliance and sales 
promotions affect company turnover positively. In contracts to their previous 
independent status when most they profited only occasionally and through resellers from 
the benefits of manufacturer promotions (Bauer&Agárdi [2000]). In the content analysis, 
several retailers have mentioned that after their entry their promotional activities have 
become more regular and intense. 
 
H2a) There is a positive relationship between the intensity of promotions organised by a strategic alliance, 
and retailer sales. 
 
 102
 
 
 
Exhibit 6.10.  
The Modifications of the Initial Theoretical Model based on the Results of Content Analysis 
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The effect of promotions on retailer’s turnover is a much debated issue. Some researches have 
concluded (Walters [1991], Walters&MacKenzie [1988]) that various types of promotion (loss-
leader, couponing, price discounts) do boost store traffic but do not generate profit for retailers. 
As opposed to this, others (Mulhern&Leone [1991]) have justified empirically that promotion 
products may create profit in case complementary effects between product categories are 
enhanced. The joint promotions of strategic alliances and member firms are normally backed by 
manufacturer trade promotions, compensating for the margin loss caused by retail promotions 
Curhan&Chevalier (1976) argue that retail promotions are profitable if discount provided for 
consumers is lower than trade allowance. Still, this profit may decrease due to substituting effects 
triggered by promotions. 
 
H2b) There is a significant relationship between the intensity of promotions organised by a strategic alliance and 
retailer’s profit.  
 
Content analysis has revealed that advertising, as a rule, is mostly linked to promotions and there 
have only been scarce examples for nationwide advertising, supporting the whole chain, to which 
retailers have attributed a turnover boosting effect.  
 
H3) There is a positive relationship between advertising ensured by strategic alliances and retailer’s turnover.  
 
The range of products purchased by strategic alliances is highly standardised and often there is a 
bounded assortment prescribed for retailers. In the exploratory research, the stability of 
assortment has been an important aspect of merchandise management, i.e. products offered by 
stores are continuously at consumers’ disposal.  
 
Assortment stability as a separate construct has not been mentioned in previous researches, but 
several authors (Tietz [1993], Levy&Weitz [2004]) have implied that appropriate breadth and 
depth of merchandise affects turnover and profit positively. Shaw et. al (1994) and Leunissen et. 
al (1996) have examined that economies of scale and scope provided by the strategic alliance 
affects business performance (e.g. gross margin) of allied retailers in a positive way. 
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H4a) There is a positive relationship between the assortment stability influenced by strategic alliances and retailer’s 
sales. 
 
H4b) There is a positive relationship between the assortment stability influenced by strategic alliances and retailer’s 
profit. 
 
In the content analysis, the distribution possibility of store brands has been mentioned a number 
of times by retailers as an advantage of being allied, for due to their favourable prices they boost 
turnover and ensure high retail margins at the same time. Several authors (Cotteril et. al [2000], 
Halstead&Ward [1995], Mulhern [1997]) have proved in empirical researches that store brands 
carry higher margins for retailers. Similarly, Hoch and Banerji (1993) have illustrated a strict 
correlation between the presence of store brands and store turnover and profit.  
 
H5a) There is a positive relationship between the number of store brands introduced by strategic alliances and 
retailer sales.  
H5b) There is a positive relationship between the number of store brands introduced by strategic alliances and 
retailer’s profit. 
 
Strategic alliances have a strong impact on the layout of the stores as well, by applying certain 
identity elements. Cronnin&Skinner (1984), Hildebrandt (1988) have evaluated the identity of 
retail chains from a consumer viewpoint and found a positive correlation between factors 
forming the retail chain’s identity and profit. Leunissen et. al (1996) have examined the effect of 
the presence of various identity elements on retail performance.  
 
H6a) There is a positive relationship between the number of identity elements characteristic for a strategic alliance 
and retailer’s sales.  
H6b) There is a positive relationship between the number of identity elements characteristic for a strategic alliance 
and retailer’s profit.  
 
In interfirm partnerships, satisfaction itself is an output and a relevant performance indicator of 
co-operations (Mohr&Spekman [1994], Tietz [1993], Geringer&Herbert [1991], 
Bucklin&Sengupta f1993]). Earlier research (Venkatraman&Ramanujam [1986], Dess&Robinson 
[1984]) has assumed that there is a strict positive correlation between objective and subjective 
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performance variables. Seth and Parvatiyar (2000) suppose that there is a positive relationship  
between satisfaction with alliance and member firm performance. 
 
H7) There is a positive relationship between the retailer’s performance (sales and profit) and satisfaction with hub 
firm.  
 
6.6.2. The Relationships of Behavioural Factors in the Relationship between Hub Firm and 
Member Firm 
 
Anderson and Narus (1990) have demonstrated in their research that there is a negative 
association between the influence of a partner firm (the inverse of dependence) and satisfaction. 
Similarly, Frazier et al. (1989) have concluded that resellers judge their own dependence and 
satisfaction with manufacturers in a negative way. Gassenheimer et al. (1998) and Andaleeb 
(1995), however, are of the view that there may be both negative and positive associations 
between dependence and satisfaction. For dependence – as a reduced scope of activity – may 
result in dissatisfaction, nevertheless, a comparatively great amount of dependence may still cause 
satisfaction, provided that the results of co-operation are shaping up according to expectations. 
Heide&John (1988) have shown in their research that asymmetric dependence, just as 
commitment and financial performance are positively associated, for the partner suffering the 
greater dependence will only be interested in maintaining the co-operation if it truly compensates 
for his loss of autonomy. Heide and Stump (1995) are of an opposing view, having found an 
inverse relationship between asymmetric dependence and the quality of co-operation. Interviews 
with managers of domestic retail strategic alliances seem to support a negative association. 
 
H8) There is a negative relationship between the dependence on hub firms perceived by retailers and the satisfaction 
with hub firms.  
 
Kumar et. al (1992) when evaluating reseller performance, have disclosed a positive relationship 
between competence and satisfaction. Barclay and Smith (1997) presume a positive association 
between the two constructs, as well. Between competence and trust, a strict positive correlation 
has been found by several authors (Doney&Cannon [1997], Selnes [1998]), although empirical 
results reveal interfirm communication to be a relevant intermediary variable between the two 
constructs (Anderson&Weitz [1989], Selnes [1998]). 
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H9) There is a positive relationship between the competence as perceived by retailers and satisfaction with hub firm.  
 
Ganesan (1994) has assumed a positive relationship between satisfaction with partner and trust. 
Similarly, Selnes (1998), Anderson&Weitz (1989) presume a positive association, too, justified 
empirically. Geyskens et. al (1998) treat satisfaction as a direct consequence of satisfaction. 
Furthermore, Doney and Cannon [1997] suppose a positive interconnection between trust and 
competence.  
 
H10) There is a positive relationship between retailers’ trust in hub firm and their satisfaction with hub firm.  
 
6.6.3. Hypotheses Concerning Moderating Variables 
 
In my initial theoretical model (Exhibit 6.6.) I have presumed the existence of moderating 
variables, influencing the relationship of strategy and performance. One of the most evident 
factors is the effect of environment which may affect the connection between strategy and 
performance in various ways. Providing that the strategy-performance relationship of companies 
operating in various environments differ significantly, it can be stated that environmental factors 
have a homologiser effect i.e. they influence the strength of strategy-performance correlation. It 
may as well occur that companies operating in various environments pursue various strategies 
and their effect is manifested only indirectly, via the strategy chosen. In this case, it is the form of 
the strategy-performance relationship that is determined by the environmental factors. 
Alternatively, environmental context defines both the strength and form of the relationship, 
termed a ‘quasi moderating effect’ (McArthur&Nystrom [1991]) 
 
Relying on results achieved so far, I assume that competitive environment i.e. the presence of 
competitors, may have a homologising effect on the interaction system investigated and affects 
most of all the strength of a retail strategy-performance relationship. Competitive environment, 
at the same time, means the intensity of competition, about which I presume that the more 
intensive competition for a retailer is, the more the relationship of retail strategy and market 
performance may be weakened.  
 
H11) The increase of competitive intensity weakens the relationship between retail strategy and market 
performance. 
 106
The size of an enterprise is at all times crucial in researches about retail companies (Leunissen et 
al. [1996]). The larger the capacity of a retail enterprise is, the more it is able to operate with 
economies of scale, consequently, an increase of size will lead to higher sales and gross margin 
figures.  
 
H12) The increase of capacity strengthens the relationship of retail strategy and market performance.  
 
Location is also a significant moderating variable, defining the trade area of a retail enterprise. In 
larger settlements retailers may expect a greater demand, and thus, better performance.  
 
H13) The growth of the trade area strengthens of the relationship of retail strategy and market performance. 
 
6.7. Quantitative Research – Survey  
 
Based on the explorative research methods, I was able to narrow down the initial theoretical 
model and formulate hypotheses between constructs. Before testing the hypotheses, I wish to 
outline the applied scales for measuring the constructs of the model (Exhibit 6.10.) in the next 
subchapter (For the actual scales see Appendix 7.) 
 
As a starting point with allied retailers, I have assessed which activities of member firms the 
strategic alliance influences, in general and with special reference to marketing activity (Shaw et. al 
1994).  
 
Scales Referring to Individual Elements of Retail Strategy Influenced by an Alliance  
 
By the term retail price we mean prices available for consumers. Retail price is the function of the 
demand patterns and the purchasing costs. By way of the content analysis it has been explored 
that joining a type of strategic alliances (e.g. buying groups or voluntary chains) has a beneficial 
effect on the price level of member firm stores. It is so primarily owing to favourable purchasing 
conditions.  
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Pricing researches in literature prefer to quantify prices on a product category level; relying on 
scanner data, an average price of the brand or category is considered (Hoch&Banerji [1993], 
Krishnan&Rao [1995]). Chevalier and Curhan (1976) take the average amount of discounts into 
account with price promotions. Smith et al. (1995) have measured the pricing activities of retailers 
by means of a multi-item scale. Respondents have evaluated their pricing on a five-point scale, 
comparing themselves to their competitors. The authors have used a subjective and at the same 
time relative scale. Leunissen et. al (1996) use objective, absolute indicators for quantifying the 
pricing of allied retailers. They define average prices on the basis of product categories, covering 
the assortment.  
 
In the questionnaire, respondents were to specify the average retail margins of eight different 
merchandise groups. I have created merchandise groups (fresh food, prepackaged food, sweets, 
beverages, off-licence, tobacco products, health&beauty products and general products) having 
considered the supply and classification used of several grocery-retailers, characterising well the 
merchandise of these type of stores. The margins of individual articles may vary considerably, 
therefore, I am taking the standard deviation of retail margins into account, too.  
 
The exploratory research concerning merchandise management of member firms has highlighted the 
fact that a strategic alliance fundamentally encourages stabile and uniform merchandise assortment and 
the appearance of store brands.  
 
Bergen et. al (1996) have identified a product category variety relying on the number of non-
identical products in one category and the number of brand variants. A similar solution has been 
applied by Hoch et al. (1999), aggregating all the different variants of the merchandise. Hoch and 
Banerji (1993), examining the success factors of store brands, have quantified the breadth and 
depth of merchandise, considering the number of manufacturer brands within the product 
category in question, the number of brands and the number of SKUs of the given category. 
Leunissen et. al (1996) use the number of collections distributed by fashion retailers and the 
number of product categories stocked in the store when analysing the effect of strategic alliances.  
 
As assortment stability means the continuous occurrence of a certain proportion of SKUs, it 
seems practical – drawing upon the above – to define it by merchandise groups. For measuring 
stability, beyond the present number of SKUs, we have also asked respondents to specify the 
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number of SKUs composing the base level of assortment, disregarding seasonal and promotional 
assortment.  
 
The presence of store brands has been measured by aggregating the number of store brands in 
each merchandise group. Consequently, here I have also applied absolute, definite indicators in 
the questionnaire. 
 
Promotion and advertising also play an essential part in the marketing activity of member firms. 
Content analysis has shown that it is mainly promotion intensity and promotional fliers as regular 
advertisers that are linked to the co-ordinational role of strategic alliances.  
 
The intensity of promotion has been measured by different tools in a number of researches. 
Hoch and Banerji (1993) define the intensity of promotion and advertising in terms of promotion 
and advertising expenditures of a certain product category in a certain period, spent by 
manufacturers on their brands in the period given. Blattberg and Levin (1987) attempt at a 
measurement of retail promotion by stock change. Chevalier and Curhan (1976) classify retailers’ 
promotions in terms of different types of promotions (layout, advertising, discounts), recognising 
a strong, an average and a poor intensity of promotion. Leunissen et. al (1996) evaluate the 
communication of retailers along three criteria: 1) advertising expenditures; 2) dummies indicating 
whether retailer advertises in daily newspapers, free local magazines or sheets; 3) two dummies 
indicating the application of direct marketing (direct mail, retailers’ own free magazines or 
sheets). Mulhern (1997) considers the depth of price discounts, duration of promotion, period of 
time between promotions when measuring retail promotion. 
 
On the strength of the above, there are several variables applicable for quantifying the advertising 
and promotion activity of grocery retailers. For measuring the intensity of promotion (national, 
regional) I have opted for two variables, i.e. frequency of national and regional promotions and 
number of SKUs included in promotions within one year. Similarly, I have measured joint 
advertising with the chain’s and the enterprise’s frequency of national and regional advertising.  
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Creating a chain identity has been a significant factor mentioned in interviews. For the most part, it 
is a much broader concept than the uniformity of frontal design and logo alone. Leunissen et. al 
(1996) apply a dummy variable for detecting whether a retailer has been provided with support by 
the alliance to establish a uniform store design. In content analysis, among identity elements, the 
application of a joint logo and frontal design elements, uniform merchandise display and 
featuring prices have been mentioned. In the questionnaire we have aggregated the number and 
presence of identity elements prescribed by the group and applied by retailers.  
 
Performance Measures of the Allied Retailers 
 
Performance researches concerning strategic alliances have produced controversial results, for the goal 
system of alliances is highly complex. The dyadic nature i.e. performance measurement generated 
in the interaction of two companies, represents some further complications. The performance of 
a strategic alliance may be asymmetric, one company achieving its goals and producing better 
financial performance within the alliance, while for another, co-operation will be unsuccessful 
(Doz et. al [1989], Hamel [1991]). 
 
There are attempts to quantify the performance of strategic alliances in terms of the duration of 
the alliance (Kogut [1989], Anderson&Weitz [1989]). Gulati (2000), however, opposes the idea, 
criticising that these researches do not distinguish between natural and premature separations.  
 
It is not an easy task to create an association between member firm performance and belonging 
to a strategic alliance, since performance is affected by several other factors, among which there 
is the effect of the environment. For this reason, researches frequently apply indirect indicators 
for measuring the performance of allied retailers. For example Balakrishnan and Koza (1993) 
came to the conclusions on how much a company has profited from its membership on the basis 
of share prices of the companies. Others have selected survival as a performance measure 
(Baum&Oliver [1991]). 
 
Strategic elements applied by the alliance determine the performance indicators to be used. 
Studies concerning retail strategy unanimously rely on turnover and profit (gross margin) for a 
measurement of interconnections.  
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I analyse the effect of certain dimensions in terms of absolute financial performance indicators 
(turnover, inventory at retail, profit), and relative (price income and percentage change of profit 
after having joined the alliance), non-financial indicators (inventory turnover). In the survey, I 
have incorporated both objective and subjective performance variables to enable a 
multidimensional measurement of member firm performance.  
 
There are, certainly, other factors as well, influencing company performance, which moderate the 
relationship of retail strategy and performance. Such factors are the competitive environment, the 
features of location and size of the retailer. When operationalising the competitive environment I 
have measured how many and what type of stores are there to be found in the trade area of a 
retailer (Leunissen et al. 1996). I have quantified the influence of location in terms of the type of 
settlement (county capital, municipality with a population of below or over 50,000 or village). Size 
has been quantified by the number of employees, stores owned, and aggregate floor space of 
stores operated.  
 
The Relationship between Member Firm and Hub Firm in a Strategic Alliance  
 
A significant element of the behavioural aspect of the model is dependence which has been 
explained in the content analysis as giving up one’s autonomy to a certain extent. This is 
supported by the literature (Pfeffer&Salancik [1978]), where this construct appears as a 
consequence of interfirm partnerships.  
 
The concept of dependence was explained in great detail in Chapter 3.3, mainly based on 
Emerson (1962)’s approach, suggesting that the measure of dependence is defined by how much 
one company depends on resources owned by the other. Dependence is ultimately the potential 
of organisations and groups in the environment of a certain organisation (Pfeffer&Salancik 
[1978]). Emerson recognises two components of dependence: 1) value/advantage received, 2) 
replaceability. Based on this, several researches have created multidimensional scales in terms of 
advantage derived from co-operation and replaceability of partner firm (Kumar et. al [1998], 
Lusch&Brown [1996], Andaleeb [1995]).  
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Researchers have applied a number of approaches42 but dependence measurement scales are 
always multidimensional ones. The sales-profit approach of El-Ansary and Stern (1972) measures 
the rate of sales and profit of target firm contributed by partner firm. The higher this 
contribution is, the more dependent the target firm is on its partner. A number of researchers 
(Brown et. al [1983], Anderson et. al [1987]) have applied the sales-profit method. Kale (1986) 
has developed the method and quantified not only the actual sales and profit contributions but 
the target firm’s sales and profit expectations, the partner firm is likely to generate in future. How 
much the partner firm promotes the fulfilment of the company’s goals is also included in this 
measurement system (Kumar et. al [1998]),. Replaceability assumes the existence of alternative 
co-operations, includes the amount of switching costs and the difficulty of replacing the present 
partner in general (Kumar et. al [1998], Andaleeb [1995], Heide&John [1988]). 
 
I measure the dependence of member firms on a strategic alliance i.e. hub firm by means of 
Kumar, Steer, Steenkamp (1998)’s scale. The scale is fundamentally based on dependence 
dimensions defined by Emerson (1962): value received from alliance and replaceability of 
alliance. 
 
In literature, professional knowledge is treated as the competence of the partner firm. Anderson and 
Weitz (1989) defines competence as ‘technological and trade expertise’ perceived by partner. 
Kumar et. al (1992) interprets competence as part of reseller performance and evaluates skills and 
knowledge provided in different fields.  
 
Competence is also understood as a multidimensional construct by authors, incorporating a 
general evaluation (Kumar et. al [1992], Anderson&Weitz [1989], Doney&Cannon [1997]) and an 
evaluation by each activity of partner firms (Selnes [1998], Barclay&Smith [1997]). The latter 
exhibits a number of similarities to the construct of role performance. This research uses Kumar 
et al. (1992)’s scale which evaluates the hub firm’s business skills, expertise, market knowledge 
and professional development from the viewpoint of the partner firm. 
                                                 
42 Stern, El-Ansary (1972): sales- and profit approach, asymmetric dependence (Lusch&Brown [1996]), relative 
dependence (Anderson&Narus [1990]), role performance (Frazier [1983]). 
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Geyskens et al. analyse researches investigating trust in interfirm relationships relying on meta-
analysis. Trust is defined by most researches on distribution systems as ‘to what extent a 
company considers its partner to be honest and/or benevolent’. Trust in the partner’s honesty is 
a belief of the company that the partner is reliable, is as good as its word, fulfils its obligations 
and is serious (Anderson&Narus [1990], Dwyer et. al [1987]).  
 
Trust in the partner’s benevolence is the company’s belief that the partner not only considers its 
own interests but aims at achieving joint goals and advantages. A benevolent partner submits its 
own interests to long-term advantages, that can be realised within the framework of co-operation 
(Anderson et. al [1987]) and will not pursue steps which would affect partner firms negatively 
(Andaleeb [1995], Anderson&Narus  [1990]).  
 
Although the two components of trust are well distinguishable conceptually, in practice they 
closely intertwined (Geyskens et. al [1998]). Trust is also treated as a multidimensional construct 
by literature.  
 
I apply the scale developed by Doney and Cannon (1997) that quantifies both dimensions 
(benevolence and honesty) of trust. Member firm owners were to evaluate their impressions on 
how much the hub firm cares about the success and well-being of their enterprise and how much 
it considers their interests, whether the hub firms keeps its promises, information received from 
them are credible and if there is a danger of its dishonest behaviour.  
 
Performance affects satisfaction with a strategic alliance i.e. a hub firm and the same stands the 
other way round, member firms are likely to be satisfied with a strategic alliance if financial 
performance justifies the correctness of the decision (Sheth& Parvatiyar [2000]). Several authors 
have examined and formulated definitions of satisfaction with partner in the field of interfirm 
relationships. Gaski and Nevin (1985) argue that the construct of satisfaction is a general 
judgement of a channel member formulated about the distribution channel. Dwyer&Schurr, Oh 
(1987) suggest that satisfaction is a global evaluation of relationship fulfilment. Anderson&Narus 
(1990) establish a highly similar definition, saying that satisfaction is an affective evaluation of all 
aspects of a working relationship (Gassenheimer et. al [1998], Barclay&Smith [1997]). However, 
there is an important difference, namely that satisfaction is treated as an emotional component by 
Baclay&Smith (1997). 
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A different approach is that of Kumar et. al (1992)’s, who define consumer satisfaction in terms 
of quality and level of services provided by resellers, drawing heavily upon Oliver&Bearden 
(1985)’s confirmation/disconfirmation theory43. 
 
Although there is no considerable difference between definitions – except for Kumar et al. (1992) 
–, marked differences are to be found with attempts at quantifying it. In several researches 
satisfaction is operationalised as a one-dimensional construct, measuring satisfaction with partner 
along one single statement. The other means for measuring satisfaction is to use 
multidimensional constructs. General satisfaction is formulated in more statements by one group 
of authors, while the others measure satisfaction in terms of activities carried out by partner. 
 
In my view, the multidimensional measurement of general satisfaction cannot be suitable because 
the synonyms of satisfaction are used, among which respondents may not perceive semantic 
differences. Satisfaction with the individual activities of hub firm is not suitable, either, as these 
are the ones to be quantified in the effect on strategy. For these reasons, I have decided to 
measure satisfaction with the help of a one-dimensional, 7-point scale, which expresses the 
satisfaction with hub firm. 
 
At the end of the questionnaire there have been questions on member firm’s profile (year of 
foundation, store number, size, number of employees) and the owner of the firm (age, education, 
number of years spent in retailing). 
 
The questionnaire of independent retailers handled as a control group is identical to that of allied 
retailers’, apart from points on the alliance. We collected data on the elements of retail strategy 
and the perceived benefits and drawbacks of buying groups. 
 
Before carrying out the field work, I have conducted a pilot study with member firm owners in 
Budapest. I have thus identified interpretational and response problems and finalised the 
questionnaire. 
                                                 
43 The theory (Oliver&Bearden[1985]) predicts that satisfaction is achieved when expectations are fulfilled 
(confirmation), that negative disconfirmation of expectations will result in dissatisfaction, and that positive 
disconfirmation will result in enhanced satisfaction. 
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7. DATA ANALYSIS.  THE EVALUATION OF RESULTS 
 
After recording the data, relying upon descriptives, I have cleaned the database and checked data 
entry with the help of probability sampling from 10 percent of the questionnaires.  
 
I analyse the data of the quantitative research with the SPSS and AMOS softwares. In the course 
of my analysis, I have to apply statistical adjustments. With variables describing retail strategy and 
performance, I examine outliers and removed them if it seemed necessary. As structural equation 
analysis does not permit the presence of missing values, I had to substitute missing values with 
imputed values. For balancing the scale differences of individual variables, I have standardised 
the variables of the model.  
 
7.1. Sampling and the Composition of the Sample 
 
The population comprises managers and/or owners of grocery and FMCG retail companies taking 
part in some type of a horizontal co-operation (buying groups and/or voluntary chains) and own 
several stores. In domestic retailing over a few hundred retail companies and enterprises have 
already joined a certain co-operational form, on whom the interconnections of my theoretical 
model can be tested. As for the controllability of the theoretical model I involve independent 
retailers as a control group in my research, who are not taking part in any type of co-operation. 
 
In the case of both allied and independent retailers there has been a sampling needed. I have 
defined quotas along counties, considering the population and store numbers. Due to 
methodological aspects44 I have planned the group of allied retailers and the control group 
(independent retailers) both to be the same size (n1=n2=100). However, as a consequence of 
unfavourable response rates and mostly the curtailment of the research budget, the planned 
sample size could not have been realised. County proportions have also become highly distorted, 
therefore the sample does not represent domestic-owned grocery retailing changes from a 
geographical point of view (Appendix 8). The conclusions arrived at thus cannot be generalised 
for all domestic retailers. In view of this fact, the information obtained from the empirical 
research, is to be regarded as that of an exploring nature. 
                                                 
44 Substantial difference in group size might distort the robustness of tests applied by comparing the group statistics. 
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The sample of allied retailers contains a total of 50 enterprises. Most retailers involved (84%) are 
associated members, i.e. they have no shares in the alliance. The proportion of shareholders is a 
mere 16 percent. These proportions quite accurately approximate the composition of allied 
member firms. 28.6 percent of retailers of the sample have already switched alliances, the 
majority, however, (71.4%) have been loyal to the alliance once chosen. Associated retail 
enterprises by and large own one or two stores (76.1%), but there have also appeared a set of 
companies with bigger retail capacity, operating smaller or larger-sized chains. The tendency is 
reflected in the distribution of floorspace. Retailers with a floorspace below 100 square metres are 
represented in the highest share (39.5%) and the proportion of enterprises with a total floorspace 
of 101-200 square metres is also significant (37.2%). The total floorspace of enterprises with a 
number of stores falls into the higher categories and there are a few retailers with a capacity of 
over 800 square metres in the sample.  
 
Broadly speaking, the companies of the sample were founded after 1996 (54.2%), a mere 15 
percent had existed before the change of regimes. Approximately one third of respondents 
founded their enterprise during the privatisation of retailing. Concentration processes starting 
after the nineties have significantly reshaped the structure of the sector, affecting domestic-
owned retailers, too. 67.4 percent of company owners had worked in the same sector before the 
change of regimes, for they confessed to have spent more than 10 years in retailing. Owners 
predominantly possess secondary qualifications but 40 percent of them have conducted higher or 
further education studies. (For more information on the composition of the sample see Appendix 
9.)  
 
7.2. A Comparison of Allied and Independent Retailers 
 
Considering marketing strategy and performance variables, I first wish to examine whether allied 
retailers do perform better than independent retailers. It also means looking at the question if a 
better marketing and corporate performance is due to the alliance or some other factors. The two 
retailer groups have been compared using the t test.  
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Exhibit 7.1. 
A Comparison of Marketing Strategy Variables of Allied and Independent Retailers 
 
Variables of marketing 
strategy 
Type of the 
retailer N Mean Std. Dev. Variance t statistic Sig. 
Allied 34 1123,91 1021,99 Equal 3,35 0,001 Basic assortment 
(Number of SKUs) Independent 43 509,29 568,77 Not equal 3,14 0,003 
Allied 43 18,49 4,96 Equal -2,32 0,022 Average retail margin (%) 
Independent 46 21,16 5,83 Not equal -2,34 0,022 
Allied 50 2,38 0,99 Equal 4,69 0,000 Number of allowances 
received Independent 49 1,39 1,11 Not equal 4,68 0,000 
Allied 50 28,30 18,68 Equal 7,85 0,000 Annual number of 
promotions Independent 49 6,10 6,60 Not equal 7,91 0,000 
Allied 50 8,12 8,96 Equal 4,79 0,000 Annual number of 
advertisements Independent 49 1,43 3,97 Not equal 4,82 0,000 
Allied 48 3,83 1,31 Equal 9,75 0,000 Number of chain identity 
elements Independent 49 1,35 1,20 Not equal 9,74 0,000 
 
Allied retailers prove to have better results than independent retailers in terms of almost all retail 
strategy variables. Group means differ significantly from one another (p<0,005), even if the 
condition of variance homogeneity is not fulfilled. Practically speaking, basic assortment is twice 
as large with allied retailers as with independent enterprises. The statement is valid for all the nine 
product groups i.e. there are no shifts in proportions to be found, the individual product groups 
are approximately equally represented in the merchandise of both retail groups. Allied retailers 
receive more allowances from suppliers, manifested in an extended payment deadline, more 
favourable purchasing prices and the pay-back of secondary conditions. It has possibly been for 
more favourable conditions and bounded prices prescribed by hub firms that allied retailers are 
able to introduce a retail margin 2.67 percent lower than independent retailers. Lower margins 
supposedly result in lower consumer prices, as well.  
 
While independent companies are only able to organise promotions for their consumers on 6.1 
occasions annually, allied retailers run an average of 28.3 promotions backed by the alliance. The 
majority of their promotions is made up of national and regional promotions supported by the 
corresponding advertising. The application of chain identity elements is also more enhanced with 
retailers belonging to an alliance. 
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Exhibit 7.2.  
Performance Measures of Allied and Independent Retailers 
 Performance 
measures Type of the retailer N Mean Std. Dev. Variance t statistic Sig. 
Allied 30 156431,8 178158,13 Equal 4,29 0,000 Total sales in 2003 
(Thousand HUF) Independent 35 26264,1 23416,96 Not equal 3,97 0,000 
Allied 26 19010,5 25626,61 Equal 3,19 0,002 Total profit in 2003 
(Thousand HUF) Independent 25 2527,3 3293,55 Not equal 3,25 0,003 
Total  gross margin 
in 2003 Allied 28 33957,4 38815,9 Equal 4,33 0,000 
(Thousand HUF) Independent 35 5363,1 4739,9 Not equal 3,88 0,001 
 
It is revealed that there are considerable differences in performance variables within each group, 
ignoring these, however, allied and non-allied retailers shows that they exhibit substantial 
differences (p<0,05). Member firms of retail strategic alliances enjoyed higher sales, gross 
margins and higher profit last year than independent retailers. 
 
7.3. The Effect of Size versus Alliance 
 
On the basis of the above analyses we may challenge the initial assumption whether it is 
exclusively a horizontal alliance that is to be responsible for a better marketing- and financial, 
market performance or there are some other factors contributing to differences between the 
groups. Size is of a crucial importance in retailing, therefore now I investigate the size differences 
of the two groups (Exhibit 7.3.).  
 
Exhibit 7.3.  
A Comparison of Size between Allied and Independent Variables 
Measures of size 
Type of the 
retailer N Mean Std. Dev. Variance t statistic Sig. 
Allied 46 11,2 15,5 Equal 3,63 0,000 Number of store 
employees Independent 46 2,8 2,1 Not equal 3,63 0,001 
Allied 46 12,6 17,0 Equal 3,66 0,000 Total number of 
employees Independent 46 3,3 2,1 Not equal 3,66 0,001 
Allied 46 2,8 3,9 Equal 2,88 0,005 
Number of stores Independent 49 1,2 0,5 Not equal 2,79 0,008 
Allied 43 228,6 283,0 Equal 4,16 0,000 Total square meter of 
the store(s) Independent 49 58,5 40,5 Not equal 3,91 0,000 
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I quantify retail company size with several variables (store number, total floorspace and number 
of sales and administrative personnel). Despite significant standard deviation it is to be 
recognised that there are scale differences in terms of store floorspace and sales personnel 
number. Store numbers also differ, still, a difference of 1.6 stores does not necessarily explain the 
huge difference encountered when looking at the total floorspace. It is thus disclosed that allied 
retailers do not necessarily operate more stores but stores with a larger floorspace. Size 
differences of the two groups may account for the assumption that it is not for the co-operation 
but larger capacity that allied retailers perform better. 
 
I analyse the effect of marketing strategy and size on performance by means of regression 
analysis. In regression analysis, retail strategic variables and variables describing size have stood 
for independent variable groups; sales in the year 200345 for the dependent variable. Appendix 10 
contains the summary of regression analysis. (Model 1 always exhibits models referring to the 
strategic variables, Model 2 the co-effect of strategic and size variables.)  
 
Both variable groups have significant and considerable effect on turnover. If the size variables of 
a retailer are involved in the regression equation, the coefficient of determination of the model46 
will grow significantly. It is, however, not certain that each size feature has the same effect on 
sales of the retailers, thus in view of this, I have stepwise reduced the number of the size 
variables.  
 
In the course of the modelling process it has been revealed that in fact it is sales personnel 
number that contributes to explaining sales differences to the largest extent. Removing this 
variable from the regression equation will lead to the coefficient of determination decreasing by 
28%, which reveals a relevant loss. Surprisingly enough, store number and floorspace exercise far 
less explaining power. Relying on the above, I argue that size has almost the same effect on 
performance variables than do strategic variables.  
                                                 
45 The gross margin in value and the profit reveal high correlation (r>0.9) with the total sales figures, so I have not 
repeated the regression analysis for the other performance measures because the analysis leads to the same results. 
46 The coefficient of determination (R2) signifies the proportion of the total variation in the dependent variable that 
is accounted for by the variation of the independent variables. It shows the strength of the relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables (Malhotra [2001], p. 610) 
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Strategic group research has studied the effect of size on performance on several occasions. 
Porter (1979) has first employed size when establishing company groups, on the basis of which 
he distinguishes between market leader and follower types of companies. He concludes his 
empirical research by stating that market leaders possess bigger size and operate far more 
profitably than the other company group. Porter attributes this strategic and competitive 
advantage to efficiency due to size. Size thus appears here as a main effect. Mascarenhas and 
Aaker (1989) similarly find a significant relationship between the performance variables and size 
versus strategic attributes of oil drilling companies but they conclude that size alone is not 
sufficient to explain strategy differences.  
 
Lewis and Thomas (1990), examine strategic groups in British grocery retailing. They include 
strategic variables like store number (reflecting the retailer’s geographical field of operation and 
expansion policy), the average floorspace of stores (representing the firm’s ambition to achieve 
economies of scale). Grocery retailers have also been classified along several concepts (size, key 
strategic variables). When investigating the groups generated on the basis of size and their 
respective performance, they arrive at a dissimilar conclusion to that of Porter (1979), namely 
they find that strategic groups generated on the basis of size correlate to none of the performance 
variables involved (ROS, ROCE, PER). 
 
When evaluating the actual effect of size there are several factors that need to be taken into 
account. To start with, retail alliances set certain expectations towards member firms. The 
aspirant member is to be in possession of a certain capacity and level of turnover in order to be 
able to settle entry expenditures (entry fee, guarantee, monthly contribution to warehousing costs, 
membership fee). The alliance thus sets the scene for a kind of pre-selection, for small-sized 
enterprises are unable to meet the entry requirements. On the other hand, co-operation 
significantly influences (R2=0.526-0.612) annual sales. Thus both size and strategic variables 
determine the annual turnover of a retailer. Consequently, the size of retailers may be regarded as 
quasi moderators (McArthur&Nystrom [1991]), for acting both as independent variables and 
moderators that significantly affect performance.  
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 7.4. The Effect of the Alliance on the Marketing Strategy of Member Firms  
 
Initially it is well worth looking at the motivational factors of retailers which stimulate their 
entering an alliance or group. Exhibit 7.4. clearly shows the ultimate incentives to be favourable 
purchasing conditions (with a mean of 4.63) and providing lower consumer prices (with a mean 
of 4.41) directing them towards co-operation. Owners have regular promotions very much in 
view (mean: 4.02) as an important factor, which they otherwise, as independent retailers, are only 
able to offer rarely and in charge of their own margins.  
 
Exhibit 7.4.  
Evaluation of Incentives Provided by the Retail Strategic Alliances 
 
2,65 2,65
4,41
1,90
4,63
3,10 3,23
3,59
2,40
3,59
4,02
2,40 2,46
3,42
2,35
3,83
2,85
3,10
2,79
3,38 3,38
3,06
1,0
1,5
2,0
2,5
3,0
3,5
4,0
4,5
5,0
R
ed
uc
in
g 
th
e
de
pe
nd
en
ce
on
 t
he
su
pp
li
er
L
ea
rn
in
g 
ne
w
m
an
ag
em
en
t
sk
ill
s
P
ro
vi
di
ng
lo
w
er
co
ns
um
er
pr
ic
e
Jo
in
in
g 
an
al
lia
nc
e 
is
fa
sh
io
na
bl
e
no
w
ad
ay
s
F
av
ou
ra
bl
e
pu
rc
ha
si
ng
co
nd
it
io
ns
R
ed
uc
in
g
m
ar
ke
ti
ng
co
st
s
E
nj
oy
in
g 
th
e
be
ne
fi
ts
 o
f a
n
al
re
ad
y
su
cc
es
sf
ul
R
ed
uc
in
g
tr
an
sp
or
ta
ti
on
an
d 
in
ve
nt
or
y
co
st
s
L
ac
k 
of
ca
pi
ta
l f
or
de
ve
lo
pi
ng
 t
he
fi
rm
P
ro
vi
di
ng
br
oa
d 
va
ri
et
y
by
 s
ha
ri
ng
 th
e
co
st
s
P
ro
vi
di
ng
fr
eq
ue
nt
pr
om
ot
io
ns
 b
y
sh
ar
in
g 
th
e
allied independent
 
n =50 n =49 allied , independent
The figures represent the averages of the respondents’ opinion measured on a 5-point Likert-scale. (1: do not agree 
at all, 5: fully agree) 
It is, however, interesting to note that developing the firm within the framework of the alliance 
(2.40), or learning new management skills (2.65) prove to be less effective incentives. From 
content analysis and interviews with experts it has been unveiled that most retailers under market 
competition pressures primarily had favourable purchasing prices and conditions in view when 
having decided to join an alliance.  
 121
Exhibit 7.5. 
The Influence of a Retail Strategic Alliance on Member Firms’ Function (%) 
51,30
17,20
7,18 4,00 4,26 3,82 3,54 5,50 3,27
0,0
10,0
20,0
30,0
40,0
50,0
60,0
70,0
80,0
90,0
100,0
P
u
rc
h
as
in
g
M
ar
ke
ti
n
g
St
or
e
op
er
at
io
n
s
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t
T
ra
in
in
g 
of
th
e 
em
p
lo
ye
es
L
eg
al
 s
u
p
p
or
t
F
in
an
ci
al
su
p
p
or
t
T
ec
h
n
ol
og
ic
al
su
p
p
or
t
O
th
er
Mean Std. Dev.
 
 n=50
 
Exhibit 7.5. depicts that the member firm owners of the alliance believe the firm’s purchasing 
(51.3%) and marketing activities (17.2%) to be mostly affected by the strategic alliance. Co-
operation little influences store operations (7.2%), and it is a few retailers (5.5%) who receive 
technological support from the hub firm.  
 
The effect on marketing may at first seem less relevant but it is important to note that from joint 
purchasing a number of obligations follow for the member firm (bounded assortment, prices and 
promotions), determining marketing strategy. Still, the data of the above two illustrations bear 
witness to the fact that owners are not fully aware that a centralised purchasing not only leads to 
competitive retail prices and extended payment periods but is reflected in everyday marketing 
activities, too. The joint share of purchasing and marketing (68.5%), however, has a considerable 
effect on the business of member firms. 
 
Beyond the fields of operation I have explored the extent to which the alliance contributes to 
each marketing function (Exhibit 7.6.). Owners were similarly to divide 100 points among 
marketing functions, covering the main marketing tools of retailing. Respondents state that the 
alliance provides the greatest help by organising regular promotions (20.87%) and printing related 
flyers (18.11%). Apart from this, the alliance shapes assortment (15.55%), prices (15.66%) and 
identity of the stores (12.89%). Market research scores are extremely low (4.72) which is not a 
focal activity of retail strategic alliances.  
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Exhibit 7.6. 
Marketing Functions Influenced by the Retail Alliance 
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n=50
The first part of the survey deals with marketing tools applied in retailing in great detail. In the 
following part I focus on the analysis of the descriptive statistics of retail strategy elements 
relevant from the viewpoint of the analytical model.  
 
Concerning the merchandise management of member firms we collected data on the number of SKUs 
distributed in terms of eight merchandise groups (fresh food, prepackaged food, sweets, 
beverages, off-licence, tobacco products, health&beauty products and general products). When 
establishing the merchandise groups I relied on the assortment of 4 grocery retailing chains 
(Coop-chain, G-Roby, CBA and Héliker-chain), whose merchandise showed considerable 
overlaps – ignoring a few exceptions. The number of SKUs in each merchandise group offers 
one an inspection of the breadth and depth of merchandise. The higher the number of SKUs, the 
more probable it is that a retailer is keeping several product categories (the breadth of 
merchandise) and more SKUs within that (depth of merchandise). In Exhibit 7.7. the bars depict 
the number of SKUs of the given product category, the line diagram the respective standard 
deviation. Deviation is usually the same or they sometimes exceed the average of SKUs, which 
points at the heterogeneity of allied retailers.  
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In connection with the actual composition of the assortment it is revealed that member firms 
prefer prepackaged food (mean: 429.9 SKUs), fresh food (mean: 223.0 SKUs), sweets (237.5 
SKUs) to offer in the largest number in their merchandise. It also justifies that companies, 
enterprises appearing in the sample were in fact grocery and FMCG retailers (population).  
 
The above data describe merchandise at retailers’ disposal at the time of data recording, seasonal 
and promoted products also included. The elements of the basic assortment have a crucial role 
from the aspect of assortment stability. Practically speaking, the composition of the permanent 
assortment is the same as the above. It is dominated by fresh food and prepackaged food, but 
sweets, health&beauty products and general products also play an important part in its structure. 
It is of notable interest to compare the permanent number of SKUs and the number of SKUs at 
a specific point of time of product categories. The most stabile product group is health&beauty 
and general products (93 percent of the basic assortment were distributed by the enterprise when 
completing the questionnaire), then fresh food (91%) and tobacco products (82%).   
 
Every alliance possesses a self-developed store brand portfolio. Store brands affect the chain’s 
image and consumer loyalty in a positive way and they help distinguish chains recruited of 
member firm stores from competitor chains (Levy&Weitz [2004]). Allied firms distribute an 
average of 92.48 store brands in their stores, with certainly considerable differences within 
company groups. Among store brands it is also consumer goods that are the most emphasised 
products, fresh food and sweets, however, taking their own share too from store brand supply. 
Store brands also appear among general products and health&beauty goods. In these categories, 
however, they frequently become provided with individual brand names, due to higher perceived 
consumer risk. Furthermore, companies sell these products to other, even competing chains, too.  
 
Analysing the retail margin diagram (Exhibit 7.7.) it is to be seen that while applying almost the 
same margins, member firms differ greatly in terms of assortment. In view of all product groups, 
they are to cover their costs and produce profit from a 18.49 percent margin on average. Off-
licence and health&beauty SKUs provide the highest margins. The actual margins approximate 
20 percent. The average is reduced by the margins of tobacco products and fresh food. 
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The price of tobacco products is regulated by the government, thus in this product category 
retailers have a limited range of action. In the case of fresh food, however, there is a rapid 
inventory turnover (3.4 days on average). The relative homogeneity of margins is valid for not 
only allied but independent retail enterprises, too. But with them, the absolute magnitude of 
margin is some percent (2.67%) higher than it is with allied retailers.  
 
In addition to retail margin, price level is determined by purchasing, or within it, allowances 
received from suppliers. Allied retailers are provided with several allowances as members of a 
retail alliance (Exhibit 7.8.). One of the most frequently mentioned allowance is an extended 
payment period, affecting 82 percent of respondents. Favourable purchasing price is also 
widespread; 78 percent of owners perceive they can purchase merchandise at more favourable 
costs than previously. One of the most important incentives of alliances and suppliers is 
reimbursing secondary conditions in form of pay-backs. Pay-backs are financial ‘rewards’ 
received by member firms in exchange of bounded prices, assortment and promotions. A 
relatively high proportion of retailers (68%) exploited this allowance in 2003.  
 
Regular promotions are regarded as one of the most relevant impacts of the alliance by 
respondents. Retail alliances in Hungary primarily concentrate on two types of promotions. One 
of them is price promotion, advertised in flyers. The first two weeks of the month is reserved for 
national promotions, the second two weeks for regional promotions. If a retailer gets involved in 
every promotion, he is able to present an assortment on promotion of even 200 products on a 
maximum of 24 occasions47. Regional promotions are of less intensity, including about a 
maximum of 100-150 products. An obvious advantage of them is that they are able to adapt to 
local demands, but a drawback is that they often aim at less valuable periods as far as consumer 
demand is concerned. Besides regular promotions backed by the alliance, members may naturally 
want to organise their individual promotions, which, however, offer products at discounts at a 
much smaller scale (a maximum of 100 SKUs, with an average of 10.26 SKUs). 
 
 
47 The average values lag behind maximum values (24 occasions annually), which is possible because allied retailers 
are differentiated and smaller-sized companies are not able to participate in every promotion organised by the 
alliance. 
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Exhibit 7.7. 
RECENT ASSORTMENT OF THE MEMBER 
FIRMS
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STORE BRANDS CARRIED BY THE MEMBER FIRMS
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AVERAGE RETAIL MARGINS OF THE MEMBER FIRMS BY 
MERCHANDISE GROUPS (%)
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The other main type of promotions very popular with retail alliances is promotional games, 
organised jointly with suppliers. This co-operative type of promotion appeals to not only 
consumers. Namely, it is a typical conflict between retailers and manufacturers that retailers wish 
to emphasise the chain, whereas suppliers would want to focus on their given brands in the 
course of the promotion. Joint promotional games serve both parties’ interests, for the 
promotional game of the given brand only runs in the given chain. It is 5.4 times a year, such 
promotion is conducted in the stores of allied retailers. 
 
Earlier it was not evident – not even with alliances operating in the form of buying groups – to 
carry out advertising apart from supporting promotions. Along with establishing a chain identity, 
nevertheless, the image enhancing effects of advertisements have become more articulate. For 
this reason, there are now national advertising campaigns in order to improve the awareness and 
image of a chain. Exhibit 7.8. clearly illustrates that for the most part, national advertising is 
carried out on the largest scale (with an annual average of 6.2), regional advertising is minimal. 
Individual advertising can similarly be regarded insignificant if compared to national advertising.   
 
The growing intensity of advertising is a part of the process, in which alliances aim to organise 
into chain the stores of their member firms. For larger suppliers channels with a uniform identity 
are more valuable. Almost without exception, every allied retailer applies flyers as a chain identity 
element, but using a logo is also typical (86%). 
 
Furthermore, more than half of owners (58%) said that employees wear a uniform and that there 
is a uniform price label displaying the chain’s name. Selling space (10%) and merchandise display 
(26%) are relatively neglected fields of co-operation. Only members of the Coop-chain are to 
submit themselves to such obligations, for the franchise contract involves directives on how to 
establish store layout and shelf picture. The greatest barrier to a uniform store design is the high 
heterogeneity of stores; for it is highly difficult to realise a concerted merchandise display in 
different-sized stores. 
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Exhibit 7.8. 
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7.5. The Relationship between Member Firm and Hub Firm 
 
The other dimension of co-operation is made up of the alliance itself, i.e. processes between hub 
firm and company. As content analysis revealed, when evaluating partnership, member firms 
believe dependence, the reliability of the hub firm and its competence to be of utmost 
importance.  
 
I measured dependence relying upon literature (Emerson [1962], El-Ansary&Stern [1972], Kumar 
et. al [1998]), along two dimensions. I first quantified the contribution of the alliance to member 
firm performance (value received), then retail enterprise owners were to speak about the 
replaceability of the present alliance. (For the multi-item scale I applied the five-point Likert-
scale.)  
 
Statements related to dependence are shown Exhibit 7.9. The two statements concerning the 
value received were mainly positively evaluated by respondents, i.e. more confessed the group to 
have contributed to the growth of both their sales and profit. 59.1 percent of respondents almost 
fully or fully agreed with the statement that the sales of the enterprise increased after having 
joined the alliance. Retailers were nevertheless more careful when speaking about the positive 
effects of profit (51%). It is only one fifth of respondents (20.4%) who attribute profit growth to 
the alliance. 28.5 percent of the sample is not convinced about the alliance providing them with 
either sales or profit advantages. 
 
Variables describing replaceability measure if another group would be able to offer the 
advantages currently enjoyed. Investigating the means, a significant part of respondents do not or 
only partly feel that it would be difficult to replace the present co-operation, neither from the 
point of view of benefits offered (conditions, sales, profit), nor costs. 
 
On the whole, retailers are positive about the value received from the alliance. These advantages, 
nevertheless, are not unique, for other alliances offer similar conditions to their member firms, 
which renders partnership replaceable. It is also supported by the fact that 28 percent of retailers 
of the sample have already switched to another alliance. 
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Exhibit 7.9. 
The Perceived Dependence of Member Firm on Hub Firm 
Perceived dependence N Mean Std. Dev. Dimension
B1) Since I joined the alliance, the sales of my firm has 
been increased. 49 3,47 1,29
Value received
B2) Since I joined the alliance, the profit of my firm has 
been increased. 49 3,31 1,31
Value received
B3) There are other alliances who could provide my firm 
with comparable benefits. 50 3,24 1,22
Replaceability
B4) Our total costs of switching to a competing alliance 
would be prohibitive. 50 2,90 1,28
Replaceability
B5) It would be difficult for our firm to replace the sales 
generated from this alliance. 50 2,54 1,31
Replaceability
B6) ) It would be difficult for our firm to replace the 
profits generated from this alliance. 50 2,60 1,39
Replaceability
(1= fully agree, 5= do not agree at all) 
 
Literature quantifies the measurement of trust in partnerships along two dimensions (Geyskens 
et. al [1998], Anderson&Narus [1990], i.e. trust in the benevolence of the partner and the honesty 
of the partner. It is the 50 percent of owners who believe that the hub firm is genuinely 
concerned with well-being of his enterprise and bears members’ interests in mind (48%). As far 
as the financial welfare of the enterprise is concerned, they were less eager about the alliance, for 
47 percent disagreed with this statement. As the interviews with experts revealed, co-operation is 
not always without conflict in alliances, as in the course of the integration of activities, individual 
interests are very probably to be hurt.  
 
Exhibit 7.10.  
Trust in the Hub Firm 
Trust N Mean Std. Dev. Dimension
T1) The hub firm of the alliance is genuinely concerned 
that our business succeeds. 50 3,22 1,33
Benevolence
T2) The hub firm keeps our best interest in mind. 50 3,24 1,35 Benevolence
T3) The hub firm considers our financial welfare as its own. 49 2,76 1,30 Benevolence
T4) The hub firm keeps promises it makes to our firm.  50 3,74 1,12 Honesty
T5) The hub firm is not always honest with us. 50 2,48 1,28 Honesty
T6) Information provided by the hub firm is not always 
credible.   49 2,69 1,23
Honesty
T7) We find it necessary to be cautious with the hub firm. . 50 2,38 1,34 Honesty
(1= fully agree, 5= do not agree at all) 
 
Member firms altogether (Exhibit 7.10.) have a favourable opinion about the honesty and 
credibility of the hub firm. The majority agreed on the hub firm keeping its promises (58%), 
being honest (54%) and providing them with credible information (45%). The average values that 
belong to each statement also give a positive picture about the reliability of the hub firm and low 
standard deviations do not unveil more severe differences in opinion, either.  
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Content analysis showed that the alliance is chiefly judged by the competence of the hub firm. 
Competence is evaluated on the basis of carrying out transactions smoothly and the consulting 
provided for member firms. I quantify the competence of the alliance along the business skills, 
professional knowledge and market knowledge of the hub firm (Exhibit 7.11.).  
 
Exhibit 7.11. 
The Perceived Competence of the Hub Firm 
Perceived competence N Mean Std. Dev. 
C1)  The hub firm has excellent business skills. 50 3,68 1,10
C2) The hub firm has excellent professional knowledge in retailing. 50 3.68 1,10
C3) The hub firm knows the competitors well. 49 3,98 1,09
C4) The hub firm knows the market well.  49 4,10 0,92
C5) The hub firm invests enough time and money in its own education 
and training.  50 3,46 1,27
C6) The hub firm provides me with useful advice for running my firm. 50 3,40 1,18
(1= fully agree, 5= do not agree at all) 
 
Member firms gave a favourable opinion of the hub firm on the whole. It is particularly true for 
the market knowledge (mean: 4.10) and knowledge of competitors of the hub firm (3.98). 
Training (3.46) and consulting (3.40) received the lowest means, but these data still carry a 
positive attitude meaning on the five-point Likert scale.  
 
I measured dependence, trust and competence all by means of multi-item scales, i.e. the 
statements used describe only single aspects of the given concept, so there is a need to analyse 
scale reliability and validity. Reliability expresses the extent to which a scale gives consistent 
results in the course of repeated measurements. Reliability may be interpreted as measurement 
free from random error (Malhotra [2001]). From among methods assessing reliability48 I have 
chosen the one based on internal consistency reliability, Cronbach’s alpha coefficient49.  
 
I quantify dependence by means of a 6-item scale (Kumar et. al [1998]). Statement D3 is of a 
negative direction which I re-coded before analysing the scale. The statements of the two 
dimensions of dependence achieved a total of α=0.8014, relying on which the internal 
consistency of the scale can be evaluated good (α=0.4 in the original research). Even if it can be 
                                                 
48 The reliability can be estimated by test-retest method, alternative forms of the scale, furthermore by analysing the 
internal consistency of the scale. The latter includes two popular techniques: the split-half reliability and the internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s alpha) (Malhotra [2001]). 
49 The Cronbach’s alpha is a measure of internal consistency reliability that is the average of all possible split-half 
coefficients resulting from different splittings of the scale items. The coefficient varies from 0 to 1, and a value of 0.6 
or less generally indicates unsatisfactory internal consistency reliability. However, the alpha coefficient is very 
sensitive to the number of scale items (Malhotra [2001]). 
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seen from the last column of Exhibit 7.12. that the structure of scales measuring dependence 
could be further purified, if statement F3 is removed from the set of items. As, on the basis of 
the correlation matrix, this item is the least correlating factor (See Appendix 11) of the 
dependence scale, thus its removal is justified. Consequently, the value of the alpha coefficient 
increases to α=0.8191. 
 
Exhibit 7.12. 
Internal Consistency of the Scale Dependence 
Item-total Statistics 
 
               Scale          Scale      Corrected 
               Mean         Variance       Item-         Squared          Alpha 
              if Item        if Item       Total         Multiple        if Item 
              Deleted        Deleted    Correlation    Correlation       Deleted 
 
D1            14,1224        21,5264        ,6433         ,7814           ,7508 
D2            14,2857        22,6667        ,5234         ,7479           ,7784 
D3 [R]        14,8163        25,4031        ,3227         ,1495           ,8191 
D4            14,6735        24,3078        ,3893         ,2931           ,8073 
D5            15,0612        19,9753        ,7757         ,8808           ,7172 
D6            15,0000        20,0417        ,7123         ,8655           ,7315 
 
Reliability Coefficients     6 items 
 
Alpha =   ,8014           Standardised item alpha =   ,7978 
 
I measured member firms’ trust in the hub firm with Doney&Cannon [1997]’s scale, as the 
reliability of the set of items they used was high (α=0.94) without having too high number of 
redundant elements. Three elements of the scale (B5-B7) have a negative direction, thus a re-
coding was needed in their case before carrying out a reliability analysis. In the present research, 
items reflecting the benevolence and honesty of the hub firm altogether make α=0.8118, which – 
even if the two dimensions are treated as one – disclose a consistent internal structure (Exhibit 
7.13.). 
 
Looking at the correlation matrix of scale elements (See Appendix 11), there are possible ways of 
some further refinement; the pairwise correlation coefficients of statements B5 and B6 are 
relatively low (r<0.4), thus I excluded them from further analysis, bearing the cleaning of the 
scale in mind. (The problem is most likely to be attributed to the fact that member firms were 
unwilling to share a negative view of the hub firm.) Having excluded the two statements, 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient increases to α=0.8460. 
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Exhibit 7.13.  
Internal Consistency of the Trust Scale 
Item-total Statistics 
 
               Scale          Scale      Corrected 
               Mean         Variance       Item-         Squared          Alpha 
              if Item        if Item       Total         Multiple        if Item 
              Deleted        Deleted    Correlation    Correlation       Deleted 
 
T1            20,4167        26,5035        ,5994         ,7762           ,7777 
T2            20,4167        25,6099        ,6442         ,8055           ,7690 
T3            20,8750        24,1968        ,7954         ,7183           ,7396 
T4            19,8958        28,8187        ,5173         ,2910           ,7926 
T5 [R]        20,0417        29,6578        ,3700         ,2883           ,8166 
T6 [R]        20,2917        29,9131        ,3684         ,3023           ,8161 
T7            19,9375        27,0386        ,5565         ,4011           ,7856 
Reliability Coefficients     7 items 
 
Alpha =   ,8118           Standardized item alpha =   ,8090 
 
I quantified the competence of the hub firm with 6 statements, with which member firms 
evaluated the business, market and professional competence of the hub firm (Exhibit 7.14.). The 
scale used in the original research (Kumar et. al [1992]) had an alpha of 0.77, which is one the 
most reliable scale in literature. In my empirical research too, competence statements display high 
internal consistency, thus a suitable reliability (α=0.8766). Excluding, however, statement C5, 
further increases the reliability of the multi-item scale (α=0.8881). 
 
Exhibit 7.14. 
Internal Consistency of the Competence Scale 
Item-total Statistics 
 
               Scale          Scale      Corrected 
               Mean         Variance       Item-         Squared          Alpha 
              if Item        if Item       Total         Multiple        if Item 
              Deleted        Deleted    Correlation    Correlation       Deleted 
 
K 
C1            18,5510        18,1276        ,8765         ,8102           ,8218 
C2            18,5510        19,2109        ,7381         ,7128           ,8459 
C3            18,2245        19,4277        ,7124         ,6677           ,8503 
C4            18,1020        20,2602        ,7685         ,7470           ,8455 
C5            18,7551        19,9388        ,5171         ,3211           ,8881 
C6            18,8367        20,2645        ,5549         ,3665           ,8776 
 
Reliability Coefficients     6 items 
 
Alpha =   ,8766           Standardized item alpha =   ,8843 
 
 
To sum up the above, the reliability of these constructs serve their aims properly, and work well 
in the research context, consequently, are suitable for the quantification of the relationship 
between member firm and hub firm. (For the statistical details of the reliability analysis, see 
Appendix 12.)  
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When testing the validity of scales that measure the relationship between member firm and hub 
firm50 I examined content validity51, construct validity52 and nomological validity53. I have already 
studied content validity when choosing a scale in Chapter 6. From among scales known and used 
in the literature, I selected the ones that best match my research context and have the relevant 
theoretical validity. I intend to describe construct validity and nomological validity when 
presenting my causal model. For measuring the previous one, I apply the confirmative factor 
analysis incorporated in the LISREL algorithm. In nomological validity I analyse how much the 
scale for measuring the given concept correlates to the measurement of related concepts in 
theoretically predicted ways (Malhotra [2001]). 
 
7.6. The Effect of the Alliance on Member Firm Performance 
 
In the survey we collected data from member firm owners on their performance derived from 
retailing. Respondents were to supply data on objective financial indicators concerning their 
enterprise (turnover, profit, gross margin), relative performance indicators (the average 
percentage change of turnover and profit since entry) and an indicator of a non-financial nature 
(inventory turnover). I measure the outcome of the partnership with the hub firm with a one-
dimensional satisfaction scale. Exhibit 7.15. depicts the performance measures of member firms.  
 
The heterogeneity of allied retailers54 is also illustrated by objective, absolute performance 
indicators. When comparing them to independent retailers, I have already mentioned that high 
standard deviation within the group can partly be attributed to size differences. Another reason 
for it is the different extent of marketing integration, which I wish to further study in connection 
with my causal model. Member firms admit to have handled sales of 147 million HUF on an 
average in the year 2003, but high deviations reveal that there were considerable deviations 
between allied retailers. 
                                                 
50 The validity of a scale may be defined as the extent to which differences in observed scale scores reflect true 
differences among objects on the characteristics being measured, rather than systematic or random error (Malhotra 
[2001], p. 349) 
51 Content validity is a subjective but systematic evaluation of how well the content of a scale represents the 
measurement task at hand. Whether the scale items adequately cover the entire domain of the construct being 
measured (Malhotra [2001], p. 349). 
52 Construct validity addresses the question of what construct or characteristic the scale is measuring. An attempt is 
made to answer theoretical questions of why a scale works and what deductions can be made concerning the theory 
underlying the scale (Malhotra [2001], p. 350).
53 Nomological validity measures the relationship between theoretical constructs. It seeks to confirm significant 
correlations between the constructs as predicted by a theory (Malhotra [2001], p. 350).
54 Similarly to the marketing variable, the performance measures were cleaned and the outliers removed before 
starting with the data analysis. 
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Exhibit 7.15.  
Performance Measures of Member Firms 
Performance Measures N Mean Std. Dev.
Total sales in 2003  (Thousand HUF) 27 146957,5 145849,5
Total gross margin (Thousand HUF) 50 27912,7 33044,1
Total profit (Thousand HUF) 25 15450,9 18464,1
Growth in sales due to the alliance (%) 37 11,1 8,7
Growth in profit due to the alliance (%) 38 8,2 9,2
Average inventory turnover (days) 42 16,6 7,3
Overall satisfaction with the hub firm of the alliance 
(7-point scale) 49 4,98 1,30
 
The enterprise with the lowest sales produced 10 million HUF, and the one with the highest sales 
520 million HUF. In retailing, a relevant performance indicator is gross margin in value (sales * 
average retail margin). Member firms generated an average of 27.9 million gross margin, from 
which the costs and profit of the retailer are settled. I calculated the profit of retailers relying on 
sales data and profit rates reported in the survey, concluding that respondent retailers produced 
an annual average of 15.5 million HUF. There are, however, enterprises in the sample, close to 
the break even and companies, closing the year with a profit of 72 million HUF.  
 
With the help of relative performance measures I tried to assess the range to which the alliance 
contributes to the sales and profit of the member firm. 78 percent of respondents were of the 
view that their sales increased by an average of 11.1 percent since their entry. 72 percent of 
respondents evaluated the profit contribution of the alliance favourable, having led to an 8.2 
percent profit growth with member firms on average.  
 
I examined the inventory turnover of member firms as a non-financial performance indicator. 
Considering the total merchandise it takes 16.6 days for the member firms’ inventory to turn, 
with considerable standard deviations from one product group to another.  
 
The ‘performance’ of the relationship with the alliance I measured on a 7-point interval scale in 
terms of satisfaction with the hub firm. The opinion of the majority of allied retailers (69.4%) 
falls into the positive magnitude of the scale (mean: 4.98). The modus and median of the scale is 
the value five, suggesting that member firm owners are somewhat more satisfied with the 
operation of the hub firm than the middle point of the scale.  
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There are various interconnections between the performance measures of member firms to be 
highlighted (See Appendix 13.). The tightest link can be revealed between objective financial 
measures (sales, gross margin, profit) where correlation coefficient is r>0.900 (p=0.000). Relative 
indicators (the contribution of the alliance to sales and profit) also have a high correlation 
coefficient (r=0.766). Inventory turnover as a non-financial performance measure is not 
interrelated to any other indicator.  
 
Notably enough, the correlation matrix reveals that annual sales (r= 0.412, p=0.063) and profit 
(r=0.528, p=0.014) shows a medium extent but significant correlation (p<0.07) to the percentage 
change of sales experienced since having joined the alliance. The percentage change of sales 
(r=0.393, p=0.018) and profit (r=0.327, p=0.048) shows a moderate correlation to the 
satisfaction with hub firm.  
 
7.7. The Presentation of the Causal Model. 
 
7.7.1. An Examination of the Initial Requirements of the Causal Analysis 
 
For presenting the model I am using marketing, behavioural and performance measures 
introduced earlier. The statistical analysis of the causal model (Exhibit 6.10.) using the AMOS 
software. Before the analysis, missing data had to be imputed. (Outliers had been removed in the 
phase of data cleaning procedure.) Missing data were analysed with the help of the SPSS Missing 
Value Analysis55. Appendix 14 contains the input and estimated statistics of the individual 
variables. All items of the input data are metric (interval and ratio scales), but they are not of the 
same magnitude, thus, for the sake of comparability, I standardised the input variables of the 
causal model. 
 
One part of the model is based on latent variables (illustrating the relationship between member 
firm and hub firm), the other on direct, observed variables (retail strategy and performance 
measures). The applied statistical algorithm in fact confirms to the LISREL methodology, in 
which I explored the relationship of exogen (latent and non-latent) and endogen variables, 
supposing that the relationship between the variables can described by a linear model. 
                                                 
55  Within the MVA algorithm I mainly applied regression estimation, as the data were metric and showed 
considerable correlation with one another. I chose independent variables based on the pairwise correlation 
coefficients, related to the estimated variable  
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The algorithm of estimation applied (Maximum Likelihood) assumes a normal distribution of 
variables. The appendices (Appendix 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22) contain the tests for the multinormal 
distribution of variables for each model respectively, on the basis of which I conclude that my 
model variables follow the pattern of a normal distribution or with only some minor deviations56. 
 
Although the number of variables involved in the analysis has no upper limit, algorithms of 
estimation used for causal analyses require the availability of considerable amount of data. The 
more pieces of information (sample size, number of specified relationships) are provided for the 
estimations of parameters, the more accurately a hypothesis system can be checked (Backhaus et. 
al [1996]). Sample size has an important role in estimation and measures of fit (Chi-square, 
Goodness of Fit, AGFI, RMR)57. The sample size of the analysis is relatively low58, affecting the 
fit of the models unfavourably. For counterbalancing it, I am going to exploit the results of the 
correlation matrix that are based on observed data when interpreting the models.  
 
The low sample size posed some further difficulties at the identification of the model, and as a 
result, indicators of marketing strategy (price level, merchandise management, 
advertising&promotion) could not be treated together, for it led to a negative degree of freedom 
and did not enable an estimation of parameters. Thus instead of my original intention I specified 
a regression model with exclusively observed variables, which made it possible to estimate the 
relationships between marketing measures and performance but allowed interactions between 
independent variables to stay quantifiable, too. Another advantage of this solution is that in this 
way, member firm marketing strategy and performance (affected by the retail alliance) and the 
relationship between member firm and hub firm could be tested in one single model.  
                                                 
56 Researcher often apply the rule of thumb stating that samples of over 30 elements approximate the normal 
distribution well  (Backhaus et. al [1996]). 
57 The Chi-Square test relies on the null hypothesis that the empirical covariance matrix is identical with the 
covariance matrix estimated by the model. The hypothesis can be accepted when the significance level (p>0.05) 
related to the Chi-Square exceeds the empirical value of the test. The Goodness-of-Fit Index (GFI) functions as the 
coefficient of determination in the regression analysis that shows to what extent the estimated model is able to 
explain the total variance of the initial variables. The value of GFI varies from 0 to 1. Value 1 means perfect fit.  
The Adjusted-Goodness-of-Fit Index (AGFI) adjusts the value of GFI by the number of variables and by the 
degrees of freedom. The index ranges from 0 to 1 as well. The Root-Mean-Square-Residual Index (RMR) is the 
complementary of GFI and AGFI because it compares the variance unexplained by the variance to the total variance 
of the input variables. (This measure is usually applied when the estimation is not based on a covariance but a 
correlation matrix.) When RMR takes the value 0 then the estimated model fully covers the observed variance of the 
model variables (Backhaus et. al [1996]). 
58 The literature determines the minimum sample size required by LISREL taking the difference between the number 
of respondents and the number of the estimated parameters which should exceed 50 (Bagozzi [1981]).  
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Below I present the results of the causal analysis in three stages. First I introduce the relationship 
of strategy and performance in terms of 4 different retail performance indicators (sales, gross 
margin, profit, sales growth due to the alliance). In stage two I present the interaction system 
between satisfaction and relationship variables of member firm and hub firm. Lastly, I study the 
complete causal model, derived as the fusion of the two partial models. The statistical analysis of 
the models and the interpretation of results enable to control for the hypotheses of the analytical 
model (Exhibit 6.9.) 
 
7.7.2. The Impact of the Retail Strategic Alliance on Member Firm Marketing Strategy and 
Performance 
 
The presentation of marketing strategy and performance relations takes place in four models, for 
it is 4 separate performance criteria (total sales in 2003, gross margin, profit and percentage sales 
growth affected by the alliance) that display a relationship to marketing strategy variables (average 
retail margin, number of supplier allowances, annual number of promotions organised by the 
alliance, annual number of the chain’s national and regional advertisements, number of SKUs in 
the basic assortment, number of the alliance’s own store brand SKUs and number of chain 
identity elements applied). The model includes also the moderating variables (number of 
multinational and independent retailers in the trade area and the total of sales personnel of the 
company plus the total floorspace of stores), making it possible to measure the effect of 
competition and size on performance. The path diagrams of each model are identical, it is only 
the performance indicators and related regression coefficients that differ. 
 
The correlation matrix of the model elements (Appendix 15) also induces me to specify the 
interactions between marketing variables i.e. correlation between independent variables, thus 
improving the fit of the model. Consequently, I primarily analysed the interconnections of 
marketing measures. Analysing the correlation matrix (Appendix 15) coefficient, reveals that 
there is of a medium strength but significant correlation between marketing strategy variables. It 
is retail margin alone that can be regarded as independent from other variables.  
 
The number of supplier allowances shows a positive correlation with the number of national and 
regional promotions (r=0.374) and advertisements (r=0.319). The number of allowances further 
depends on the number of SKUs in the basic assortment (r=0.365), i.e. the more SKUs a retailer 
 138
stocks in his basic assortment, the more allowances he will be likely to receive from suppliers. It 
is not at all surprising, considering the fact that after bounded prices retailers get pay-backs from 
suppliers and consequently, the more products they offer from the supplier’s merchandise, the 
higher the amount of pay-back will be.  
 
National and regional promotions and advertisements mutually reinforce each other’s effect 
(r=0.477), content analysis has already revealed the two activities to intertwine very frequently. 
Promotions (r=0.433) and advertisements (r=0.434) organised by the alliance define the identity 
of member retailers, too, for both marketing tools mean continuous communication with 
consumers.  
 
The number of promotions and SKUs of the basic assortment also correlate (r=0.383), for which 
the reason might lie in the size of the company. Interviews with experts showed that hub firms 
differentiate their member firms along certain criteria, such as size and other quality-related 
factors. Consequently, the extent of co-operation may vary by segments of the member firms, 
affecting the involvement in promotions or the size of the basic assortment.  
 
Similarly, the number of store brands and SKUs of the basic assortment correlate with one 
another (r=0.328), which also depend on firm’s size. If size variables (floorspace, number of 
employees) are considered as controlling factors when looking at the correlation coefficient of 
the two marketing variables, then the partial correlation coefficient (r=0.242, p=0.091) will 
somewhat decrease.  
 
Identified interactions between marketing variables were used for specifying the causal models, 
from among which I first present the one on the causal relationships between the marketing 
strategy and annual sales of member firms. Exhibit 7.16. illustrates the impact of marketing and 
moderating variables on performance by means of regression coefficients and interactions 
between causal variables by the means of correlation coefficients. (For detailed statistical 
indicators see Appendix 16.) 
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Exhibit 7.16. 
The Causal Relationships between the Marketing Strategy and Annual Sales of Member Firms  
(standardised  regression coefficients and correlation coefficients) 
 
The fit of the model cannot be 
judged too favourable on the basis of 
the Chi-square test (Chi-square: 
100.870, degree of freedom: 41, 
p=0.000), the explained variance of 
the model is 0.778 (GFI), to which – 
due to a low degree of freedom and 
a relatively high parameter number – 
a lower value of Adjusted Goodness 
of Fit (AGFI=0.578) is associated. 
Marketing and moderating variables 
are able to explain 58 percent of the 
variance of annual sales. 
The sales of member firms is 
fundamentally determined by the 
number of store brands (standardised 
regression coefficient: 0.486), which 
is at the same time the most 
powerful explaining measure of sales. 
Namely, the more store brands a retailer distributes, the higher his sales will be. Sales is 
predominantly a function of moderating variables. Retailers’ annual sales is strongly determined by the 
presence of multinational and independent retailers, reflecting the intensity of competition. It is, 
however, interesting to note that a member firm’s sales is affected in a positive way by the 
number of multinational companies (standardised regression coefficient: 0.240), while in a 
negative direction by the number of independent retailers (standardised regression coefficient:  
-0.353). Furthermore, both size variables have significant effect on sales, too. By increasing floorspace 
(standardised regression coefficient: 0.231) and the number of sales personnel (standardised 
regression coefficient: 0.292) the sales of member firm stores will increase, too. The main effects 
found significant in the model are consistent with the pairwise correlation coefficients to be 
discovered in the correlation matrix (Appendix 15).  
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The causal relationship59 between marketing variables and annual gross margin is depicted in 
Exhibit 7.17. Statistical data concerning the model are to be found in Appendix 17.  
 
Exhibit 7.17.  
The Causal Relationship between the Marketing Strategy and Annual Gross Margin of Member Firms  
(standardised  regression coefficients and correlation coefficients) 
 
The gross margin of an allied retailer 
is primarily influenced by the 
number of store brands. The 
standardised regression coefficient is 
the highest one (0.482). In addition 
to this, it was retail margin 
(standardised regression coefficient: 
0.212) and supplier allowances 
(standardised regression coefficient: 
0.243) that significantly affected 
gross margin. Retail margin and 
favourable supplier conditions 
increase member firm’s gross 
margin, which combined with a 
proper cost management leads to 
higher profit. Competition and size 
are significant factors here, too, with 
a little difference from that of sales, 
such as the number of sales 
personnel is not significant with gross margin. As opposed to floorspace, which allows us to draw 
a conclusion about the importance of operating with economies of scale (standardised regression 
coefficient: 0.218). The variables of the model are able explain 53 percent of the total variance of 
the annual gross margin. (The main effects found significant in the model are consistent with the 
correlation coefficients of Appendix 15.)  
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59 Chi-Square: 100.870, Degree of freedom: 41, p=0.000; GFI=0.778, AGFI=0.578, RMR=0.194. 
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Exhibit 7.18. 
The Causal Relationships between the Marketing Strategy and Annual Profit of Member Firms  
 (standardised  regression coefficients and correlation coefficients) 
 
One of the most important 
performance measure is the profit 
generated which is gross margin 
reduced by purchasing and 
operational costs and taxes. Exhibit 
7.18 shows the causal relationships60 
between the marketing strategy and 
profit of member firms. (For detailed 
results see Appendix 18.)  
 
Profit is primarily determined by 
marketing measures and they 
account for 44 percent of variance 
experienced in the profit of a 
member firm. Member firms’ profit 
was mainly influenced by store 
brands (standardised regression 
coefficient: 0.459), supplier 
allowances (standardised regression 
coefficient: 0.245) and number of 
chain identity elements (standardised regression coefficient: 0.261) in the year 2003. Moderating 
factors do not influence profit significantly. Relying on the above model, it can be stated that it 
lies in retailer’s interest to increase supplier allowances and store brands and a wide usage of 
chain identity elements, for these all affect their profitability in a beneficial way.  
margin
prom
assort
ident
allow
,44
profit
,26
e12
,15
,04
,24
-,19
advert
sbrand
,46
multi indpdt floorspemploy
,03 ,19 -,13
,34
,43
,31
,33
,32
,23
,40
,26
,23
,26
,35
,01 ,25
-,02
,38
,08
 
                                                 
60 Chi-Square: 100.870, Degree of freedom: 41, p=0.000;GFI: 0.778, AGFI: 0.578, RMR: 0.194. 
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Exhibit 7.19. 
The Causal Relationships between the Marketing Strategy and Sales Growth Due to the Alliance   
(standardised  regression coefficients and correlation coefficients) 
 
Only one relative performance 
measure showed correlation with 
marketing variables of retailers in the 
correlation matrix (Appendix 15), i.e. 
sales growth61. The fit of the model 
conforms to that of previously 
analysed models. Sales growth due to 
the alliance is caused by the variable 
that has continuously exercised the 
highest explaining power in the 
above: the number of store brands 
(standardised regression coefficient: 
0.308). The variance of sales growth 
may also be attributed to the number 
of independent retailers in the trade 
area (standardised regression 
coefficient: 0.321). The more 
independent retailers an allied retailer 
is to compete with, the more the 
sales growing effect of the alliance can be perceived after its entry. The floorspace of stores of 
allied retailers, however, affect sales growth due to the alliance in a negative way (standardised 
regression coefficient: -0.417). Marketing strategy elements, competitive environment and the size 
of the member firm explain 46 percent of the total variance of the dependent variable (sales 
growth due to the alliance). For the details of the statistical analysis see Appendix 19. 
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61 The percentage growth of profit correlated to none of the variables but the percentage growth of sales, which may 
supposedly be caused by the fact that member firm owners could not estimate the profit change due to the alliance 
enough. 
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 7.7.3. The Relationship of the Member Firm and the Hub Firm 
 
In the next stage I aim to analyse the relationship of the member firm and the hub firm (Exhibit 
7.20.) (For the correlation matrix of the partial model see Appendix 11.)  
 
The estimating algorithm62 enables a testing of the nomological validity of latent, non-observed 
variables, beyond an exploration of interconnections between endogen and exogen variables. All 
variables of dependence (d1, d2, d5, d6) are significant, i.e. they define the concept of dependence. 
However, statements d5 and d6 on the replaceability of the alliance have less factor weight (≤0.5) 
than the sales and profit contribution of the alliance (d1:0.98, d2: 0.87). Statements evaluating the 
competence of the hub firm (competence) have the suitable factor weight. Statements on the business 
skills of the hub firm (c1: 0.95), retail competence (c3: 0.87), and market knowledge (c4: 0.80) are 
particularly dominant. From among observed variables on the trust in the hub firm indicators 
expressing the benevolence of the hub firm possess high weight. Statements on honesty (t4, t7≤ 
0.50) are significant, yet they play a minor role in shaping the latent variable.  
 
Based on the above, we can conclude that the theoretical concept of ‘competence’ has the highest 
nomological validity, for each of its indicators have a high factor weight. As for dependence, 
value received from the alliance is the part of the scale which correlates with the latent variable 
and is the most significant. Variables of replaceability, however, affect the validity of the concept 
of dependence unfavourably. The indicators of trust connected to benevolence are the ones 
mostly contributing to scale validity. The correlation coefficient of the other component, the 
negative statement connected to honesty is much lower. As it is only one or two statements that 
are ‘problematic’ within the construct, the nomological validity can be regarded acceptable.  
 
The poor fit of the partial model (Exhibit 7.20.)63 is reflected in the high rate of standard errors, 
yet, the values of the indicators always stay between the values of the saturated model and the 
independence model. (For detailed statistics concerning the model see Appendix 21.)  
                                                 
62 The LISREL model estimates the latent variables by applying confirmative factor analysis differing from the 
explorative one that the variables belonging to the factors are determined by the researcher not by the algorithm of 
the method. (Backhaus et. al [1996]). 
63 Chi-Square: 247.518, Degree of freedom: 85, p=0.000; Goodness of Fit Index: 0.675, AGFI: 0.541, RMR: 0.126 
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Exhibit 7.20. 
Evaluating the Relationship of the Member Firm and the Hub Firm 
(standardised  regression coefficients and correlation coefficients) 
 
In spite of the not too favourable fit 
the main effects of the model reflects 
the pattern of the correlation matrix 
based on the observed variables 
(Appendix 11). Satisfaction with the 
hub firm is most increased by the trust 
of the hub firm (standardised 
regression coefficient: 0,495). Similarly, 
competence elicits a significant, 
positive (standardised regression 
coefficient: 0.407) effect from member 
firms concerning satisfaction with hub 
firm. The regression coefficient of 
dependence is negative (-0.232), still, 
the related significance level is high 
(p>0.1), and on this account, 
statistically speaking, its effect on 
satisfaction cannot be regarded 
dissimilar to nil. The three latent variables are thus able to explain 48.1 percent of the total 
variance of satisfaction.  
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Besides main effects, Exhibit 7.20. also illustrates relationships between latent variables. It is not 
surprising to find competence and trust to have a strong positive correlation with each other (r= 0.633). The 
more a member firm believes the hub firm to be competent, the more it trusts in its decisions. 
This relationship has already been implied by Doney and Cannon (1997) in their studying seller-
buyer relationships.  
 
It is even more interesting to study the interaction of dependence versus trust and competence. Both 
latent variables exhibit a positive correlation with dependence. Result become clearer if we 
consider that dependence is primarily defined the benefits derived from the alliance (sales and 
profit growth). I.e. the greater the benefits of the alliance are perceived, the more they trust in the 
hub firm and the more competent they perceive it to be. Kumar et al. (1995) conducted a 
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research with American and Dutch car retailers where trust and dependence was found to have a 
positive correlation, too. A similar connection was found by Ganesan (1994) between 
transaction-specific investments creating dependence and trust in the partner in the course of the 
co-operation of retailers and their suppliers.  
 
The perceived competence of the hub firm and the perceived dependence on the alliance also reinforce one 
another’s effect. I.e. the more competent companies think the hub firm is, the more benefits they 
hope to receive from the alliance and the harder it gets to replace the co-operation. Kumar, Stern 
and Achrol (1992) arrive at a similar conclusion in their research, when they find a significant 
relationship between reseller competence and influence over supplier.  
 
About the nomological validity of trust and competence it can be told that both constructs operate 
according to what theoretical assumptions predicted and conform to the results of other 
independent empirical researches. The construct of dependence, however, is only partially able to 
measure the given concept system and it is only the sales and profit contribution of the scale that 
behaves as expected according to literature assumptions. 
 
7.7.4. The Casual Model 
 
Lastly, I present the estimation of the full model (Exhibit 6.9.) constructed on the basis of 
literature and exploratory research methods (content analysis, cognitive map and interviews with 
experts). There is also a possibility to analyse four models based on the different performance 
measures. Yet, the correlation matrix of member firm performance measures and satisfaction 
with the alliance reveals (Appendix 14) that the satisfaction of the member firm cannot be linked 
to annual sales, gross margin or profit, but sales growth due to the alliance. Therefore I only 
study the relationship system of the latter performance measure (Exhibit 7.21.; Appendix 22).  
 
The fit measures of the model were further corrupted by the increased parameter number64. In 
Exhibit 7.22. the effects of the partial models conform to what has been described at Exhibits 
7.19. and 7.20. The novelty of the extended model is the estimation of the causal relationship 
between sales growth due to the alliance and satisfaction with the hub firm. 
 
64  Chi-Square: 588.626, Degree of freedom:  305, p=0.000, GFI=0.586, AGFI=0.487, RMR= 0.170. 
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Exhibit 7.21. 
The Impact of Retail Strategic Alliances on Member Firms’ Marketing Strategy and Performance (sales growth due the alliance) 
(standardised  regression coefficients and correlation coefficients) 
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The low value of the standardised regression coefficient suggests that on the basis of this 
empirical research, the existence of a connection between member firm and the perceived 
performance of the alliance cannot be proved. It might be owing to the answers on satisfaction, 
the majority was more or less satisfied with the hub firm, regardless to the performance achieved 
within the alliance framework.  
 
Exhibit 7.22. 
A Summary of the Structural Equation Models 
(Unstandardised Regression Coefficients) 
 
 
Total sales in 
2003
Total gross 
margin in 
2003
Total profit 
in 2003
Sales Growth 
due to the 
alliance (%)
Satisfaction 
with the hub 
firm
Retail margin    -0.055     0.207**      0.143      -0.139
Allowances     0.244**     0.240**      0.241**       0.191
Advertising    -0.244    -0.098      0.075      -0.003
Promotions    -0.031    -0.199     -0.191      -0.119
Basic assortment    -0.172    -0.031      0.039       0.017
Store brand     0.529**     0.474**      0.450**       0.329**
Chain identity     0.167     0.229*      0.258*       0.257*
Multinational retailers     0.259**     0.199**      0.028     -0.032
Independent retailers    -0.381**    -0.278**      0.184*      0.341**
Floorspace     0.250**     0.213**     -0.126     -0.442**
Sales personnel     0.316**     0.159     -0.023      0.127
 
Perceived dependence     -0.139
Trust      0.447**
Perceived competence      0.582**
Total sales in 2003     -0.155
Total gross margin in 2003     -0.172
Total profit in 2003     -0.217
Sales growth due to the 
alliance 
 
     0.082
** significant at level p< 0.05  
*  significant at the level p< 0.1 
 
Exhibit 7.22. contains the results of the models, previously studied, relying on which in the next 
subchapter I wish to analyse to which extent the hypotheses of the causal model (Exhibit 6.9.) 
can be verified.  
 
7.7.5. The Hypotheses of the Causal Model Revisited  
 
In the course of establishing the model I assumed that the retail margin of allied retailers 
diminishes and that there is a negative relationship between price level and sales (H1a). In Subchapter 7.2. 
it has already been proved that the margin of allied retailers is lower than that of independent 
retailers, from which I concluded that a lower margin can be regarded as the effect of enterprise 
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size and the alliance. In models describing the relationship between marketing variables and 
performance measures the effect of margin had a different outcome. The regression coefficient 
sign of annual sales was negative, which would justify hypothesis H1a), yet this correlation did 
not prove to be significant due to high level of standard errors. Sales growth since entry had 
similar results. Although the direction of the theoretically assumed relationship can be justified, 
hypothesis H1a cannot be supported by the empirical research, owing to the heterogeneity of 
sample (high standard deviation of performance measure) and insufficient sample size.  
 
According to hypothesis H1b) price level decrease influenced by the strategic alliance affects retailers’ profit in 
a positive way if retailers can get access to favourable purchasing conditions within the alliance. I 
quantified the profitability of the member firm with two indicators: gross margin and the profit 
after taxation. The results of the two causal models (Exhibits 7.17 and 7.18.) highlight that the 
gross margin of allied retailers and retail margin have a clear positive relationship, that is to say, 
the increase of retail margins leads to an increased gross margin with retailers. The average retail 
margin defining price level has a minor positive effect on the annual profit of a member firm, 
being insufficient for us, to accept its effect as being dissimilar to nil65.  
 
The second part of the hypothesis is about profitability being increased if retailers get access to 
favourable purchasing conditions, and thus their purchasing costs are reduced, and as a result, their 
gross margin and profit increased.  
 
This assumption is reinforced by the results of the causal model, for both gross margin and 
profit are defined by the number of supplier allowances (payment period, favourable prices, pay-
backs). When interpreting the results, it is worth looking at whether the effect of gross margin is 
indeed due to the interaction of margin and supplier allowances or is it that either factor has a 
more enhanced role in the causal relationship. However, there is no relationship between the 
number of allowances and retail margin (r=0.023, p=0.874). The lack of relationship can mainly 
be explained by the fact that in grocery retailing there is a sharp price competition, supposedly 
leading to the convergence of retail margins.  
                                                 
65 Other than marketing and moderating variables, profit is obviously also affected by some further factors such as 
the accountancy of the given year (investments, value decrease, building reserves), which may distort the actual 
extent of profit (Brown&Laverick [1994]). 
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Therefore, the general retail margin and supplier allowances increase profit in an additive way, 
and profit is exclusively defined by allowances.  
 
The interaction between performance measures and national&regional promotions organised by the alliance is 
summarised by hypotheses H2a) and H2b). The effect of promotions on sales is insignificant. 
The same stands for gross margin and profit. Empirical researches measure the effect of 
promotions on sales on a product category level, for promotions may induce substituting effects 
within product categories and complementary effects between categories (Mulhern [1997]). In 
my research, the main reason for the lack of relationship is that chains established by the alliance 
conduct highly similar promotion policies. Interviews with experts revealed that alliances mostly 
organise biweekly price promotions for retailers, which are exploited by the majority of retailers. 
It means that retail enterprises with various sales figures offer approximately the same amount of 
promotions for their consumers. On the strength of my research results, the alliance’s effect on 
promotions can only be illustrated in a comparison with independent retailers, which revealed a 
significant difference between the two grocery retailing groups.  
 
There is a similar conclusion to be arrived at when examining the advertising influenced by the 
alliance. In hypothesis 3 I assumed that advertising influenced by the alliance has a positive effect on annual 
sales (H3). The advertisements (national and regional) of the alliance has no effect on sales but is 
strongly correlated (r=0.433, p<0.05) with promotion. It enhances the effect of promotions in 
the model, still, it is insufficient to produce a positive effect on sales of the member firm.  
 
Hypotheses H4 a) and b) assumed a positive relationship between assortment stability and annual sales and 
profitability. I measured assortment stability by means of a standard number of SKUs, which 
denotes the assortment that a retailer carries regardless to his promotions and seasonal supply in 
his stores. In models complemented with moderating variables, assortment stability plays an 
important role in none of the performance measures as a significant explaining factor. It is 
mainly due to the overwhelming effect of competition and size, for ignoring moderating 
variables, the number of basic assortment SKUs correlates with gross margin (r=0.375,p=0.007). 
Studies of the marketing literature (Hoch et. al [1999], Van Ryzin&Mahajan [1999], Leunissen et 
al [1996]) normally find a positive relationship between assortment size and category or store-
level performance measures.  
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Still, a retail alliance does not leave the assortment of member firms untouched, for store brands 
distributed by the member firms possessed the strongest explaining power in each model (H5a,b). The 
number of store brands developed by the chain greatly determined sales and profit measures. 
Therefore, the more store brands retailers offer, the higher sales, gross margin and profit they are 
able to realise. Moreover, in sales growth induced by the alliance it is also the presence of store 
brands that plays the most decisive role, according to the empirical findings. The acceptability of 
hypothesis H5) is increased by the fact that the effect of variables connected to size of the 
retailer and presence of competitors is far less than that of store brands. The findings of earlier 
research support these results (Halstead&Ward [1995], Mulhern [1997]). 
 
Assumptions concerning the relationship of identity and corporate performance (H6a,b) have various 
outcomes, too. There is no relationship to be revealed with the annual sales of member firm, 
whereas in the case of sales growth induced by the alliance a correlation can be demonstrated. 
Consequently, the more chain identity elements an allied retailer uses, the more the sales of his 
store(s) increases. Using chain identity elements has a beneficial effect on gross margin and 
profit, too. In view of this, my research results underline hypothesis 6, saying that using chain 
identity elements developed by the alliance has a favourable effect on member firm performance. 
Hildebrandt (1988), investigating the relationship between store image and business performance 
measures, similarly found a positive correlation between the two dimensions.  
 
In my theoretical model (Exhibit 6.6.) I assumed that competitive environment i.e. the presence 
of competitors affects (McArthur&Nystrom [1991]) the interaction system in question, and 
primarily influences the strength of the relationship between retail strategy and performance. I 
examined competitive environment in terms of competition intensity, and measured it by the 
number of various types of competitors in a retailer’s trade area (multinational retailers, other 
domestic retailers, other retailers of the own chain and independent retailers).   
Relying on previous analyses (See correlation matrix in Appendix 20.) the presence of 
multinational and independent retailers’ stores did not reveal a relationship with member firm 
performance measures. In hypothesis H11) I assumed that an increasing number of competitors will  
weaken of the relationship between marketing measures and performance, regardless the type of competitors. 
The modelling process if competition intensity unveiled that the two variables affect 
performance in different ways.  
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If the number of multinational stores increases, there will be an increase of sales and gross margin experienced in 
member firm stores. The different impacts of the two strategic groups is due to settlement type. 
Multinational stores primarily appear in settlements, municipalities where there is considerable 
buying power. Bigger buying power affects the sales of allied retailers in a favourable way, too. 
The presence of independent enterprises, however, affects sales and gross margin in a negative way, featuring 
mostly in smaller settlements and villages. The negative correlation, furthermore, may suggest the 
replaceability of allied and independent retailers’ stores. However, member firms of alliances 
believe mainly (56% of respondents) multinational retailers to be the most significant 
competitors, as opposed to the stores of independent retailers (14%). The differentiated effect of 
competitors may, however, be justified on the basis of Miller et al. (1999)’s research results, who 
analyse the effects of competition between identical and different retailing forms. They argue 
that increasing the number of identical (e.g. specialist stores with a less broad merchandise) retailing 
types leads to a substituting effect, reducing retailers’ sales and profit. In contrast, if the concentration 
of different types of retailers grows (specialist stores and department stores with a broad 
merchandise) in a trade agglomeration, then synergy is generated and stores increase one another’s 
sales and profit.  
 
Retailer’s size is always a relevant issue with researches on retail companies (Leunissen et.al 
[1996]). The more capacity a retail enterprise has, the more economies of scale it is able to 
achieve, consequently, increasing size leads to higher sales and gross margin. For quantifying size 
of allied retailers I applied several measures: sales personnel number, store number and total 
floorspace of stores. Previous test (see the correlation matrix in Appendix 20) revealed that it is 
predominantly sales personnel and total floorspace that affect the relationship between 
marketing tools and company performance measures. Size variables enhanced the relationship 
between exogen and endogen variables in terms of annual sales and gross margin. On sales 
growth due to the alliance, nevertheless, total floorspace has a negative, significant (p<0.05) 
effect, which is remarkable, for it implies that the more floorspace a retailer has, the less sales 
growth can be derived from belonging to an alliance. An explanation for it is that larger-scaled 
enterprises had already been able to achieve certain allowances and economies of scale, that is 
why sales growth is less significant in their case. However, considering the total value of benefits 
achieved through the alliance, the co-operation still means a favourable option for the larger 
sized retailers. 
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Location is also an important moderator, defining the trade area of a retail enterprise. 
Respondents were to enumerate the type of settlements they operate stores (county capital, 
towns with a population of over or below 50 000, and village). According to the hypothesis, in 
larger settlements retailers may expect higher demand, and may achieve a better performance 
(H13). The correlation coefficients of Appendix 20, however, bear witness to the fact that 
location variables66 do not play a direct role in the relationship of retail strategy and corporate 
performance.  
 
In the analytical model (Exhibit 6.10.) I assumed that there is a negative relationship between dependence 
and satisfaction with the hub firm. This hypothesis (H8) cannot be justified based on the above 
model. Although the standardised regression coefficient of dependence is negative  
(-0.232), but this is not a significant main effect. Furthermore, it also presents a problem that 
dependence is primarily determined by benefits gained from co-operation (the sales and profit 
contribution of the alliance), so a negative sign contradicts the theoretical assumptions. It is 
mainly researches that concentrate on the advantages of a partnership (Frazier et. al [1989], 
Anderson and Narus [1990]) that find a positive relationship between dependence on partner 
and satisfaction with partner, which conforms to value received in the present study (i.e. the 
advantages). Replaceability, however, (Anderson&Narus [1984]) affects satisfaction with partner 
unfavourably. To sum it up, hypothesis H8) cannot be verfied on the basis of the quantitative 
research results.  
 
There is a positive relationship between the perceived competence of the hub firm and satisfaction with it 
(H9), which is of moderate strength and significant. In view of this, the more competent 
member firms believe hub firm to be, the more satisfied they are with its activity; i.e. competence 
is one of the most important aspect for retail enterprises. This is the conclusion arrived at by 
several authors (Barclay &Smith[1997], Selnes et. al [1998]); Kumar et al. (1992) for example also 
find a positive correlation between satisfaction with resellers and competence. 
 
Further, I assumed that the trust of allied member firms and satisfaction with hub firm also enhance one 
another (H10). Empirical researches justify this hypothesis, as it is trust that has the most 
                                                 
66 Location variables were coded as dichotom variables and for the purpose of quantifying their effects, they were 
standardised. 
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relevant effect on satisfaction. Literature (Geyskens et. al [1998]) regards satisfaction as the direct 
consequence of trust, i.e. the more benevolent and honest an alliance towards its member firms 
is, the more satisfied they are with it. The reason for it is that retailers believe correct and reliable 
co-operation to be of crucial importance. Moreover, there typically is a well-working 
communication between partners, also supporting trust in the hub firm (Anderson&Weitz 
[1989]). 
 
Hypothesis H7) was investigated in the causal model (Exhibit 7.21.), saying if member firm 
performance increases, the satisfaction with hub firm from the part of member firm will increase. On the basis of 
research results, this hypothesis is refused in terms of any of the performance measures, for 
neither annual sales, nor profitability variables showed a relationship with satisfaction with hub 
firm. The lack of correlation may be traced back to several reasons. First, most respondents 
marked the middle point (4) of the scale on the satisfaction scale, thus satisfaction is invariant to 
performance measures. Second, satisfaction is a subjective performance indicator, about which a 
number of authors (Geringer&Herbert [1991]) argued that the evaluations of companies are 
distorted, i.e. member firms are not happy to support a negative opinion against the alliance. In 
contrast to this, there are several researches studying interfirm relationships 
(Venkatraman&Ramanujam [1986], Dess&Robinson [1984]) that find a strong, positive 
correlation between satisfaction and objective performance measures.  
 
7.8. The Summary of the Empirical Research. Conclusions 
7.8.1. The Most Relevant Results of the Empirical Research 
 
Several authors (Morgan [2000], Cravens&Cravens [2000]) have proved that with partners of 
horizontal strategic alliances, co-operation becomes incorporated in the company’s strategy. The 
quantitative research proved that the horizontal co-operations of retailers primarily affect purchasing and 
marketing via purchasing, which justifies the relevance of the research concept.  
 
When planning the research concept, I consciously made effort to have a control group besides 
the member firms of the alliance, on which the effects of a retail strategic alliance can be tested. 
In the course of comparing the two groups, the question arose if the marked differences between 
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allied and independent retailers is due to the strategic alliance exclusively or differences may 
occur due to a retail enterprise size. Regression analysis revealed that marketing strategy and company 
performance measures are differentiated by the fact of being allied and company size to approximately the same 
extent. 
 
The effect of size, however, cannot be treated as totally separate from the effect of the alliance, 
for strategic alliances carry certain pre-selection effects, manifested in requirements of joining the 
alliance. 
 
On the sample of allied retailers I tested the relationships and hypotheses formulated in the 
causal model. In the causal models, the different combinations of marketing strategy variables 
contributed to the individual performance measures, which at the same time, highlights the 
relevance of a multi-dimensional measurement.  
 
There are some marketing strategy elements whose effect on company performance is highly 
stabile in the sense that they do not fail to affect almost each performance indicator. One such 
relevant variable was the number of store brands stocked in the assortment, which affected all four 
performance measures (annual sales, gross margin, profit and sales growth after entry). Earlier 
researches have shown that the store brands of a chain have a positive effect on profit, for their 
lower prices boost sales, while their purchasing cost increases profit.  
 
The number of supplier allowances is also of crucial importance, which is much higher in the case of 
allied retailers than with independent retailers. Retailers’ sales, gross margin and profit were also 
affected in a positive way by favourable purchasing conditions and pay-backs. Thus, one of the 
main appeals of retail strategic alliances are still advantages derived from joint purchasing.  
 
A distinctive feature of belonging to an alliance is the use of chain identity elements. Identity 
elements help establish a uniform image, which represents added value both consumers and 
suppliers. A chain-like appearance has a beneficial effect on gross margin, profit of retailers, 
moreover, the number of chain identity elements also define sales growth due to the alliance.  
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Retail margin exclusively correlated with gross margin, which is mainly owing to the strict price 
competition. Yet this calls attention to the fact that a competitive price level is only a necessary 
but not sufficient condition for market success. It also suggests that domestic buying groups 
have arrived at a new evolutionary phase where besides low price some further distinguishing 
tools (e.g. identity, their own store brands) have appeared as relevant competition factors.  
 
Contradictory to expectations, promotion and advertising backed by the alliance failed to affect any 
performance measures. On the one hand, it is owing to similarities to be encountered in the 
promotion and advertising activity of alliances, second, the research possibly aimed to grasp the 
effects of retail promotions on too much of an aggregate level. The comparative investigation, 
however, justified the assumption that allied retailers are able to offer far more promotions to 
their consumers than independent retailers.  
 
Hypotheses formulated for moderating variables were justified, for both size and market 
competition intensity are relevant factors of the relationship between marketing strategy and 
performance. Thus for instance, ignoring member firm size, basic assortment has a positive 
correlation with sales and gross margin, including, however, the size variable the significance 
level of the relationship substantially increases.  
 
Member firms appreciate when the alliance reveals high level of competence. The more competent 
present or potential member firms perceive hub firm to be, the more satisfied they are with the 
alliance. As a consequence, demonstrating their market competence can be a persuasive tool in 
the hands of hub firms. The reliability of the hub firm becomes attached to this, which member firms 
measure in terms of benevolence expressed towards them and honest communication. If a 
member firm is convinced that it can rely on the alliance, it will be more likely to be satisfied 
with the co-operation.  
 
7.8.2. The Limits of the Research and Future Research Prospects 
 
The main limit of the empirical research is an insufficient sample size and thus retail companies 
of strategic alliances are not sufficiently represented. Consequently, the results of the empirical 
research cannot be generalised. Furthermore, small sample size only enables a limited control of  
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the validity and reliability of the model, at present I applied correlation matrixes based on input, 
observed data for this purpose.  
 
In future, the research concept could be conducted with other retail companies of a bigger 
sample size and different merchandise type (e.g. fashion of electronic products) that are 
operating in some type of a horizontal co-operation, for the results only refer to domestic-owned 
grocery retailing enterprises.  
 
The present research had one single basis of comparison, i.e. the control group of independent 
retailers, but it would well worth looking at the issue in the function of time, in order for changes 
due to the alliance to be traced on. In domestic grocery retailing there would be a need for a 
panel comprised by retail companies, which would make conducting longitudinal investigations 
possible. At present AC Nielsen operates one such retail panel, but its data recording units are 
stores, not companies. 
 
Interviews with experts revealed that strategic alliances made up of domestic retailers may well 
be able to achieve allowances due to their increased buying power, yet integration is directed by 
more powerful suppliers. In view of this, a further research base could be to examine the vertical 
co-operations of retail strategic alliances and suppliers.  
 
The size of member firms proved to be an important influencing factor in the correlation system 
of marketing measures and performance, which needs further research. On the basis of the 
research results it may be assumed that conceptualising size could appear as an alternative theory 
as opposed to modelling the effect of strategic alliances, which again reinforces the expansion 
possibilities of the research concept.  
 
7.8.3. The Scientific and Business Relevance of the Dissertation  
 
The dissertation studies the effects of a horizontal alliance in a grocery retailing context. The issue of 
horizontal alliances is a relatively new are of research in international marketing literature, for 
earlier research centred upon vertical alliances. Consequently, international and domestic 
literature on co-operations between retail companies is somewhat limited. The dissertation 
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studies co-operations created between companies of the sector thoroughly and from several 
viewpoints. 
 
Thus, the model developed in the research concept is suitable for illustrating and analysing the 
marketing and behavioural dimensions of a horizontal alliance, which normally appears in separate 
models. Grasping the complex causal relationships was made possible by the methodology 
applied. In the course of the research it has become clear that the method of cognitive maps is of a 
great potential to contribute to the conceptualising of explaining models and the effectiveness of 
the quantitative research. Applying the method in the science of marketing is justified and 
represents a new approach in exploring and specifying causal relationships.  
 
The dissertation is not only of notable interest for researchers but contains relevant conclusions 
for retail companies and hub firms. The study promotes an understanding of the effects of co-operation 
for both parties. It helps member retailers become more aware which are the elements of a 
horizontal co-operation that play part in their performance, thus enhancing their strategic 
thinking. Hub firms, on the other hand, may realise the factors that influence the evaluation of the 
hub firm and what are the means by which it can improve its relationship with its member firms 
and satisfaction with co-operation.  
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10 K.L.I. A nagykertől a franchise-hálózatig Fezo Kereskedelmi Kft. Mai piac 2001/11 24-25 
11 Justyák János Árrésgyakorlatok Cartel System Kft. Mai piac 2001/10 22 
12 Dézsi Zoltán Budapesten is érdemes kereskedni Coop-Star Rt. Mai piac 2001/9 20-21 
13 K.L.I. Helyzetbe hozzák a kiskereskedőket Gulyás Általános Kereskedelmi Kft. Mai piac 2001/8 23 
14 Nagy Katalin Párhuzamosok ha találkoznak Sláger Mai piac 2001/12 22-23 
15 Jász Folyamatos terjeszkedés, növekvő forgalom Szolnok Coop Rt. Mai piac 2001/12 38-40 
16 Bajor Eszter A közös fellépés egyéni érdek beszerzési társulások (Honiker, CBA, Coop) Mai piac 1996/2 12-16 
17 Nagy Katalin Átváltozások kora: Coop-lánc születik Coop Mai piac 1996/1 16-17 
18 Hlavay Richárd A "Kereknap" sikere mögött saját nagyker Kereknap Mai piac 1997/9 42-44 
19 Hlavay Richárd Palócker-recept: stabilitás és alkalmazkodás Palócker Mai piac 1997/6-8 20-22 
20 Honti Katalin Megújult a Szegedi Éliker Rt. Szegedi Éliker Rt. Mai piac 1997/5 34-36 
 
 176
 177
Appendix 1 
List of Articles Included in Content Analysis (continued) 
Nr. Author Title Retailer Source Year/Issue Page 
21 Justyák János Jégcsillag Kft. Családi vállalkozás a toplistán Jégcsillag Kft. Mai piac 2001/1-2 18-19 
22 Bukta Zsuzsa Gé-Ker Bt. Nem a név kötelez Gé-Ker Bt. Mai piac 2000/5 40-41 
23 Bukta Zsuzsa Reális jövőkép Reál Mai piac 2001/4 26-27 
24 Bajor Eszter A változás minőségi kiskereskedelmi tendenciák Mai piac 2000/4 32-34 
25 Körtési Zsolt Több lábon állva Siófok és Vidéke ÁFÉSZ Mai piac 1998/10 24-25 
26 Varga Sándor Budapesten is erősített Tisza Coop Rt. Mai piac 1998/9 20 
27 Bukta Zsuzsa Sarki Sláger Sláger Mai piac 1998/3 34-36 
28   A helyzeti előny még nem elég a győzelemhez Coop Mai piac 1998/3 12-16 
29 Bajor Eszter A kevesebb néha több Kerékgyártó Kft. Mai piac 1998/2 18-19 
30 Maróti Zsuzsa Három a magyar igazság Győri ÁFÉSZ Mai piac 1998/12 18-20 
31 Bukta Zsuzsa Maximális kényelem Max Szupermarket Mai piac 1999/11 20-23 
32 Hä Szerkezetváltás a nagykereskedelemben Alfa Kereskedelmi Rt. Mai paic 1995/2 34-35 
33 D.I. Csemegeüzlet a lakótelepen 7Csemege Mai piac 2000/3 20-21 
34  Terjeszkedni kötelező Szarvas Coop Mai piac 2002/4 22 
35  A régi, új Honiker: Új marketingkoncepció Honiker Mai piac 2002/5 24 
36 Nagy Katalin Itt a mirelit sziget, jön a convenience store Sláger Rt. Mai piac 2002/7 18-20 
37  Reál: Találkozzunk mindennap Reál Hungária Élelmiszer Rt. Mai piac 2002/8 31 
38  A Reál első éve Reál Hungária Élelmiszer Rt. Mai piac 2002/12 51 
39  Reál: Találkozzunk mindennap Reál Hungária Élelmiszer Rt. Mai piac 2002/9 25 
40 
 
Üdülõövezeti miniszupermarket 
Igényesebb vevõkörre készülnek 
Reál Ibolya ABC 
 Mai piac 2002/10 26-28 
41  Mai Piac Kerekasztal: Közös jövő Reál Rt, CBA, Honiker Mai piac 2002/1-2 18-20 
42 Gémes Gábor-
Kovács L. István Vevőközeli üzletek, önálló imázzsal Tempo Szupermarket Kft. Mai piac 2002/1-2 38-39 
  
Appendix 2 
Codelist Applied in the Content Analysis 
 
Subject of Analysis Concepts 
What type of retail alliance does it take part 
the retailer in? 
 
Buying group 
Franchise 
Voluntary chain 
 
What elements of marketing strategy are 
influenced by the alliance? 
 
Price 
Merchandise assortment 
Store brand 
Advertising 
Service 
 
What behavioural aspects are mentioned 
regarding the co-operation within the 
alliance? 
 
Reliability, trust 
Autonomy 
Dependence 
Commitment 
Conflict 
 
What performance measures are affected 
by the retail mix elements?  
 
Turnover/sales 
Gross margin 
Revenue/profit 
ROI, ROA 
Efficiency 
Inventory turnover 
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Appendix 3 
 
Coding Scheme A 
 
Document ID:  _______________ 
 
Name of coder: _______________ 
 
Date coded: _____  page  ___________  of  __________________ 
 
 
Text, citation Code of 
Concept 
Comments 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
Coding Scheme B 
 
Document ID:  _______________ 
 
Name of coder: _______________ 
 
Date coded: _____  page  ___________  of __________________ 
 
Concept 1 Concept 2 Code of 
Association 
Comments 
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Appendix 4 
The Association of Concepts 
Positive association   
A positively affects B 
 facilitates  
 advances  
 increases  
 makes better  
 helps  
 promotes  
 is necessary for  
   
Negative association   
A negatively affects B 
 makes difficult  
 hinders  
 hurts  
 impedes  
 prevents  
 inhibits  
 changes for the worse  
   
Non positive association   
A won’t positively affect B 
 won’t help  
 won’t promote  
 is no benefit to  
 (construct of negatives of 
positive association) 
 
   
Non negative association   
A won’t affect negatively B 
 won’t hurt  
 won’t hinders  
 (contruct negatives of negative 
association) 
 
   
small, but not zero effect 
A affects in some nonzero way B 
 somehow affects  
   
No effect   
A has no effect on B 
 has no relation to  
 does not matter for  
   
Equivalent   
A is equivalent to B 
 is the same as  
 is defined as  
   
Non equivalent   
A is not the same as B 
   
Example   
A is a member of  
 is an example of B 
 belongs to set  
 is not a member of  
Source: Axelrod, R. [1976]: Structure of Decision. Princeton, New York 
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Appendix 5 
Adjacency Matrix  
 Cau  se                  
Effect Joining 
the 
alliance
Compet
ency 
Supplier Favourable 
purchasing 
conditions
Secondary 
conditions
Develo
pment 
Assort
ment 
Store 
brand 
Price 
level 
Corpor
ate 
Identity 
Turnov
er 
Promoti
on 
Wareho
using 
Effectiv
eness 
Gross 
margin
Inventory 
turnover 
Competitive-
ness 
Total nr. 
of effects 
Joining the 
alliance 
                 0 
Competency                  0 
Suppliers  1                1 
Favourable 
purchasing 
conditions 
2                 2 
Secondary 
conditions 
                 0 
Development     1             1 
Assortment 1 1                2 
Store brand                  0 
Price level  1                1 
Corporate 
Identity 
 1                1 
Turnover 4  1 1 1 1 4 2 2 1  4      21 
Promotion                  0 
Warehousing 1                 1 
Effectiven  ess 1 1 1                 3 
Gross mar  gin 1                 1 
Inventory 
Turnover 
2 1                 3 
Competitiven  ess  2 1                3 
Total nr. of 
causes 
13 4 1 2 2 1 4 5 2 1 0 4 1 0 0 0 0  
 
Appendix 6 
Interview Guide for the Hub Firms of the Retail Alliance 
 
INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
1) What factors have motivated the creation of  the alliance? 
 
 2) What type of activities are influenced by the co-operation? What part of retail activities should 
be harmonised between the member and the hub firm of the alliance? 
 
3) What are the patterns of decision making within the aliance?  
 
4) What are the most difficult areas to work with the allied retailers?  
 
5) Are there any differences in the partnership with the member firms? Does the management 
apply any differentiation, or segmentation?  
 
6) How are the performance of the allied retailers measured? Are there any significant differences 
in market performance and what factors are responsible for the differences?  
 
7) Market potential of the alliance? Growth ratio of the alliance? Competition within and between 
retail alliances?  
 
Respondents 
Reál Hungária Rt. Gálfi, Katalin Marketing Director 
Coop Hungary Rt. Boros, Péter Sales Executive 
CBA Kereskedelmi Kft. Neubauer, Katalin Sales Executive 
Honiker Kereskedelmi és 
Szolgáltató Kft. 
Tóth, Tibor Sales Executive 
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Appendix 7 
 
Scales Used in the Quantitative Research 
Marketing Strategy Variables: 
 
 Pricing: average retail margin (%), average standard deviation of  retail margin (%) in the most 
important merchandise groups (fresh food, prepackaged food, sweets, beverages, off-licence, 
tobacco products, health&beauty products, and general products)  
 
 Trade allowances: dummy variables measuring different types of allowances (the length of the 
payment period, quantity discount, pay-backs for bounded assortment and prices, short term 
loan for financing inventory, other type of allowance)  
 
 Basic assortment: number of SKUs in different merchandise groups (fresh food, prepackaged 
food, sweets, beverages, off-licence, tobacco products, health&beauty products, and general 
products)  
 
 Store brands: number of SKUs of store brands in different merchandise groups (fresh food, 
prepackaged food, sweets, beverages, off-licence, tobacco products, health&beauty products, 
and general products)  
 
 Promotion intensity: number of national, regional and individual promotions within a year, 
average number of SKUs included in a weekly or biweekly promotion, number of 
promotional games within a year  
 
 Advertising: annual number of national, regional and individual paid impersonal advertising  
 
 Identity: dummy variables for different identity elements (frontal design, logo, flyer, uniform, 
store layout, merchandise display, price featuring, other identity element) 
 
Performance Measures 
 Annual Sales (in Thousand HUF) 
 Annual Gross Margin (in Thousand HUF) 
 Annual Net Profit (in Thousand HUF) 
 Sales Growth due to the alliance (%) 
 Profit Growth due to the alliance 
 
Moderating Variables 
 Size of the retailer (total number of store employees, total number of the owned stores, total 
square meter of floorspace) 
 Location of the stores: dummies of 4 types of settlements (county capital, settlements with a 
population of below or over 50 000, village) 
 Competition intensity: store number of different type of competitors in the trade area 
(multinational chain, other domestic chain, other retailers belonging to the same alliance, 
independent retailers) 
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Appendix 7 (continued) 
Scales Used in the Quantitative Research 
 
Scales for Describing the Relationship between the Allied Retailer and the Hub Firm of 
the Alliance 
 
Dependence (Kumar, Sheer, Steenkamp [1998], 5-point Likert-scale) 
 Since I entered this alliance, the sales of my firm has increased. 
 Since I entered this alliance, the profit of my firm has increased. 
 There are other alliances, who could provide us with comparable benefits. (Reversed) 
 Our total cost of switching to a competing alliance would be prohibitive. 
 It would be difficult to replace the sales generated from this alliance. 
 It would be difficult to replace the profit generated from this alliance. 
 
Trust (Doney&Cannon [1997], 5-point Likert-scale)
 The hub firm is genuinely concerned that our business succeds. 
 We trust the hub firm keeps our best interest in mind. 
 When making important decisions, the hub firm considers our welfare as well as its own. 
 The hub firm keeps promises it makes to our firm 
 The hub firm is not always honest with us. (Reversed) 
 We do not always believe the information that the hub firm provides us. (Reversed) 
 We find it necessary to be cautious with the hub firm. (Reversed) 
 
Competence (Kumar et.a. [1992], Selnes [1998], 5-point Likert-scale) 
 The hub firm of the alliance has the required business skills necessary to run a successful 
business. 
 The hub firm of the alliance demonstrates a great deal of knowledge about retailing. 
 The hub firm of the alliance have a good knowledge of competitors. 
 The hub firm of the alliance knows the market well. 
 The hub firm of the alliance has invested enough time and money in educating and training 
itself. 
 The hub firm of the alliance provides me with advice about how to operate my business. 
 
Satisfaction 
Overall satisfaction with the hub firm (7-point scale) 
 
Retailer’s Profile 
 Year of foundation of the retail firm (year) 
 Age of the owner/manager (year) 
 Education level of the owner  
 Experience: years spent in retail business 
Appendix 8 
The Structure of the Sample 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE PLANNED AND REALISED SAMPLE BY COUNTIES
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Appendix 9 
The Structure of the Sample 
 
 186
STATUS IN THE ALLIANCE
shareholder
16,0%
associated member
84,0%
THE PRESENT ALLIANCE IS THE FIRST HORIZONTAL 
CO-OPERATION
no
28,6%
yes
71,4%
TOTAL NUMBER OF STORES OWNED
1 store
60,9%
2 stores
15,2%
3-5 stores
13,0%
over 6 stores
10,9%
 TOTAL FLOORSPACE OF THE OWNED STORES 
(square meter)
under 100
39,5%101-200
37,2%
201-400
9,3%
401-800
9,3%
above 801
4,7%
Appendix 9 (continued) 
The Structure of the Sample  Hiba!
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TOTAL NUMBER OF SALES PERSONNEL
1-2
20,9%
3-5
25,6%6-10
27,9%
11-20
18,6%
above 21
7,0%
RETAIL EXPERIENCE OF THE OWNER 
(years)
under 10 years
32,6%
21-30 years
7,0% above 31 years
16,3%
11-20 years
44,2%
THE OWNER'S EDUCATION
secondary
46,7%
higher education
40,0%
elementary
13,3%
FOUNDATION OF THE FIRM
before 1990
14,6%
1991-1995
31,3%
after 1996
54,2%
 Appendix 10 
The Effect of the Size on the Relationship of Marketing Strategy and Performance of the Allied Retailers 
Model Summary          
  R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate Change Statistics         Durbin-Watson 
Model         R Square Change F Change df1 df2 Sig. F Change   
1 0,725 0,526 0,457 77367,74 0,53 7,59 6 41 1,62989E-05   
2 0,945 0,893 0,863 38788,81 0,37 31,53 4 37 1,84266E-11 2,182499774 
Predictors: (Constant), Nr. of chain identity elements, Average retail margin, Nr. of advertisements, Nr. of promotions, Nr. of allowances, Basic assortment (nr. of SKUs) 
Predictors: (Constant), Nr. of chain identity elements, Average retail margin, Nr. of advertisements, Nr. of promotions, Nr. of allowances, Basic assortment (nr. of SKUs), Nr. of 
stores, Total floorspace, Nr. of sales employees, Nr. of employees) 
Dependent Variable: Total Sales in 2003        
           
Model Summary          
  R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate Change Statistics         Durbin-Watson 
Model         R Square Change F Change df1 df2 Sig. F Change   
1 0,725 0,526 0,457 77367,74 0,53 7,59 6 41 1,62989E-05   
2 0,943 0,889 0,862 38945,79 0,36 41,27 3 38 4,90504E-12 2,294805222 
Predictors: (Constant), Nr. of chain identity elements, Average retail margin, Nr. of advertisements, Nr. of promotions, Nr. of allowances, Basic assortment (nr. of SKUs) 
Predictors: (Constant), Nr. of chain identity elements, Average retail margin, Nr. of advertisements, Nr. of promotions, Nr. of allowances, Basic assortment (nr. of SKUs), Nr. of 
stores, Az Total floorspace, Nr. of employees 
Dependent Variable: Total Sales in 2003        
           
Model Summary          
  R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate Change Statistics         Durbin-Watson 
Model         R Square Change F Change df1 df2 Sig. F Change   
1 0,725 0,526 0,457 77367,74 0,53 7,59 6 41 1,62989E-05   
2 0,937 0,878 0,853 40305,68 0,35 56,03 2 39 3,40347E-12 2,415292035 
Predictors: (Constant), Nr. of chain identity elements, Average retail margin, Nr. of advertisements, Nr. of promotions, Nr. of allowances, Basic assortment (nr. of SKUs) 
Predictors: (Constant), Nr. of chain identity elements, Average retail margin, Nr. of advertisements, Nr. of promotions, Nr. of allowances, Basic assortment (nr. of SKUs), Nr. of 
employees, Az Total floorspace 
Dependent Variable: Total Sales in 2003        
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Appendix 10 (continued) 
The Effect of the Size on the Relationship of Marketing Strategy and Performance of the Allied Retailers 
 
Model Summary          
  R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate Change Statistics         Durbin-Watson 
Model         R Square Change F Change df1 df2 Sig. F Change   
1 0,726 0,528 0,460 76490,39 0,53 7,82 6 42 1,10272E-05   
2 0,784 0,614 0,549 69941,43 0,09 9,23 1 41 0,004124068 1,946449084 
Predictors: (Constant), Nr. of chain identity elements, Average retail margin, Nr. of advertisements, Nr. of promotions, Nr. of allowances, Basic assortment (nr. of SKUs) 
Predictors: (Constant), Nr. of chain identity elements, Average retail margin, Nr. of advertisements, Nr. of promotions, Nr. of allowances, Basic assortment (nr. of SKUs), Az Total 
floorspace 
Dependent Variable: Total Sales in 2003        
           
Model Summary          
  R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate Change Statistics         Durbin-Watson 
Model         R Square Change F Change df1 df2 Sig. F Change   
1 0,782 0,612 0,559 99640,58 0,61 11,57 6 44 9,82212E-08   
2 0,946 0,896 0,879 52262,47 0,28 116,94 1 43 7,6198E-14 2,763841441 
Predictors: (Constant), Nr. of chain identity elements, Average retail margin, Nr. of advertisements, Nr. of allowances, Nr. of promotions, Basic assortment (nr. of SKUs) 
Predictors: (Constant), Nr. of chain identity elements, Average retail margin, Nr. of advertisements, Nr. of allowances, Nr. of promotions, Basic assortment (nr. of SKUs), Nr. of 
employees 
Dependent Variable: Total Sales in 2003        
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Appendix 11 
Correlation Matrix of the Relationship between the Member Firms and Hub Firm 
  F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 S 
D1 Pearson Correlation 1,000 0,861 -0,291 0,186 0,484 0,442 0,586 0,615 0,490 0,265 0,015 -0,135 -0,317 0,468 0,396 0,180 0,242 0,490 0,523 0,298 
 Sig. (2-tailed) , 0,000 0,043 0,200 0,000 0,001 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,066 0,919 0,361 0,026 0,001 0,005 0,221 0,097 0,000 0,000 0,040 
 N 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 48 49 49 48 49 49 49 48 48 49 49 48 
D2 Pearson Correlation 0,861 1,000 -0,251 0,139 0,349 0,308 0,576 0,558 0,475 0,221 0,007 -0,075 -0,268 0,398 0,372 0,042 0,132 0,484 0,413 0,307 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0,000 , 0,083 0,343 0,014 0,031 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,127 0,960 0,612 0,062 0,005 0,008 0,777 0,371 0,000 0,003 0,034 
 N 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 48 49 49 48 49 49 49 48 48 49 49 48 
D3 Pearson Correlation -0,291 -0,251 1,000 -0,089 -0,324 -0,268 -0,171 -0,160 -0,213 0,032 -0,023 0,240 0,367 -0,277 -0,307 -0,121 -0,168 -0,258 -0,252 -0,210 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0,043 0,083 , 0,540 0,022 0,060 0,234 0,268 0,142 0,828 0,874 0,097 0,009 0,052 0,030 0,408 0,248 0,071 0,077 0,148 
 N 49 49 50 50 50 50 50 50 49 50 50 49 50 50 50 49 49 50 50 49 
D4 Pearson Correlation 0,186 0,139 -0,089 1,000 0,518 0,494 0,181 0,061 -0,047 0,180 0,067 -0,059 -0,049 0,383 0,238 0,271 0,103 0,255 0,378 0,161 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0,200 0,343 0,540 , 0,000 0,000 0,209 0,672 0,747 0,210 0,643 0,685 0,737 0,006 0,096 0,059 0,481 0,073 0,007 0,270 
 N 49 49 50 50 50 50 50 50 49 50 50 49 50 50 50 49 49 50 50 49 
D5 Pearson Correlation 0,484 0,349 -0,324 0,518 1,000 0,929 0,317 0,363 0,137 0,097 0,134 0,033 -0,084 0,449 0,208 0,292 0,134 0,241 0,504 0,249 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0,000 0,014 0,022 0,000 , 0,000 0,025 0,009 0,349 0,501 0,354 0,820 0,560 0,001 0,148 0,042 0,358 0,092 0,000 0,084 
 N 49 49 50 50 50 50 50 50 49 50 50 49 50 50 50 49 49 50 50 49 
D6 Pearson Correlation 0,442 0,308 -0,268 0,494 0,929 1,000 0,392 0,435 0,197 0,076 0,076 0,018 -0,070 0,438 0,250 0,361 0,238 0,177 0,513 0,191 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0,001 0,031 0,060 0,000 0,000 , 0,005 0,002 0,176 0,599 0,600 0,901 0,627 0,001 0,080 0,011 0,099 0,219 0,000 0,189 
 N 49 49 50 50 50 50 50 50 49 50 50 49 50 50 50 49 49 50 50 49 
T1 Pearson Correlation 0,586 0,576 -0,171 0,181 0,317 0,392 1,000 0,869 0,720 0,436 -0,039 -0,039 -0,243 0,568 0,582 0,351 0,397 0,242 0,555 0,594 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0,000 0,000 0,234 0,209 0,025 0,005 , 0,000 0,000 0,002 0,786 0,789 0,089 0,000 0,000 0,013 0,005 0,090 0,000 0,000 
 N 49 49 50 50 50 50 50 50 49 50 50 49 50 50 50 49 49 50 50 49 
T2 Pearson Correlation 0,615 0,558 -0,160 0,061 0,363 0,435 0,869 1,000 0,772 0,406 -0,127 -0,025 -0,266 0,522 0,536 0,332 0,406 0,185 0,619 0,513 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0,000 0,000 0,268 0,672 0,009 0,002 0,000 , 0,000 0,003 0,379 0,863 0,062 0,000 0,000 0,020 0,004 0,198 0,000 0,000 
 N 49 49 50 50 50 50 50 50 49 50 50 49 50 50 50 49 49 50 50 49 
T3 Pearson Correlation 0,490 0,475 -0,213 -0,047 0,137 0,197 0,720 0,772 1,000 0,496 -0,308 -0,312 -0,520 0,468 0,541 0,305 0,353 0,281 0,541 0,535 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0,000 0,001 0,142 0,747 0,349 0,176 0,000 0,000 , 0,000 0,031 0,031 0,000 0,001 0,000 0,033 0,013 0,050 0,000 0,000 
 N 48 48 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 48 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 48 
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Appendix 11 (continued) 
Correlation Matrix of the Relationship between the Member Firms and Hub Firm  
  D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 S 
T4 Pearson Correlation 0,265 0,221 0,032 0,180 0,097 0,076 0,436 0,406 0,496 1,000 -0,266 -0,236 -0,286 0,379 0,379 0,200 0,212 0,388 0,559 0,636 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0,066 0,127 0,828 0,210 0,501 0,599 0,002 0,003 0,000 , 0,061 0,102 0,044 0,007 0,007 0,168 0,144 0,005 0,000 0,000 
 N 49 49 50 50 50 50 50 50 49 50 50 49 50 50 50 49 49 50 50 49 
T5 Pearson Correlation 0,015 0,007 -0,023 0,067 0,134 0,076 -0,039 -0,127 -0,308 -0,266 1,000 0,422 0,486 -0,005 -0,135 -0,101 -0,167 -0,026 -0,170 -0,132 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0,919 0,960 0,874 0,643 0,354 0,600 0,786 0,379 0,031 0,061 , 0,003 0,000 0,974 0,349 0,489 0,251 0,859 0,237 0,367 
 N 49 49 50 50 50 50 50 50 49 50 50 49 50 50 50 49 49 50 50 49 
T6 Pearson Correlation -0,135 -0,075 0,240 -0,059 0,033 0,018 -0,039 -0,025 -0,312 -0,236 0,422 1,000 0,499 -0,075 -0,014 -0,093 -0,167 -0,385 -0,184 -0,023 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0,361 0,612 0,097 0,685 0,820 0,901 0,789 0,863 0,031 0,102 0,003 , 0,000 0,608 0,925 0,528 0,258 0,006 0,206 0,879 
 N 48 48 49 49 49 49 49 49 48 49 49 49 49 49 49 48 48 49 49 48 
T7 Pearson Correlation -0,317 -0,268 0,367 -0,049 -0,084 -0,070 -0,243 -0,266 -0,520 -0,286 0,486 0,499 1,000 -0,152 -0,194 -0,098 -0,168 -0,117 -0,357 -0,169 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0,026 0,062 0,009 0,737 0,560 0,627 0,089 0,062 0,000 0,044 0,000 0,000 , 0,292 0,178 0,501 0,247 0,417 0,011 0,246 
 N 49 49 50 50 50 50 50 50 49 50 50 49 50 50 50 49 49 50 50 49 
C1 Pearson Correlation 0,468 0,398 -0,277 0,383 0,449 0,438 0,568 0,522 0,468 0,379 -0,005 -0,075 -0,152 1,000 0,830 0,695 0,764 0,535 0,607 0,592 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0,001 0,005 0,052 0,006 0,001 0,001 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,007 0,974 0,608 0,292 , 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
 N 49 49 50 50 50 50 50 50 49 50 50 49 50 50 50 49 49 50 50 49 
C2 Pearson Correlation 0,396 0,372 -0,307 0,238 0,208 0,250 0,582 0,536 0,541 0,379 -0,135 -0,014 -0,194 0,830 1,000 0,572 0,722 0,388 0,496 0,577 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0,005 0,008 0,030 0,096 0,148 0,080 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,007 0,349 0,925 0,178 0,000 , 0,000 0,000 0,005 0,000 0,000 
 N 49 49 50 50 50 50 50 50 49 50 50 49 50 50 50 49 49 50 50 49 
C3 Pearson Correlation 0,180 0,042 -0,121 0,271 0,292 0,361 0,351 0,332 0,305 0,200 -0,101 -0,093 -0,098 0,695 0,572 1,000 0,793 0,441 0,399 0,441 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0,221 0,777 0,408 0,059 0,042 0,011 0,013 0,020 0,033 0,168 0,489 0,528 0,501 0,000 0,000 , 0,000 0,001 0,004 0,002 
 N 48 48 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 48 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 48 
C4 Pearson Correlation 0,242 0,132 -0,168 0,103 0,134 0,238 0,397 0,406 0,353 0,212 -0,167 -0,167 -0,168 0,764 0,722 0,793 1,000 0,387 0,411 0,385 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0,097 0,371 0,248 0,481 0,358 0,099 0,005 0,004 0,013 0,144 0,251 0,258 0,247 0,000 0,000 0,000 , 0,006 0,003 0,007 
 N 48 48 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 48 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 48 
C5 Pearson Correlation 0,490 0,484 -0,258 0,255 0,241 0,177 0,242 0,185 0,281 0,388 -0,026 -0,385 -0,117 0,535 0,388 0,441 0,387 1,000 0,408 0,395 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0,000 0,000 0,071 0,073 0,092 0,219 0,090 0,198 0,050 0,005 0,859 0,006 0,417 0,000 0,005 0,001 0,006 , 0,003 0,005 
 N 49 49 50 50 50 50 50 50 49 50 50 49 50 50 50 49 49 50 50 49 
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Appendix 11 (continued) 
Correlation Matrix of the Relationship between the Member Firms and Hub Firm  
  D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 S 
C6 Pearson Correlation 0,523 0,413 -0,252 0,378 0,504 0,513 0,555 0,619 0,541 0,559 -0,170 -0,184 -0,357 0,607 0,496 0,399 0,411 0,408 1,000 0,500 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0,000 0,003 0,077 0,007 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,237 0,206 0,011 0,000 0,000 0,004 0,003 0,003 , 0,000 
 N 49 49 50 50 50 50 50 50 49 50 50 49 50 50 50 49 49 50 50 49 
S Pearson Correlation 0,298 0,307 -0,210 0,161 0,249 0,191 0,594 0,513 0,535 0,636 -0,132 -0,023 -0,169 0,592 0,577 0,441 0,385 0,395 0,500 1,000 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0,040 0,034 0,148 0,270 0,084 0,189 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,367 0,879 0,246 0,000 0,000 0,002 0,007 0,005 0,000 , 
 N 48 48 49 49 49 49 49 49 48 49 49 48 49 49 49 48 48 49 49 49 
 
D1: Since I entered this alliance, the sales of my firm has increased. 
D2: Since I entered this alliance, the profit of my firm has increased. 
D3: There are other alliances who could provide us with comparable benefits. (Reversed) 
D4: Our total cost of switching to a competing alliance would be prohibitive. 
D5: It would be difficult to replace the sales generated from this alliance. 
D6: It would be difficult to replace the profit generated from this alliance. 
 
T1: The hub firm is genuinely concerned that our business succeds. 
T2: We trust the hub firm keeps our best interest in mind. 
T3: When making important decisions, the hub firm considers our welfare as well as its own. 
T4: The hub firm keeps promises it makes to our firm 
T5: The hub firm is not always honest with us. (Reversed) 
T6: We do not always believe the information that the hub firm provides us. (Reversed) 
T7: We find it necessary to be cautious with the hub firm. (Reversed) 
 
C1: The hub firm of the alliance has the required business skills necessary to run a successful business. 
C2: The hub firm of the alliance demonstrates a great deal of knowledge about retailing. 
C3: The hub firm of the alliance have a good knowledge of competitors. 
C4: The hub firm of the alliance knows the market well. 
C5: The hub firm of the alliance has invested enough time and money in educating and training itself. 
C6: The hub firm of the alliance provides me with advice about how to operate my business. 
 
S: Overall satisfaction with the hub firm (7-point scale) 
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Appendix 12 
Reliability Analysis of the Construct Perceived Dependence 
****** Method 2 (covariance matrix) will be used for this analysis ****** 
 
  DEPENDENCE 
 
  R E L I A B I L I T Y   A N A L Y S I S   -   S C A L E   (A L P H A) 
 
  1.     D1       Since I entered this alliance, the sales of my firm has increased. 
  2.     D2       Since I entered this alliance, the profit of my firm has increased. 
  3.     D3 (R)   There are other alliances who could provide us with comparable benefits. 
  4.     D4       Our total cost of switching to a competing alliance would be prohibitive. 
  5.     D5       It would be difficult to replace the sales generated from this alliance. 
  6.     D6       It would be difficult to replace the profit generated from this alliance. 
 
 
                             Mean        Std Dev       Cases 
 
  1.     D1            3,4694         1,2926        49,0 
  2.     D2            3,3061         1,3103        49,0 
  3.     D3 (R)        2,7755         1,2292        49,0 
  4.     D4            2,9184         1,2884        49,0 
  5.     D5            2,5306         1,3245        49,0 
  6.     D6            2,5918         1,3982        49,0 
 
        N of Cases =        49,0 
 
                                                   N of 
Statistics for       Mean   Variance    Std Dev  Variables 
      Scale       17,5918    30,9133     5,5600          6 
 
Item Means           Mean    Minimum    Maximum      Range    Max/Min   Variance 
                   2,9320     2,5306     3,4694      ,9388     1,3710      ,1461 
 
Item Variances       Mean    Minimum    Maximum      Range    Max/Min   Variance 
                   1,7113     1,5111     1,9549      ,4439     1,2938      ,0211 
 
Item-total Statistics 
 
          Scale          Scale         Corrected 
          Mean          Variance       Item-         Squared         Alpha 
          if Item        if Item       Total         Multiple        if Item 
          Deleted        Deleted    Correlation    Correlation       Deleted 
 
D1        14,1224        21,5264        ,6433         ,7814           ,7508 
D2        14,2857        22,6667        ,5234         ,7479           ,7784 
D3(R)!    14,8163        25,4031        ,3227         ,1495           ,8191 
D4!       14,6735        24,3078        ,3893         ,2931           ,8073 
D5        15,0612        19,9753        ,7757         ,8808           ,7172 
D6        15,0000        20,0417        ,7123         ,8655           ,7315 
 
 
  R E L I A B I L I T Y   A N A L Y S I S   -   S C A L E   (A L P H A) 
 
                       Analysis of Variance 
 
Source of Variation     Sum of Sq.       DF       Mean Square    F         Prob. 
 
Between People            247,3061        48           5,1522 
Within People             281,3333       245           1,1483 
  Between Measures           35,7823         5         7,1565      6,9947  ,0000 
  Residual                  245,5510       240         1,0231 
Total                     528,6395       293           1,8042 
     Grand Mean        2,9320 
 
 
Hotelling's T-Squared =     30,9990        F =      5,6832       Prob. =   ,0004 
  Degrees of Freedom:              Numerator =      5      Denominator =      44 
 
Reliability Coefficients     6 items 
 
Alpha =   ,8014           Standardized item alpha =   ,7978 
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Appendix 12 (continued) 
Reliability Analysis of the Construct Trust 
 
TRUST   
 
R E L I A B I L I T Y   A N A L Y S I S   -   S C A L E   (A L P H A) 
 
  1.     T1      The hub firm is genuinely concerned that our business succeds. 
  2.     T2      We trust the hub firm keeps our best interest in mind. 
  3.     T3      When making important decisions, the hub firm considers our welfare as well 
                 as its own. 
  4.     T4      The hub firm keeps promises it makes to our firm. 
  5.     T5(R)   The hub firm is not always honest with us. (Reversed) 
  6.     T6(R)   We do not always believe the information that the hub firm provides us.  
                (Reversed) 
  7.     T7(R)   We find it necessary to be cautious with the hub firm. (Reversed) 
 
                        Mean        Std Dev       Cases 
 
  1.     T1           3,2292         1,2922        48,0 
  2.     T2           3,2292         1,3407        48,0 
  3.     T3           2,7708         1,3086        48,0 
  4.     T4           3,7500         1,1013        48,0 
  5.     T5(R)        3,6042         1,2332        48,0 
  6.     T6(R)        3,3542         1,1938        48,0 
  7.     T7(R)        3,7083         1,2876        48,0 
 
        N of Cases =        48,0 
 
                                                   N of 
Statistics for       Mean   Variance    Std Dev  Variables 
      Scale       23,6458    36,1485     6,0124          7 
Item Means           Mean    Minimum    Maximum      Range    Max/Min   Variance 
                   3,3780     2,7708     3,7500      ,9792     1,3534      ,1187 
Item Variances       Mean    Minimum    Maximum      Range    Max/Min   Variance 
                   1,5709     1,2128     1,7974      ,5847     1,4821      ,0401 
 
 
Item-total Statistics 
 
           Scale          Scale      Corrected 
           Mean         Variance       Item-         Squared          Alpha 
           if Item        if Item       Total         Multiple        if Item 
           Deleted        Deleted    Correlation    Correlation       Deleted 
 
T1         20,4167        26,5035        ,5994         ,7762           ,7777 
T2         20,4167        25,6099        ,6442         ,8055           ,7690 
T3         20,8750        24,1968        ,7954         ,7183           ,7396 
T4         19,8958        28,8187        ,5173         ,2910           ,7926 
T5(R)!     20,0417        29,6578        ,3700         ,2883           ,8166 
T6(R)!     20,2917        29,9131        ,3684         ,3023           ,8161 
T7(R)      19,9375        27,0386        ,5565         ,4011           ,7856 
 
 
  R E L I A B I L I T Y   A N A L Y S I S   -   S C A L E   (A L P H A) 
 
                       Analysis of Variance 
 
Source of Variation     Sum of Sq.       DF       Mean Square    F         Prob. 
 
Between People            242,7113        47           5,1641 
Within People             308,2857       288           1,0704 
  Between Measures           34,1845         6         5,6974      5,8616  ,0000 
  Residual                  274,1012       282          ,9720 
Total                     550,9970       335           1,6448 
     Grand Mean        3,3780 
 
 
Hotelling's T-Squared =     50,1782        F =      7,4734       Prob. =   ,0000 
  Degrees of Freedom:              Numerator =      6      Denominator =      42 
 
Reliability Coefficients     7 items 
 
Alpha =   ,8118           Standardized item alpha =   ,8090 
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Appendix 12 (continued) 
Reliability Analysis of the Construct Perceived Competence 
COMPETENCE 
 
  R E L I A B I L I T Y   A N A L Y S I S   -   S C A L E   (A L P H A) 
 
  1.     C1  The hub firm of the alliance has the required business skills necessary to run 
             a successful business. 
  2.     C2  The hub firm of the alliance demonstrates a great deal of knowledge about 
             retailing. 
  3.     C3  The hub firm of the alliance have a good knowledge of competitors. 
  4.     C4  The hub firm of the alliance knows the market well. 
  5.     C5  The hub firm of the alliance has invested enough time and money in educating and 
             training itself. 
  6.     C6  The hub firm of the alliance provides me with advice about how to operate my  
             business. 
 
                        Mean        Std Dev       Cases 
 
  1.     C1           3,6531         1,0907        49,0 
  2.     C2           3,6531         1,0907        49,0 
  3.     C3           3,9796         1,0895        49,0 
  4.     C4           4,1020          ,9184        49,0 
  5.     C5           3,4490         1,2758        49,0 
  6.     C6           3,3673         1,1672        49,0 
 
        N of Cases =        49,0 
 
                                                   N of 
Statistics for       Mean   Variance    Std Dev  Variables 
      Scale       22,2041    27,4575     5,2400          6 
 
Item Means           Mean    Minimum    Maximum      Range    Max/Min   Variance 
                   3,7007     3,3673     4,1020      ,7347     1,2182      ,0836 
 
Item Variances       Mean    Minimum    Maximum      Range    Max/Min   Variance 
                   1,2333      ,8435     1,6276      ,7840     1,9294      ,0660 
 
Item-total Statistics 
 
           Scale          Scale      Corrected 
            Mean         Variance       Item-         Squared          Alpha 
         if Item        if Item       Total         Multiple        if Item 
         Deleted        Deleted    Correlation    Correlation       Deleted 
 
C1       18,5510        18,1276        ,8765         ,8102           ,8218 
C2       18,5510        19,2109        ,7381         ,7128           ,8459 
C3       18,2245        19,4277        ,7124         ,6677           ,8503 
C4       18,1020        20,2602        ,7685         ,7470           ,8455 
C5!      18,7551        19,9388        ,5171         ,3211           ,8881 
C6       18,8367        20,2645        ,5549         ,3665           ,8776 
 
 
  R E L I A B I L I T Y   A N A L Y S I S   -   S C A L E   (A L P H A) 
 
                       Analysis of Variance 
 
Source of Variation     Sum of Sq.       DF       Mean Square    F         Prob. 
 
Between People            219,6599        48           4,5762 
Within People             156,0000       245            ,6367 
  Between Measures           20,4762         5         4,0952      7,2523  ,0000 
  Residual                  135,5238       240          ,5647 
Total                     375,6599       293           1,2821 
     Grand Mean        3,7007 
 
 
Hotelling's T-Squared =     31,8261        F =      5,8348       Prob. =   ,0003 
  Degrees of Freedom:              Numerator =      5      Denominator =      44 
 
 
Reliability Coefficients     6 items 
 
Alpha =   ,8766           Standardized item alpha =   ,8843 
Appendix 13 
Correlation Matrix of the  Performance Measures of the Allied Retailers 
  SALES GRMRG PROFIT SGROWTH PGROWTH INVTRN SATISF 
Pearson Correlation 1,000 0,912 0,909 0,412 -0,048 0,221 -0,093 
Sig. (2-tailed) , 0,000 0,000 0,063 0,836 0,299 0,652 
N 
SALES 
 27 27 23 21 21 24 26 
Pearson Correlation 0,912 1,000 0,907 0,198 -0,066 0,089 -0,162 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,000 , 0,000 0,241 0,694 0,576 0,267 
N 
GRMRG 
 27 50 25 37 38 42 49 
Pearson Correlation 0,909 0,907 1,000 0,528 0,062 0,223 -0,226 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,000 0,000 , 0,014 0,790 0,295 0,288 
N 
PROFIT 
 23 25 25 21 21 24 24 
Pearson Correlation 0,412 0,198 0,528 1,000 0,766 0,006 0,393 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,063 0,241 0,014 , 0,000 0,974 0,018 
N 
SGROWTH 
 21 37 21 37 37 34 36 
Pearson Correlation -0,048 -0,066 0,062 0,766 1,000 -0,195 0,327 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,836 0,694 0,790 0,000 , 0,263 0,048 
N 
PGROWTH 
 21 38 21 37 38 35 37 
Pearson Correlation 0,221 0,089 0,223 0,006 -0,195 1,000 0,155 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,299 0,576 0,295 0,974 0,263 , 0,332 
N 
INVTRN 
 24 42 24 34 35 42 41 
Pearson Correlation -0,093 -0,162 -0,226 0,393 0,327 0,155 1,000 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,652 0,267 0,288 0,018 0,048 0,332 , 
N 
SATISF 
 26 49 24 36 37 41 49 
Abbreviations: 
SALES = Sales in 2003 (in Thousand HUF) 
GRMRG = Gross margin in 2003 (in Thousand HUF) 
PROFIT = Net Profit (after tax) in 2003 (in Thousand HUF) 
SGROWTH = Sales growth due to the alliance (%) 
PGROWTH = Profit growth due to the alliance (%) 
INVTRN = Average inventory turnover in 2003 (days) 
SATISF = Overall satisfaction with the hub firm of the alliance (7-point scale) 
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Appendix 14 
Statistics Associated with the Imputation of Missing Data 
 Descriptives of input variables Descriptives of imputed variables 
Variable Valid Missing Missing % Mean Std. Dev. Method Mean Std. Dev. 
Basic assortment (nr. of SKUs)  34 16 32,0 1123,9 771,50 MVA, Regression 1029,7 922,9
Store brands (nr. of SKUs) 35 15 30,0 92,5 68,95 MVA, Regression 95,6 62,4
Average retail margin 43 7 14,0 18,5 4,96 MVA, Regression 18,1 4,9
Total number of promotion organised by 
the alliance (national and regional) 45 5 10,0 25,9 16,85 MVA, Regression 28,3 18,68
Total number of advertisements organised 
by the alliance (national and regional) 36 14 28,0 7,1 9,83
System 
Missing=0 8,1 8,96
Total number of chain identity elements 
used by the member firm 48 2 4 3,8 1,31
System 
Missing=0 3,7 1,49
Number of sales personnel (Pers.) 46 4 8,0 11,22 15,51 MVA, Regression 11,8 15,50
Total number of employees (Pers.) 46 4 8,0 12,6 17,04 MVA, Regression 12,1 16,46
Number of stores 46 4 8,0 2,8 3,91 MVA, Regression 2,7 3,78
Total floorspace (sq. meter) 43 7 14,0 228,6 283,02 MVA, Regression 213,4 264,78
Sales in 2003 (in Thousand HUF) 30 20 40,0 156431,8 178158,13 MVA, Regression 149912,7 171422,37
Net Profit (after tax) in 2003 (in Thousand 
HUF) 26 24 52,0 19010,5 25626,61 MVA, Regression 17163,7 17013,04
Gross margin in 2003 (in Thousand HUF) 28 22 44,0 33957,4 38815,9 MVA, Regression 27912,7 33044,14
Sales growth due to the alliance (%) 37 13 26,0 11,05 8,75 MVA, Regression 10,4 7,89
Profit growth due to the alliance (%) 38 12 24,0 8,18 9,22 MVA, Regression 8,9 9,28
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Appendix 15 
Correlation Matrix of Marketing Strategy Variables and Performance Measures of the Allied Retailers 
  MARGIN ALLOW PROM ADVERT ASSORT SBRAND IDENT SALES GRMRG PROFIT SGROWTH PGROWTH 
Pearson Correlation MARGIN 1,000 0,023 -0,004 -0,053 0,215 0,224 0,041 0,103 0,366 0,271 -0,038 0,023 
Sig. (2-tailed)  , 0,874 0,975 0,714 0,134 0,118 0,777 0,475 0,009 0,057 0,794 0,875 
N  50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Pearson Correlation ALLOW 0,023 1,000 0,374 0,319 0,365 0,115 0,348 0,331 0,336 0,354 0,279 -0,019 
Sig. (2-tailed)  0,874 , 0,008 0,024 0,009 0,427 0,013 0,019 0,017 0,012 0,050 0,895 
N  50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Pearson Correlation PROM -0,004 0,374 1,000 0,477 0,383 0,289 0,433 0,178 0,170 0,207 0,135 -0,005 
Sig. (2-tailed)  0,975 0,008 , 0,000 0,006 0,042 0,002 0,216 0,237 0,149 0,352 0,970 
N  50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Pearson Correlation ADVERT -0,053 0,319 0,477 1,000 0,147 0,297 0,434 0,055 0,068 0,309 0,228 0,087 
Sig. (2-tailed)  0,714 0,024 0,000 , 0,308 0,036 0,002 0,705 0,639 0,029 0,111 0,547 
N  50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Pearson Correlation ASSORT 0,215 0,365 0,383 0,147 1,000 0,328 0,412 0,261 0,375 0,325 0,202 0,151 
Sig. (2-tailed)  0,134 0,009 0,006 0,308 , 0,020 0,003 0,067 0,007 0,021 0,159 0,294 
N  50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Pearson Correlation SBRAND 0,224 0,115 0,289 0,297 0,328 1,000 0,104 0,485 0,514 0,507 0,254 0,142 
Sig. (2-tailed)  0,118 0,427 0,042 0,036 0,020 , 0,474 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,075 0,324 
N  50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Pearson Correlation IDENT 0,041 0,348 0,433 0,434 0,412 0,104 1,000 0,231 0,292 0,376 0,361 0,140 
Sig. (2-tailed)  0,777 0,013 0,002 0,002 0,003 0,474 , 0,106 0,040 0,007 0,010 0,334 
N  50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
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Appendix 15 (continued) 
Correlation Matrix of Marketing Strategy Variables and Performance Measures of the Allied Retailers 
  MARGIN ALLOW PROM ADVERT ASSORT SBRAND IDENT SALES GRMRG PROFIT SGRWOTH PGROWT 
Pearson Correlation SALES 0,103 0,331 0,178 0,055 0,261 0,485 0,231 1,000 0,937 0,607 0,191 -0,140 
Sig. (2-tailed)  0,475 0,019 0,216 0,705 0,067 0,000 0,106 , 0,000 0,000 0,184 0,333 
N  50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Pearson Correlation GRMRG 0,366 0,336 0,170 0,068 0,375 0,514 0,292 0,937 1,000 0,669 0,156 -0,112 
Sig. (2-tailed)  0,009 0,017 0,237 0,639 0,007 0,000 0,040 0,000 , 0,000 0,279 0,438 
N  50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Pearson Correlation PROFIT 0,271 0,354 0,207 0,309 0,325 0,507 0,376 0,607 0,669 1,000 0,217 0,025 
Sig. (2-tailed)  0,057 0,012 0,149 0,029 0,021 0,000 0,007 0,000 0,000 , 0,130 0,865 
N  50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Pearson Correlation SGROWTH -0,038 0,279 0,135 0,228 0,202 0,254 0,361 0,191 0,156 0,217 1,000 0,614 
Sig. (2-tailed)  0,794 0,050 0,352 0,111 0,159 0,075 0,010 0,184 0,279 0,130 , 0,000 
N  50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Pearson Correlation PGROWTH 0,023 -0,019 -0,005 0,087 0,151 0,142 0,140 -0,140 -0,112 0,025 0,614 1,000 
Sig. (2-tailed)  0,875 0,895 0,970 0,547 0,294 0,324 0,334 0,333 0,438 0,865 0,000 , 
N  50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Rövidítések jelentése: 
MARGIN= Average retail margin applied by the member firm (%) 
ALLOW= Number of trade allowances received 
PROM= Number of national, and regional promotions in the stores of the member firm organised by the alliance within a year 
ADVERT= Number of national, and regional chain advertisements organised by the alliance 
ASSORT= Number of SKUs of the basic assortment (without promotional and seasonal offering) 
SBRAND= Number of SKUs of store brands developed by the alliance 
IDENT= Number of different chain identity elements 
SALES = Sales in 2003 (in Thousand HUF) 
GRMRG = Gross margin in 2003 (in Thousand HUF) 
PROFIT = Net profit in 2003 (after tax) (in Thousand HUF) 
SGROWTH = Sales growth due to the alliance (%) 
PGROWTH = Profit growth due to the alliance (%) 
 
Appendix 16 
Causal Analysis of Marketing Srategy Variables and the Annual Sales  of Allied Retailers 
Your model contains the following variables 
 
 
             sales                          observed   endogenous 
 
             ident                          observed   exogenous 
             margin                         observed   exogenous 
             assort                         observed   exogenous 
             allow                          observed   exogenous 
             prom                           observed   exogenous 
             sbrand                         observed   exogenous 
             multi                          observed   exogenous 
             indpdt                         observed   exogenous 
             floorsp                        observed   exogenous 
             advert                         observed   exogenous 
             employ                         observed   exogenous 
 
             e12                            unobserved exogenous 
 
 
                     Number of variables in your model:   13 
                     Number of observed variables:        12 
                     Number of unobserved variables:       1 
                     Number of exogenous variables:       12 
                     Number of endogenous variables:       1 
 
 
 
Summary of Parameters 
 
                   Weights  Covariances Variances    Means   Intercepts   Total 
                   -------  ----------- ---------    -----   ----------   ----- 
            Fixed:    1          0          0          0          0          1 
          Labeled:    0          0          0          0          0          0 
        Unlabeled:   11         14         12          0          0         37 
                   -------  ----------- ---------    -----   ----------   ----- 
            Total:   12         14         12          0          0         38 
 
NOTE: 
    The model is recursive. 
 
 
 
Assessment of normality 
 
                              min      max     skew      c.r.  kurtosis    c.r.  
                           -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
                  employ     -0,880    3,914    2,077    5,996    4,824    6,963 
                  advert     -0,928    3,479    1,027    2,964    1,271    1,835 
                 floorsp     -0,693    4,859    3,135    9,049   10,670   15,400 
                  indpdt     -0,613    4,556    3,467   10,009   12,637   18,240 
                   multi     -0,897    3,001    1,494    4,312    1,767    2,551 
                  sbrand     -1,388    2,011    0,452    1,304   -0,848   -1,224 
                    prom     -1,602    3,299    0,676    1,952    0,681    0,983 
                   allow     -2,410    1,641   -0,561   -1,620    0,250    0,361 
                  assort     -1,202    3,780    1,515    4,372    2,687    3,878 
                  margin     -1,854    3,508    1,424    4,111    3,142    4,536 
                   ident     -2,469    2,227   -0,111   -0,320    0,441    0,636 
                   sales     -1,018    3,591    1,740    5,024    2,569    3,708 
            Multivariate                                         46,023    8,877 
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Computation of degrees of freedom 
 
                      Number of distinct sample moments:   78 
          Number of distinct parameters to be estimated:   37 
                                     ------------------------- 
                                     Degrees of freedom:   41 
 
    0e  3 0,0e+000 -3,8772e-002  1,00e+004   1,93481817887e+002    0 1,00e+004 
    1e  0 3,6e+001  0,0000e+000  8,09e-001   1,25913751467e+002   18 1,01e+000 
    2e  0 2,1e+001  0,0000e+000  4,80e-001   1,11918089197e+002    3 0,00e+000 
    3e  0 2,1e+001  0,0000e+000  3,93e-001   1,02536968358e+002    1 1,08e+000 
    4e  0 2,8e+001  0,0000e+000  2,43e-001   1,00969623541e+002    1 1,13e+000 
    5e  0 3,3e+001  0,0000e+000  8,33e-002   1,00870475985e+002    1 1,06e+000 
    6e  0 3,3e+001  0,0000e+000  8,67e-003   1,00869597207e+002    1 1,01e+000 
    7e  0 3,3e+001  0,0000e+000  8,94e-005   1,00869597112e+002    1 1,00e+000 
 
 
 
Minimum was achieved 
 
 
 
Chi-square = 100,870 
Degrees of freedom = 41 
Probability level = 0,000 
 
 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
---------------------------- 
 
 
 
Regression Weights:                      Estimate     S.E.      C.R.     Label  
-------------------                      --------   -------   -------   ------- 
 
               sales <-------- ident       0,167     0,125     1,329            
               sales <------- margin      -0,055     0,100    -0,546            
               sales <------- assort      -0,172     0,124    -1,394            
               sales <-------- allow       0,244     0,115     2,125            
               sales <--------- prom      -0,031     0,126    -0,245            
               sales <------- sbrand       0,529     0,112     4,716            
               sales <-------- multi       0,259     0,100     2,583            
               sales <------- indpdt      -0,381     0,100    -3,801            
               sales <------ floorsp       0,250     0,104     2,412            
               sales <------- employ       0,316     0,104     3,052            
               sales <------- advert      -0,244     0,126    -1,939            
 
 
Standardized Regression Weights:         Estimate 
--------------------------------         -------- 
 
               sales <-------- ident       0,151 
               sales <------- margin      -0,051 
               sales <------- assort      -0,157 
               sales <-------- allow       0,223 
               sales <--------- prom      -0,028 
               sales <------- sbrand       0,486 
               sales <-------- multi       0,240 
               sales <------- indpdt      -0,353 
               sales <------ floorsp       0,231 
               sales <------- employ       0,292 
               sales <------- advert      -0,223 
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Covariances:                             Estimate     S.E.      C.R.     Label  
------------                             --------   -------   -------   ------- 
 
               allow <--------> prom       0,318     0,136     2,334            
               prom <-------> advert       0,409     0,139     2,936            
               assort <------> allow       0,301     0,135     2,222            
               ident <-------> allow       0,315     0,140     2,242            
               assort <-------> prom       0,301     0,127     2,361            
               prom <-------> sbrand       0,214     0,123     1,731            
               ident <--------> prom       0,374     0,137     2,725            
               allow <------> advert       0,252     0,133     1,899            
               sbrand <-----> advert       0,217     0,127     1,713            
               assort <-----> sbrand       0,250     0,129     1,943            
               ident <------> assort       0,337     0,132     2,550            
               multi <------> indpdt       0,006     0,140     0,044            
               floorsp <----> employ       0,244     0,144     1,693            
               ident <------> advert       0,364     0,136     2,679            
 
 
Correlations:                            Estimate 
-------------                            -------- 
 
               allow <--------> prom       0,338 
               prom <-------> advert       0,433 
               assort <------> allow       0,314 
               ident <-------> allow       0,330 
               assort <-------> prom       0,320 
               prom <-------> sbrand       0,226 
               ident <--------> prom       0,399 
               allow <------> advert       0,262 
               sbrand <-----> advert       0,226 
               assort <-----> sbrand       0,260 
               ident <------> assort       0,353 
               multi <------> indpdt       0,006 
               floorsp <----> employ       0,249 
               ident <------> advert       0,381 
 
 
Variances:                               Estimate     S.E.      C.R.     Label  
----------                               --------   -------   -------   ------- 
 
                               ident       0,947     0,188     5,046            
                              margin       0,980     0,198     4,950            
                              assort       0,957     0,191     5,009            
                               allow       0,960     0,193     4,985            
                                prom       0,926     0,182     5,079            
                              sbrand       0,965     0,194     4,968            
                               multi       0,980     0,198     4,950            
                              indpdt       0,980     0,198     4,950            
                             floorsp       0,980     0,198     4,950            
                              advert       0,961     0,193     4,994            
                              employ       0,980     0,198     4,950            
                                 e12       0,484     0,098     4,950            
 
 
Squared Multiple Correlations:           Estimate 
------------------------------           -------- 
 
                               sales       0,578 
 
 
 
Total Effects 
 
          employ   advert   floorsp  indpdt   multi    sbrand   prom     
          -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
sales        0,316   -0,244    0,250   -0,381    0,259    0,529   -0,031 
 
          allow    assort   margin   ident    
          -------- -------- -------- -------- 
sales        0,244   -0,172   -0,055    0,167 
 202
 
 
 
Standardized Total Effects 
 
          employ   advert   floorsp  indpdt   multi    sbrand   prom     
          -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
sales        0,292   -0,223    0,231   -0,353    0,240    0,486   -0,028 
 
 
          allow    assort   margin   ident    
          -------- -------- -------- -------- 
sales        0,223   -0,157   -0,051    0,151 
 
 
 
Direct Effects 
 
          employ   advert   floorsp  indpdt   multi    sbrand   prom     
          -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
sales        0,316   -0,244    0,250   -0,381    0,259    0,529   -0,031 
 
          allow    assort   margin   ident    
          -------- -------- -------- -------- 
sales        0,244   -0,172   -0,055    0,167 
 
 
 
Standardized Direct Effects 
 
          employ   advert   floorsp  indpdt   multi    sbrand   prom     
          -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
sales        0,292   -0,223    0,231   -0,353    0,240    0,486   -0,028 
 
          allow    assort   margin   ident    
          -------- -------- -------- -------- 
sales        0,223   -0,157   -0,051    0,151 
 
 
 
Indirect Effects 
 
          employ   advert   floorsp  indpdt   multi    sbrand   prom     
          -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
sales        0,000    0,000    0,000    0,000    0,000    0,000    0,000 
 
          allow    assort   margin   ident    
          -------- -------- -------- -------- 
sales        0,000    0,000    0,000    0,000 
 
 
 
Standardized Indirect Effects 
 
          employ   advert   floorsp  indpdt   multi    sbrand   prom     
          -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
sales        0,000    0,000    0,000    0,000    0,000    0,000    0,000 
 
          allow    assort   margin   ident    
          -------- -------- -------- -------- 
sales        0,000    0,000    0,000    0,000 
 
 
Summary of models 
----------------- 
 
               Model  NPAR        CMIN    DF           P     CMIN/DF 
    ----------------  ----   ---------    --   ---------   --------- 
       Default model    37     100,870    41       0,000       2,460 
     Saturated model    78       0,000     0 
  Independence model    12     201,877    66       0,000       3,059 
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               Model         RMR         GFI        AGFI        PGFI 
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model       0,196       0,778       0,578       0,409 
     Saturated model       0,000       1,000                         
  Independence model       0,253       0,536       0,451       0,453 
 
 
                          DELTA1        RHO1      DELTA2        RHO2 
               Model         NFI         RFI         IFI         TLI         CFI 
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model       0,500       0,196       0,628       0,291       0,559 
     Saturated model       1,000                   1,000                   1,000 
  Independence model       0,000       0,000       0,000       0,000       0,000 
 
  
              Model      PRATIO        PNFI        PCFI 
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model       0,621       0,311       0,347 
     Saturated model       0,000       0,000       0,000 
  Independence model       1,000       0,000       0,000 
 
 
               Model         NCP       LO 90       HI 90             
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model      59,870      34,145      93,287 
     Saturated model       0,000       0,000       0,000 
  Independence model     135,877      96,883     182,499 
 
 
               Model        FMIN          F0       LO 90       HI 90 
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model       2,059       1,222       0,697       1,904 
     Saturated model       0,000       0,000       0,000       0,000 
  Independence model       4,120       2,773       1,977       3,724 
 
 
               Model       RMSEA       LO 90       HI 90      PCLOSE 
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model       0,173       0,130       0,215       0,000 
  Independence model       0,205       0,173       0,238       0,000 
 
 
               Model         AIC         BCC         BIC        CAIC 
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model     174,870     201,592     337,556     282,614 
     Saturated model     156,000     212,333     498,961     383,138 
  Independence model     225,877     234,544     278,640     260,822 
 
 
               Model        ECVI       LO 90       HI 90       MECVI 
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model       3,569       3,044       4,251       4,114 
     Saturated model       3,184       3,184       3,184       4,333 
  Independence model       4,610       3,814       5,561       4,787 
 
 
                         HOELTER     HOELTER 
               Model         .05         .01 
    ----------------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model          28          32 
  Independence model          21          24 
 
 
Execution time summary: 
 
 
          Minimization: 0,090 
         Miscellaneous: 0,881 
             Bootstrap: 0,000 
                 Total: 0,971 
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Appendix 17 
Causal Analysis of Marketing Srategy Variables and the Annual Gross Margin (in Value) of Allied Retailers 
 
Your model contains the following variables 
 
 
             grmrg                          observed   endogenous 
 
             ident                          observed   exogenous 
             margin                         observed   exogenous 
             assort                         observed   exogenous 
             allow                          observed   exogenous 
             prom                           observed   exogenous 
             sbrand                         observed   exogenous 
             multi                          observed   exogenous 
             indpdt                         observed   exogenous 
             floorsp                        observed   exogenous 
             advert                         observed   exogenous 
             employ                         observed   exogenous 
 
             e12                            unobserved exogenous 
 
 
                     Number of variables in your model:   13 
                     Number of observed variables:        12 
                     Number of unobserved variables:       1 
                     Number of exogenous variables:       12 
                     Number of endogenous variables:       1 
 
 
Summary of Parameters 
 
                   Weights  Covariances Variances    Means   Intercepts   Total 
                   -------  ----------- ---------    -----   ----------   ----- 
            Fixed:    1          0          0          0          0          1 
          Labeled:    0          0          0          0          0          0 
        Unlabeled:   11         14         12          0          0         37 
                   -------  ----------- ---------    -----   ----------   ----- 
            Total:   12         14         12          0          0         38 
 
NOTE: 
    The model is recursive. 
 
 
Assessment of normality 
 
                              min      max     skew      c.r.  kurtosis    c.r.  
                           -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
                  employ     -0,880    3,914    2,077    5,996    4,824    6,963 
                  advert     -0,928    3,479    1,027    2,964    1,271    1,835 
                 floorsp     -0,693    4,859    3,135    9,049   10,670   15,400 
                  indpdt     -0,613    4,556    3,467   10,009   12,637   18,240 
                   multi     -0,897    3,001    1,494    4,312    1,767    2,551 
                  sbrand     -1,388    2,011    0,452    1,304   -0,848   -1,224 
                    prom     -1,602    3,299    0,676    1,952    0,681    0,983 
                   allow     -2,410    1,641   -0,561   -1,620    0,250    0,361 
                  assort     -1,202    3,780    1,515    4,372    2,687    3,878 
                  margin     -1,854    3,508    1,424    4,111    3,142    4,536 
                   ident     -2,469    2,227   -0,111   -0,320    0,441    0,636 
                   grmrg     -0,980    3,127    1,771    5,114    2,450    3,537 
            Multivariate                                         46,824    9,031 
 
 
Model: Default model 
 
 
Computation of degrees of freedom 
 
                      Number of distinct sample moments:   78 
          Number of distinct parameters to be estimated:   37 
                                     ------------------------- 
                                     Degrees of freedom:   41 
 
 
    0e  3 0,0e+000 -3,8772e-002  1,00e+004   1,94078277741e+002    0 1,00e+004 
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    1e  0 2,8e+001  0,0000e+000  8,38e-001   1,23492444776e+002   18 9,99e-001 
    2e  0 2,1e+001  0,0000e+000  3,41e-001   1,11476002937e+002    3 0,00e+000 
    3e  0 2,1e+001  0,0000e+000  3,82e-001   1,02520728728e+002    1 1,07e+000 
    4e  0 3,0e+001  0,0000e+000  2,43e-001   1,00969556104e+002    1 1,14e+000 
    5e  0 3,7e+001  0,0000e+000  8,33e-002   1,00870475984e+002    1 1,06e+000 
    6e  0 3,8e+001  0,0000e+000  8,67e-003   1,00869597207e+002    1 1,01e+000 
    7e  0 3,8e+001  0,0000e+000  8,94e-005   1,00869597112e+002    1 1,00e+000 
 
 
 
Minimum was achieved 
 
 
 
Chi-square = 100,870 
Degrees of freedom = 41 
Probability level = 0,000 
 
 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
---------------------------- 
 
 
 
Regression Weights:                      Estimate     S.E.      C.R.     Label  
-------------------                      --------   -------   -------   ------- 
 
               grmrg <-------- ident       0,229     0,119     1,918            
               grmrg <------- margin       0,207     0,096     2,169            
               grmrg <------- assort      -0,031     0,118    -0,264            
               grmrg <-------- allow       0,240     0,109     2,194            
               grmrg <--------- prom      -0,098     0,120    -0,815            
               grmrg <------- sbrand       0,474     0,107     4,440            
               grmrg <-------- multi       0,199     0,096     2,081            
               grmrg <------- indpdt      -0,278     0,096    -2,908            
               grmrg <------ floorsp       0,213     0,099     2,157            
               grmrg <------- employ       0,159     0,099     1,609            
               grmrg <------- advert      -0,199     0,120    -1,663            
 
 
Standardized Regression Weights:         Estimate 
--------------------------------         -------- 
 
               grmrg <-------- ident       0,230 
               grmrg <------- margin       0,212 
               grmrg <------- assort      -0,031 
               grmrg <-------- allow       0,243 
               grmrg <--------- prom      -0,098 
               grmrg <------- sbrand       0,482 
               grmrg <-------- multi       0,203 
               grmrg <------- indpdt      -0,284 
               grmrg <------ floorsp       0,218 
               grmrg <------- employ       0,162 
               grmrg <------- advert      -0,202 
 
 
Covariances:                             Estimate     S.E.      C.R.     Label  
------------                             --------   -------   -------   ------- 
 
               allow <--------> prom       0,318     0,136     2,334            
               prom <-------> advert       0,409     0,139     2,936            
               assort <------> allow       0,301     0,135     2,222            
               ident <-------> allow       0,315     0,140     2,242            
               assort <-------> prom       0,301     0,127     2,361            
               prom <-------> sbrand       0,214     0,123     1,731            
               ident <--------> prom       0,374     0,137     2,725            
               allow <------> advert       0,252     0,133     1,899            
               sbrand <-----> advert       0,217     0,127     1,713            
               assort <-----> sbrand       0,250     0,129     1,943            
               ident <------> assort       0,337     0,132     2,550            
               multi <------> indpdt       0,006     0,140     0,044            
               floorsp <----> employ       0,244     0,144     1,693            
               ident <------> advert       0,364     0,136     2,679            
 
 
Correlations:                            Estimate 
-------------                            -------- 
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               allow <--------> prom       0,338 
               prom <-------> advert       0,433 
               assort <------> allow       0,314 
               ident <-------> allow       0,330 
               assort <-------> prom       0,320 
               prom <-------> sbrand       0,226 
               ident <--------> prom       0,399 
               allow <------> advert       0,262 
               sbrand <-----> advert       0,226 
               assort <-----> sbrand       0,260 
               ident <------> assort       0,353 
               multi <------> indpdt       0,006 
               floorsp <----> employ       0,249 
               ident <------> advert       0,381 
 
 
Variances:                               Estimate     S.E.      C.R.     Label  
----------                               --------   -------   -------   ------- 
 
                               ident       0,947     0,188     5,046            
                              margin       0,980     0,198     4,950            
                              assort       0,957     0,191     5,009            
                               allow       0,960     0,193     4,985            
                                prom       0,926     0,182     5,079            
                              sbrand       0,965     0,194     4,968            
                               multi       0,980     0,198     4,950            
                              indpdt       0,980     0,198     4,950            
                             floorsp       0,980     0,198     4,950            
                              advert       0,961     0,193     4,994            
                              employ       0,980     0,198     4,950            
                                 e12       0,438     0,089     4,950            
 
 
Squared Multiple Correlations:           Estimate 
------------------------------           -------- 
 
                               grmrg       0,532 
 
 
 
Total Effects 
 
          employ   advert   floorsp  indpdt   multi    sbrand   prom     
          -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
grmrg        0,159   -0,199    0,213   -0,278    0,199    0,474   -0,098 
 
          allow    assort   margin   ident    
          -------- -------- -------- -------- 
grmrg        0,240   -0,031    0,207    0,229 
 
 
 
Standardized Total Effects 
 
          employ   advert   floorsp  indpdt   multi    sbrand   prom     
          -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
grmrg        0,162   -0,202    0,218   -0,284    0,203    0,482   -0,098 
 
 
          allow    assort   margin   ident    
          -------- -------- -------- -------- 
grmrg        0,243   -0,031    0,212    0,230 
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Direct Effects 
 
          employ   advert   floorsp  indpdt   multi    sbrand   prom     
          -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
grmrg        0,159   -0,199    0,213   -0,278    0,199    0,474   -0,098 
 
          allow    assort   margin   ident    
          -------- -------- -------- -------- 
grmrg        0,240   -0,031    0,207    0,229 
 
 
 
Standardized Direct Effects 
 
          employ   advert   floorsp  indpdt   multi    sbrand   prom     
          -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
grmrg        0,162   -0,202    0,218   -0,284    0,203    0,482   -0,098 
 
          allow    assort   margin   ident    
          -------- -------- -------- -------- 
grmrg        0,243   -0,031    0,212    0,230 
 
 
 
Indirect Effects 
 
          employ   advert   floorsp  indpdt   multi    sbrand   prom     
          -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
grmrg        0,000    0,000    0,000    0,000    0,000    0,000    0,000 
 
          allow    assort   margin   ident    
          -------- -------- -------- -------- 
grmrg        0,000    0,000    0,000    0,000 
 
 
 
Standardized Indirect Effects 
 
          employ   advert   floorsp  indpdt   multi    sbrand   prom     
          -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
grmrg        0,000    0,000    0,000    0,000    0,000    0,000    0,000 
 
          allow    assort   margin   ident    
          -------- -------- -------- -------- 
grmrg        0,000    0,000    0,000    0,000 
 
 
Summary of models 
----------------- 
 
               Model  NPAR        CMIN    DF           P     CMIN/DF 
    ----------------  ----   ---------    --   ---------   --------- 
       Default model    37     100,870    41       0,000       2,460 
     Saturated model    78       0,000     0 
  Independence model    12     206,715    66       0,000       3,132 
 
 
 
               Model         RMR         GFI        AGFI        PGFI 
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model       0,191       0,778       0,578       0,409 
     Saturated model       0,000       1,000                         
  Independence model       0,259       0,525       0,438       0,444 
 
 
 
                          DELTA1        RHO1      DELTA2        RHO2 
               Model         NFI         RFI         IFI         TLI         CFI 
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model       0,512       0,214       0,639       0,315       0,575 
     Saturated model       1,000                   1,000                   1,000 
  Independence model       0,000       0,000       0,000       0,000       0,000 
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               Model      PRATIO        PNFI        PCFI 
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model       0,621       0,318       0,357 
     Saturated model       0,000       0,000       0,000 
  Independence model       1,000       0,000       0,000 
 
 
 
               Model         NCP       LO 90       HI 90             
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model      59,870      34,145      93,287 
     Saturated model       0,000       0,000       0,000 
  Independence model     140,715     101,111     187,941 
 
 
 
               Model        FMIN          F0       LO 90       HI 90 
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model       2,059       1,222       0,697       1,904 
     Saturated model       0,000       0,000       0,000       0,000 
  Independence model       4,219       2,872       2,063       3,836 
 
 
 
               Model       RMSEA       LO 90       HI 90      PCLOSE 
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model       0,173       0,130       0,215       0,000 
  Independence model       0,209       0,177       0,241       0,000 
 
 
 
 
 
               Model         AIC         BCC         BIC        CAIC 
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model     174,870     201,592     337,556     282,614 
     Saturated model     156,000     212,333     498,961     383,138 
  Independence model     230,715     239,382     283,478     265,659 
 
 
 
               Model        ECVI       LO 90       HI 90       MECVI 
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model       3,569       3,044       4,251       4,114 
     Saturated model       3,184       3,184       3,184       4,333 
  Independence model       4,708       3,900       5,672       4,885 
 
 
 
                         HOELTER     HOELTER 
               Model         .05         .01 
    ----------------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model          28          32 
  Independence model          21          23 
 
 
 
 
Execution time summary: 
 
 
          Minimization: 0,090 
         Miscellaneous: 0,761 
             Bootstrap: 0,000 
                 Total: 0,851 
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Appendix 18 
Causal Analysis of Marketing Srategy Variables and the Annual Profit of Allied Retailers 
Your model contains the following variables 
 
 
             profit                         observed   endogenous 
 
             ident                          observed   exogenous 
             margin                         observed   exogenous 
             assort                         observed   exogenous 
             allow                          observed   exogenous 
             prom                           observed   exogenous 
             sbrand                         observed   exogenous 
             multi                          observed   exogenous 
             indpdt                         observed   exogenous 
             floorsp                        observed   exogenous 
             advert                         observed   exogenous 
             employ                         observed   exogenous 
 
             e12                            unobserved exogenous 
 
 
                     Number of variables in your model:   13 
                     Number of observed variables:        12 
                     Number of unobserved variables:       1 
                     Number of exogenous variables:       12 
                     Number of endogenous variables:       1 
 
 
 
Summary of Parameters 
 
                   Weights  Covariances Variances    Means   Intercepts   Total 
                   -------  ----------- ---------    -----   ----------   ----- 
            Fixed:    1          0          0          0          0          1 
          Labeled:    0          0          0          0          0          0 
        Unlabeled:   11         14         12          0          0         37 
                   -------  ----------- ---------    -----   ----------   ----- 
            Total:   12         14         12          0          0         38 
 
NOTE: 
    The model is recursive. 
 
 
 
Assessment of normality 
 
                              min      max     skew      c.r.  kurtosis    c.r.  
                           -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
                  employ     -0,880    3,914    2,077    5,996    4,824    6,963 
                  advert     -0,928    3,479    1,027    2,964    1,271    1,835 
                 floorsp     -0,693    4,859    3,135    9,049   10,670   15,400 
                  indpdt     -0,613    4,556    3,467   10,009   12,637   18,240 
                   multi     -0,897    3,001    1,494    4,312    1,767    2,551 
                  sbrand     -1,388    2,011    0,452    1,304   -0,848   -1,224 
                    prom     -1,602    3,299    0,676    1,952    0,681    0,983 
                   allow     -2,410    1,641   -0,561   -1,620    0,250    0,361 
                  assort     -1,202    3,780    1,515    4,372    2,687    3,878 
                  margin     -1,854    3,508    1,424    4,111    3,142    4,536 
                   ident     -2,469    2,227   -0,111   -0,320    0,441    0,636 
                  profit     -1,001    3,223    1,696    4,895    2,183    3,150 
            Multivariate                                         45,606    8,796 
 
 210
 
Computation of degrees of freedom 
 
                      Number of distinct sample moments:   78 
          Number of distinct parameters to be estimated:   37 
                                     ------------------------- 
                                     Degrees of freedom:   41 
 
    0e  2 0,0e+000 -3,8772e-002  1,00e+004   1,83434074912e+002    0 1,00e+004 
    1e  0 2,3e+001  0,0000e+000  7,70e-001   1,21163637834e+002   18 1,01e+000 
    2e  0 2,1e+001  0,0000e+000  4,78e-001   1,07646189443e+002    2 0,00e+000 
    3e  0 2,1e+001  0,0000e+000  3,30e-001   1,01741879537e+002    1 1,18e+000 
    4e  0 2,7e+001  0,0000e+000  1,96e-001   1,00907457226e+002    1 1,12e+000 
    5e  0 3,0e+001  0,0000e+000  5,38e-002   1,00869737805e+002    1 1,04e+000 
    6e  0 3,1e+001  0,0000e+000  3,50e-003   1,00869597115e+002    1 1,00e+000 
    7e  0 3,1e+001  0,0000e+000  1,45e-005   1,00869597112e+002    1 1,00e+000 
 
 
 
Minimum was achieved 
 
 
 
Chi-square = 100,870 
Degrees of freedom = 41 
Probability level = 0,000 
 
 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
---------------------------- 
 
 
 
Regression Weights:                      Estimate     S.E.      C.R.     Label  
-------------------                      --------   -------   -------   ------- 
 
               profit <------- ident       0,258     0,130     1,981            
               profit <------ margin       0,143     0,104     1,371            
               profit <------ assort       0,039     0,129     0,300            
               profit <------- allow       0,241     0,120     2,013            
               profit <-------- prom      -0,191     0,132    -1,449            
               profit <------ sbrand       0,450     0,117     3,850            
               profit <------- multi       0,028     0,104     0,270            
               profit <------ indpdt       0,184     0,104     1,761            
               profit <----- floorsp      -0,126     0,108    -1,171            
               profit <------ employ      -0,023     0,108    -0,209            
               profit <------ advert       0,075     0,131     0,577            
 
 
Standardized Regression Weights:         Estimate 
--------------------------------         -------- 
 
               profit <------- ident       0,261 
               profit <------ margin       0,147 
               profit <------ assort       0,039 
               profit <------- allow       0,245 
               profit <-------- prom      -0,190 
               profit <------ sbrand       0,459 
               profit <------- multi       0,029 
               profit <------ indpdt       0,189 
               profit <----- floorsp      -0,130 
               profit <------ employ      -0,023 
               profit <------ advert       0,077 
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Covariances:                             Estimate     S.E.      C.R.     Label  
------------                             --------   -------   -------   ------- 
 
               allow <--------> prom       0,318     0,136     2,334            
               prom <-------> advert       0,409     0,139     2,936            
               assort <------> allow       0,301     0,135     2,222            
               ident <-------> allow       0,315     0,140     2,242            
               assort <-------> prom       0,301     0,127     2,361            
               prom <-------> sbrand       0,214     0,123     1,731            
               ident <--------> prom       0,374     0,137     2,725            
               allow <------> advert       0,252     0,133     1,899            
               sbrand <-----> advert       0,217     0,127     1,713            
               assort <-----> sbrand       0,250     0,129     1,943            
               ident <------> assort       0,337     0,132     2,550            
               multi <------> indpdt       0,006     0,140     0,044            
               floorsp <----> employ       0,244     0,144     1,693            
               ident <------> advert       0,364     0,136     2,679            
 
 
Correlations:                            Estimate 
-------------                            -------- 
 
               allow <--------> prom       0,338 
               prom <-------> advert       0,433 
               assort <------> allow       0,314 
               ident <-------> allow       0,330 
               assort <-------> prom       0,320 
               prom <-------> sbrand       0,226 
               ident <--------> prom       0,399 
               allow <------> advert       0,262 
               sbrand <-----> advert       0,226 
               assort <-----> sbrand       0,260 
               ident <------> assort       0,353 
               multi <------> indpdt       0,006 
               floorsp <----> employ       0,249 
               ident <------> advert       0,381 
 
 
Variances:                               Estimate     S.E.      C.R.     Label  
----------                               --------   -------   -------   ------- 
 
                               ident       0,947     0,188     5,046            
                              margin       0,980     0,198     4,950            
                              assort       0,957     0,191     5,009            
                               allow       0,960     0,193     4,985            
                                prom       0,926     0,182     5,079            
                              sbrand       0,965     0,194     4,968            
                               multi       0,980     0,198     4,950            
                              indpdt       0,980     0,198     4,950            
                             floorsp       0,980     0,198     4,950            
                              advert       0,961     0,193     4,994            
                              employ       0,980     0,198     4,950            
                                 e12       0,524     0,106     4,950            
 
 
Squared Multiple Correlations:           Estimate 
------------------------------           -------- 
 
                              profit       0,436 
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Total Effects 
 
          employ   advert   floorsp  indpdt   multi    sbrand   prom     
          -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
profit      -0,023    0,075   -0,126    0,184    0,028    0,450   -0,191 
 
          allow    assort   margin   ident    
          -------- -------- -------- -------- 
profit       0,241    0,039    0,143    0,258 
 
 
 
Standardized Total Effects 
 
          employ   advert   floorsp  indpdt   multi    sbrand   prom     
          -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
profit      -0,023    0,077   -0,130    0,189    0,029    0,459   -0,190 
 
 
          allow    assort   margin   ident    
          -------- -------- -------- -------- 
profit       0,245    0,039    0,147    0,261 
 
 
 
Direct Effects 
 
          employ   advert   floorsp  indpdt   multi    sbrand   prom     
          -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
profit      -0,023    0,075   -0,126    0,184    0,028    0,450   -0,191 
 
          allow    assort   margin   ident    
          -------- -------- -------- -------- 
profit       0,241    0,039    0,143    0,258 
 
 
 
Standardized Direct Effects 
 
          employ   advert   floorsp  indpdt   multi    sbrand   prom     
          -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
profit      -0,023    0,077   -0,130    0,189    0,029    0,459   -0,190 
 
          allow    assort   margin   ident    
          -------- -------- -------- -------- 
profit       0,245    0,039    0,147    0,261 
 
 
 
Indirect Effects 
 
          employ   advert   floorsp  indpdt   multi    sbrand   prom     
          -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
profit       0,000    0,000    0,000    0,000    0,000    0,000    0,000 
 
          allow    assort   margin   ident    
          -------- -------- -------- -------- 
profit       0,000    0,000    0,000    0,000 
 
 
 
Standardized Indirect Effects 
 
          employ   advert   floorsp  indpdt   multi    sbrand   prom     
          -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
profit       0,000    0,000    0,000    0,000    0,000    0,000    0,000 
 
          allow    assort   margin   ident    
          -------- -------- -------- -------- 
profit       0,000    0,000    0,000    0,000 
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Summary of models 
----------------- 
 
               Model  NPAR        CMIN    DF           P     CMIN/DF 
    ----------------  ----   ---------    --   ---------   --------- 
       Default model    37     100,870    41       0,000       2,460 
     Saturated model    78       0,000     0 
  Independence model    12     197,927    66       0,000       2,999 
 
 
 
               Model         RMR         GFI        AGFI        PGFI 
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model       0,194       0,778       0,578       0,409 
     Saturated model       0,000       1,000                         
  Independence model       0,261       0,521       0,434       0,441 
 
 
 
                          DELTA1        RHO1      DELTA2        RHO2 
               Model         NFI         RFI         IFI         TLI         CFI 
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model       0,490       0,180       0,618       0,269       0,546 
     Saturated model       1,000                   1,000                   1,000 
  Independence model       0,000       0,000       0,000       0,000       0,000 
 
 
 
               Model      PRATIO        PNFI        PCFI 
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model       0,621       0,305       0,339 
     Saturated model       0,000       0,000       0,000 
  Independence model       1,000       0,000       0,000 
 
 
 
               Model         NCP       LO 90       HI 90             
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model      59,870      34,145      93,287 
     Saturated model       0,000       0,000       0,000 
  Independence model     131,927      93,438     178,049 
 
 
 
               Model        FMIN          F0       LO 90       HI 90 
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model       2,059       1,222       0,697       1,904 
     Saturated model       0,000       0,000       0,000       0,000 
  Independence model       4,039       2,692       1,907       3,634 
 
 
 
               Model       RMSEA       LO 90       HI 90      PCLOSE 
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model       0,173       0,130       0,215       0,000 
  Independence model       0,202       0,170       0,235       0,000 
 
 
 
 
 
               Model         AIC         BCC         BIC        CAIC 
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model     174,870     201,592     337,556     282,614 
     Saturated model     156,000     212,333     498,961     383,138 
  Independence model     221,927     230,593     274,690     256,871 
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               Model        ECVI       LO 90       HI 90       MECVI 
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model       3,569       3,044       4,251       4,114 
     Saturated model       3,184       3,184       3,184       4,333 
  Independence model       4,529       3,744       5,470       4,706 
 
 
 
                         HOELTER     HOELTER 
               Model         .05         .01 
    ----------------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model          28          32 
  Independence model          22          24 
 
 
 
 
Execution time summary: 
 
 
          Minimization: 0,070 
         Miscellaneous: 0,821 
             Bootstrap: 0,000 
                 Total: 0,891 
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Appendix 19 
Causal Analysis of Marketing Srategy Variables and the Sales Growth Induced by the Alliance 
   
Your model contains the following variables 
 
             sgrowth                        observed   endogenous 
 
             ident                          observed   exogenous 
             margin                         observed   exogenous 
             assort                         observed   exogenous 
             allow                          observed   exogenous 
             prom                           observed   exogenous 
             sbrand                         observed   exogenous 
             multi                          observed   exogenous 
             indpdt                         observed   exogenous 
             floorsp                        observed   exogenous 
             advert                         observed   exogenous 
             employ                         observed   exogenous 
 
             e12                            unobserved exogenous 
 
 
                     Number of variables in your model:   13 
                     Number of observed variables:        12 
                     Number of unobserved variables:       1 
                     Number of exogenous variables:       12 
                     Number of endogenous variables:       1 
 
Summary of Parameters 
 
                   Weights  Covariances Variances    Means   Intercepts   Total 
                   -------  ----------- ---------    -----   ----------   ----- 
            Fixed:    1          0          0          0          0          1 
          Labeled:    0          0          0          0          0          0 
        Unlabeled:   11         14         12          0          0         37 
                   -------  ----------- ---------    -----   ----------   ----- 
            Total:   12         14         12          0          0         38 
 
NOTE: 
    The model is recursive. 
 
Assessment of normality 
 
                              min      max     skew      c.r.  kurtosis    c.r.  
                           -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
                  employ     -0,880    3,914    2,077    5,996    4,824    6,963 
                  advert     -0,928    3,479    1,027    2,964    1,271    1,835 
                 floorsp     -0,693    4,859    3,135    9,049   10,670   15,400 
                  indpdt     -0,613    4,556    3,467   10,009   12,637   18,240 
                   multi     -0,897    3,001    1,494    4,312    1,767    2,551 
                  sbrand     -1,388    2,011    0,452    1,304   -0,848   -1,224 
                    prom     -1,602    3,299    0,676    1,952    0,681    0,983 
                   allow     -2,410    1,641   -0,561   -1,620    0,250    0,361 
                  assort     -1,202    3,780    1,515    4,372    2,687    3,878 
                  margin     -1,854    3,508    1,424    4,111    3,142    4,536 
                   ident     -2,469    2,227   -0,111   -0,320    0,441    0,636 
                 sgrowth     -2,582    2,487    0,531    1,533    0,950    1,372 
            Multivariate                                         43,161    8,325 
 
 
Computation of degrees of freedom 
 
                      Number of distinct sample moments:   78 
          Number of distinct parameters to be estimated:   37 
                                     ------------------------- 
                                     Degrees of freedom:   41 
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    0e  2 0,0e+000 -3,8772e-002  1,00e+004   1,88919922435e+002    0 1,00e+004 
    1e  0 2,5e+001  0,0000e+000  7,90e-001   1,22219975164e+002   18 1,01e+000 
    2e  0 2,1e+001  0,0000e+000  5,19e-001   1,07391842022e+002    2 0,00e+000 
    3e  0 2,1e+001  0,0000e+000  3,33e-001   1,01709855301e+002    1 1,18e+000 
    4e  0 2,4e+001  0,0000e+000  1,95e-001   1,00907108322e+002    1 1,12e+000 
    5e  0 2,8e+001  0,0000e+000  5,38e-002   1,00869737775e+002    1 1,04e+000 
    6e  0 2,8e+001  0,0000e+000  3,50e-003   1,00869597115e+002    1 1,00e+000 
    7e  0 2,8e+001  0,0000e+000  1,45e-005   1,00869597112e+002    1 1,00e+000 
 
Minimum was achieved 
 
 
Chi-square = 100,870 
Degrees of freedom = 41 
Probability level = 0,000 
 
 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
---------------------------- 
 
 
Regression Weights:                      Estimate     S.E.      C.R.     Label  
-------------------                      --------   -------   -------   ------- 
 
               sgrowth <------ ident       0,257     0,138     1,857            
               sgrowth <----- margin      -0,139     0,111    -1,257            
               sgrowth <----- assort       0,017     0,137     0,125            
               sgrowth <------ allow       0,191     0,127     1,507            
               sgrowth <------- prom      -0,119     0,140    -0,850            
               sgrowth <----- sbrand       0,329     0,124     2,656            
               sgrowth <------ multi      -0,032     0,111    -0,293            
               sgrowth <----- indpdt       0,341     0,111     3,071            
               sgrowth <---- floorsp      -0,442     0,115    -3,862            
               sgrowth <----- employ       0,127     0,115     1,109            
               sgrowth <----- advert      -0,003     0,139    -0,022            
 
 
Standardized Regression Weights:         Estimate 
--------------------------------         -------- 
 
               sgrowth <------ ident       0,238 
               sgrowth <----- margin      -0,131 
               sgrowth <----- assort       0,016 
               sgrowth <------ allow       0,178 
               sgrowth <------- prom      -0,109 
               sgrowth <----- sbrand       0,308 
               sgrowth <------ multi      -0,031 
               sgrowth <----- indpdt       0,321 
               sgrowth <---- floorsp      -0,417 
               sgrowth <----- employ       0,120 
               sgrowth <----- advert      -0,003 
 
 
Covariances:                             Estimate     S.E.      C.R.     Label  
------------                             --------   -------   -------   ------- 
 
               allow <--------> prom       0,318     0,136     2,334            
               prom <-------> advert       0,409     0,139     2,936            
               assort <------> allow       0,301     0,135     2,222            
               ident <-------> allow       0,315     0,140     2,242            
               assort <-------> prom       0,301     0,127     2,361            
               prom <-------> sbrand       0,214     0,123     1,731            
               ident <--------> prom       0,374     0,137     2,725            
               allow <------> advert       0,252     0,133     1,899            
               sbrand <-----> advert       0,217     0,127     1,713            
               assort <-----> sbrand       0,250     0,129     1,943            
               ident <------> assort       0,337     0,132     2,550            
               multi <------> indpdt       0,006     0,140     0,044            
               floorsp <----> employ       0,244     0,144     1,693            
               ident <------> advert       0,364     0,136     2,679            
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Correlations:                            Estimate 
-------------                            -------- 
 
               allow <--------> prom       0,338 
               prom <-------> advert       0,433 
               assort <------> allow       0,314 
               ident <-------> allow       0,330 
               assort <-------> prom       0,320 
               prom <-------> sbrand       0,226 
               ident <--------> prom       0,399 
               allow <------> advert       0,262 
               sbrand <-----> advert       0,226 
               assort <-----> sbrand       0,260 
               ident <------> assort       0,353 
               multi <------> indpdt       0,006 
               floorsp <----> employ       0,249 
               ident <------> advert       0,381 
 
 
Variances:                               Estimate     S.E.      C.R.     Label  
----------                               --------   -------   -------   ------- 
 
                               ident       0,947     0,188     5,046            
                              margin       0,980     0,198     4,950            
                              assort       0,957     0,191     5,009            
                               allow       0,960     0,193     4,985            
                                prom       0,926     0,182     5,079            
                              sbrand       0,965     0,194     4,968            
                               multi       0,980     0,198     4,950            
                              indpdt       0,980     0,198     4,950            
                             floorsp       0,980     0,198     4,950            
                              advert       0,961     0,193     4,994            
                              employ       0,980     0,198     4,950            
                                 e12       0,590     0,119     4,950            
 
 
Squared Multiple Correlations:           Estimate 
------------------------------           -------- 
 
                             sgrowth       0,464 
 
 
 
Total Effects 
 
          employ   advert   floorsp  indpdt   multi    sbrand   prom     
          -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
sgrowth      0,127   -0,003   -0,442    0,341   -0,032    0,329   -0,119 
 
          allow    assort   margin   ident    
          -------- -------- -------- -------- 
sgrowth      0,191    0,017   -0,139    0,257 
 
 
 
Standardized Total Effects 
 
          employ   advert   floorsp  indpdt   multi    sbrand   prom     
          -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
sgrowth      0,120   -0,003   -0,417    0,321   -0,031    0,308   -0,109 
 
 
          allow    assort   margin   ident    
          -------- -------- -------- -------- 
sgrowth      0,178    0,016   -0,131    0,238 
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Direct Effects 
 
          employ   advert   floorsp  indpdt   multi    sbrand   prom     
          -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
sgrowth      0,127   -0,003   -0,442    0,341   -0,032    0,329   -0,119 
 
          allow    assort   margin   ident    
          -------- -------- -------- -------- 
sgrowth      0,191    0,017   -0,139    0,257 
 
 
 
Standardized Direct Effects 
 
          employ   advert   floorsp  indpdt   multi    sbrand   prom     
          -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
sgrowth      0,120   -0,003   -0,417    0,321   -0,031    0,308   -0,109 
 
          allow    assort   margin   ident    
          -------- -------- -------- -------- 
sgrowth      0,178    0,016   -0,131    0,238 
 
 
 
Indirect Effects 
 
          employ   advert   floorsp  indpdt   multi    sbrand   prom     
          -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
sgrowth      0,000    0,000    0,000    0,000    0,000    0,000    0,000 
 
          allow    assort   margin   ident    
          -------- -------- -------- -------- 
sgrowth      0,000    0,000    0,000    0,000 
 
 
 
Standardized Indirect Effects 
 
          employ   advert   floorsp  indpdt   multi    sbrand   prom     
          -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
sgrowth      0,000    0,000    0,000    0,000    0,000    0,000    0,000 
 
          allow    assort   margin   ident    
          -------- -------- -------- -------- 
sgrowth      0,000    0,000    0,000    0,000 
 
 
Summary of models 
----------------- 
 
               Model  NPAR        CMIN    DF           P     CMIN/DF 
    ----------------  ----   ---------    --   ---------   --------- 
       Default model    37     100,870    41       0,000       2,460 
     Saturated model    78       0,000     0 
  Independence model    12     192,097    66       0,000       2,911 
 
 
 
               Model         RMR         GFI        AGFI        PGFI 
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model       0,194       0,778       0,578       0,409 
     Saturated model       0,000       1,000                         
  Independence model       0,250       0,541       0,458       0,458 
 
 
 
                          DELTA1        RHO1      DELTA2        RHO2 
               Model         NFI         RFI         IFI         TLI         CFI 
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model       0,475       0,155       0,604       0,236       0,525 
     Saturated model       1,000                   1,000                   1,000 
  Independence model       0,000       0,000       0,000       0,000       0,000 
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               Model      PRATIO        PNFI        PCFI 
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model       0,621       0,295       0,326 
     Saturated model       0,000       0,000       0,000 
  Independence model       1,000       0,000       0,000 
 
 
 
               Model         NCP       LO 90       HI 90             
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model      59,870      34,145      93,287 
     Saturated model       0,000       0,000       0,000 
  Independence model     126,097      88,365     171,470 
 
 
 
               Model        FMIN          F0       LO 90       HI 90 
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model       2,059       1,222       0,697       1,904 
     Saturated model       0,000       0,000       0,000       0,000 
  Independence model       3,920       2,573       1,803       3,499 
 
 
 
               Model       RMSEA       LO 90       HI 90      PCLOSE 
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model       0,173       0,130       0,215       0,000 
  Independence model       0,197       0,165       0,230       0,000 
 
 
 
 
 
               Model         AIC         BCC         BIC        CAIC 
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model     174,870     201,592     337,556     282,614 
     Saturated model     156,000     212,333     498,961     383,138 
  Independence model     216,097     224,763     268,860     251,041 
 
 
 
               Model        ECVI       LO 90       HI 90       MECVI 
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model       3,569       3,044       4,251       4,114 
     Saturated model       3,184       3,184       3,184       4,333 
  Independence model       4,410       3,640       5,336       4,587 
 
 
 
                         HOELTER     HOELTER 
               Model         .05         .01 
    ----------------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model          28          32 
  Independence model          22          25 
 
 
 
 
Execution time summary: 
 
 
          Minimization: 0,070 
         Miscellaneous: 0,781 
             Bootstrap: 0,000 
                 Total: 0,851 
 
Appendix 20 
Correlation Matrix of  Performance Measures and Moderating Variables 
    SALES GRMRG PROFIT SGROWTH PGROWTH COUNTY SETTL<50 VILLAGE SETTL>50 MULTI DOM OWN INDPDT EMPLOY
Correlation SALES 1 0,937 0,607 0,191 -0,140 -0,013 0,137 -0,061 0,201 0,250 -0,024 -0,025 0,112 0,305 
Sig. (2-tailed)   , 0,000 0,000 0,184 0,333 0,930 0,341 0,674 0,161 0,080 0,868 0,862 0,437 0,031 
N   50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Correlation GRMRG 0,937 1,000 0,669 0,156 -0,112 0,027 0,115 -0,082 0,173 0,222 -0,072 0,082 0,113 0,292 
Sig. (2-tailed)   0,000 , 0,000 0,279 0,438 0,850 0,425 0,571 0,229 0,121 0,618 0,570 0,434 0,040 
N   50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Correlation PROFIT 0,607 0,669 1,000 0,217 0,025 0,185 0,040 -0,137 0,232 0,048 0,042 0,072 0,291 0,353 
Sig. (2-tailed)   0,000 0,000 , 0,130 0,865 0,197 0,781 0,342 0,104 0,742 0,774 0,621 0,040 0,012 
N   50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Correlation SGROWTH 0,191 0,156 0,217 1,000 0,614 0,045 0,053 -0,229 -0,012 -0,021 -0,036 -0,052 0,306 0,434 
Sig. (2-tailed)   0,184 0,279 0,130 , 0,000 0,759 0,715 0,110 0,934 0,884 0,805 0,722 0,030 0,002 
N   50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Correlation PGROWTH -0,140 -0,112 0,025 0,614 1,000 0,055 -0,076 -0,119 -0,009 -0,156 -0,082 0,103 0,202 0,264 
Sig. (2-tailed)   0,333 0,438 0,865 0,000 , 0,704 0,599 0,412 0,953 0,281 0,573 0,478 0,159 0,064 
N   50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Correlation COUNTY -0,013 0,027 0,185 0,045 0,055 1,000 -0,653 -0,306 0,138 -0,080 -0,206 0,000 -0,179 -0,156 
Sig. (2-tailed)   0,930 0,850 0,197 0,759 0,704 , 0,000 0,031 0,341 0,579 0,152 1,000 0,213 0,280 
N   50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Correlation SETTL<50 0,137 0,115 0,040 0,053 -0,076 -0,653 1,000 -0,100 -0,084 -0,087 0,220 0,091 0,153 0,046 
Sig. (2-tailed)   0,341 0,425 0,781 0,715 0,599 0,000 , 0,490 0,561 0,550 0,124 0,530 0,288 0,753 
N   50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Correlation VILLAGE -0,061 -0,082 -0,137 -0,229 -0,119 -0,306 -0,100 1,000 0,084 0,374 -0,100 -0,182 -0,101 -0,017 
Sig. (2-tailed)   0,674 0,571 0,342 0,110 0,412 0,031 0,490 , 0,561 0,007 0,491 0,206 0,485 0,906 
N   50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Correlation SETTL>50 0,201 0,173 0,232 -0,012 -0,009 0,138 -0,084 0,084 1,000 0,169 -0,183 -0,207 -0,098 -0,177 
Sig. (2-tailed)   0,161 0,229 0,104 0,934 0,953 0,341 0,561 0,561 , 0,240 0,204 0,150 0,499 0,220 
N   50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Correlation MULTI 0,250 0,222 0,048 -0,021 -0,156 -0,080 -0,087 0,374 0,169 1,000 -0,003 -0,197 0,006 -0,028 
Sig. (2-tailed)   0,080 0,121 0,742 0,884 0,281 0,579 0,550 0,007 0,240 , 0,984 0,171 0,965 0,849 
N   50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
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Appendix 20 (continued) 
Correlation Matrix of  Performance Measures and Moderating Variables 
    SALES GRMRG PROFIT SGROWTH PGROWTH COUNTY SETTL<50 VILLAGE SETTL>50 MULTI DOM OWN INDPDT EMPLOY 
Correlation DOM -0,024 -0,072 0,042 -0,036 -0,082 -0,206 0,220 -0,100 -0,183 -0,003 1,000 0,142 0,348 -0,032 
Sig. (2-tailed)   0,868 0,618 0,774 0,805 0,573 0,152 0,124 0,491 0,204 0,984 , 0,325 0,013 0,824 
N   50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Correlation OWN -0,025 0,082 0,072 -0,052 0,103 0,000 0,091 -0,182 -0,207 -0,197 0,142 1,000 -0,086 -0,020 
Sig. (2-tailed)   0,862 0,570 0,621 0,722 0,478 1,000 0,530 0,206 0,150 0,171 0,325 , 0,552 0,889 
N   50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Correlation INDPDT 0,112 0,113 0,291 0,306 0,202 -0,179 0,153 -0,101 -0,098 0,006 0,348 -0,086 1,000 0,572 
Sig. (2-tailed)   0,437 0,434 0,040 0,030 0,159 0,213 0,288 0,485 0,499 0,965 0,013 0,552 , 0,000 
N   50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Correlation EMPLOY 0,305 0,292 0,353 0,434 0,264 -0,156 0,046 -0,017 -0,177 -0,028 -0,032 -0,020 0,572 1,000 
Sig. (2-tailed)   0,031 0,040 0,012 0,002 0,064 0,280 0,753 0,906 0,220 0,849 0,824 0,889 0,000 , 
N   50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Correlation FLOORSP 0,326 0,323 0,219 -0,035 -0,080 -0,025 -0,056 0,045 0,045 -0,040 0,320 -0,041 0,563 0,249 
Sig. (2-tailed)   0,021 0,022 0,127 0,809 0,580 0,866 0,700 0,756 0,757 0,785 0,023 0,777 0,000 0,081 
N   50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
 
Abbreviations: 
SALES: Sales in 2003 (in Thousand HUF
GRMRG: Gross margin in 2003 (in Thousand HUF)
PROFIT: Net profit in 2003 (after tax) (in Thousand HUF) 
SGROWTH: Sales growth due to the alliance (%) 
PRGROWTH: Profit growth due to the alliance (%) 
COUNTY: County capital 
SETTL<50: Settlement with less than 50 000 population 
VILLAGE: village 
SETTL>50: Settlement with more than 50 000 population 
MULTI: stores of multinational chains 
DOM: stores of other domestic chains 
OWN: stores of the own chain being operated by other retailer 
INDPDT: stores of independent retailers 
EMPLOY: number of sales employee 
FLOORSP: floorspace of the stores being operated by the member firm 
 
Appendix 21 
Causal Analysis of the Relationship between the Allied Retailer and the Hub Firm of the Alliance 
 
Your model contains the following variables 
 
             d1                             observed   endogenous 
             d2                             observed   endogenous 
             d5                             observed   endogenous 
             d6                             observed   endogenous 
             t1                             observed   endogenous 
             t2                             observed   endogenous 
             t3                             observed   endogenous 
             t4                             observed   endogenous 
             t7_r                           observed   endogenous 
             c1                             observed   endogenous 
             c2                             observed   endogenous 
             c3                             observed   endogenous 
             c4                             observed   endogenous 
             c6                             observed   endogenous 
 
             satisf                         observed   endogenous 
  
            dependence                     unobserved exogenous 
             e1                             unobserved exogenous 
             e2                             unobserved exogenous 
             e4                             unobserved exogenous 
             e5                             unobserved exogenous 
 
             trust                          unobserved exogenous 
             e6                             unobserved exogenous 
             e7                             unobserved exogenous 
             e8                             unobserved exogenous 
             e9                             unobserved exogenous 
             e11                            unobserved exogenous 
 
             competence                     unobserved exogenous 
             e12                            unobserved exogenous 
             e13                            unobserved exogenous 
             e14                            unobserved exogenous 
             e15                            unobserved exogenous 
             e18                            unobserved exogenous 
             e19                            unobserved exogenous 
 
 
                     Number of variables in your model:   33 
                     Number of observed variables:        15 
                     Number of unobserved variables:      18 
                     Number of exogenous variables:       18 
                     Number of endogenous variables:      15 
 
Summary of Parameters 
 
                   Weights  Covariances Variances    Means   Intercepts   Total 
                   -------  ----------- ---------    -----   ----------   ----- 
            Fixed:   18          0          0          0          0         18 
          Labeled:    0          0          0          0          0          0 
        Unlabeled:   14          3         18          0          0         35 
                   -------  ----------- ---------    -----   ----------   ----- 
            Total:   32          3         18          0          0         53 
 
NOTE:     The model is recursive. 
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Assessment of normality 
                              min      max     skew      c.r.  kurtosis    c.r.  
                           -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
                  satisf     -2,318    1,571   -0,370   -1,068   -0,303   -0,437 
                      c6     -2,037    1,358   -0,439   -1,267   -0,609   -0,879 
                      c4     -3,410    0,990   -1,021   -2,946    1,190    1,717 
                      c3     -2,763    0,946   -1,045   -3,017    0,569    0,822 
                      c2     -2,445    1,204   -0,655   -1,890    0,083    0,119 
                      c1     -2,445    1,204   -0,561   -1,619    0,020    0,030 
                    t7_r     -1,957    1,031   -0,569   -1,643   -0,811   -1,171 
                      t4     -2,443    1,124   -0,527   -1,522   -0,442   -0,638 
                      t3     -1,368    1,741    0,165    0,478   -1,084   -1,564 
                      t2     -1,661    1,305   -0,343   -0,991   -1,009   -1,456 
                      t1     -1,670    1,339   -0,304   -0,879   -1,091   -1,574 
                      d6     -1,155    1,733    0,419    1,209   -1,026   -1,481 
                      d5     -1,173    1,874    0,404    1,168   -0,929   -1,341 
                      d2     -1,773    1,310   -0,345   -0,997   -0,958   -1,383 
                      d1     -1,935    1,186   -0,660   -1,906   -0,595   -0,859 
            Multivariate                                         35,791    5,603 
 
Sample size:    50 
 
Model: Default model 
 
Computation of degrees of freedom 
 
                      Number of distinct sample moments:  120 
          Number of distinct parameters to be estimated:   35 
                                     ------------------------- 
                                     Degrees of freedom:   85 
 
    0e  7 0,0e+000 -7,5353e-001  1,00e+004   6,81082289369e+002    0 1,00e+004 
    1e* 6 0,0e+000 -3,7225e-001  3,81e+000   4,01241211048e+002   20 2,89e-001 
    2e  3 0,0e+000 -3,5576e-001  5,57e-001   3,34276964396e+002    6 9,00e-001 
    3e  2 0,0e+000 -4,3211e-001  5,39e-001   2,90777117727e+002    5 8,12e-001 
    4e  0 2,5e+004  0,0000e+000  4,08e-001   2,63222563322e+002    5 8,39e-001 
    5e  0 2,2e+002  0,0000e+000  9,62e-001   2,58494198264e+002    7 0,00e+000 
    6e  0 1,4e+002  0,0000e+000  7,14e-001   2,51870847261e+002    2 0,00e+000 
    7e  0 8,7e+001  0,0000e+000  1,99e-001   2,47688941249e+002    1 1,10e+000 
    8e  0 8,1e+001  0,0000e+000  4,48e-002   2,47518620821e+002    1 1,04e+000 
    9e  0 8,3e+001  0,0000e+000  3,41e-003   2,47517767504e+002    1 1,00e+000 
   10e  0 8,3e+001  0,0000e+000  1,96e-005   2,47517767468e+002    1 1,00e+000 
 
 
 
Minimum was achieved 
 
 
 
Chi-square = 247,518 
Degrees of freedom = 85 
Probability level = 0,000 
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Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
---------------------------- 
 
Regression Weights:                      Estimate     S.E.      C.R.     Label  
-------------------                      --------   -------   -------   ------- 
 
         d1 <------------ dependence       1,000                                
         d2 <------------ dependence       0,887     0,099     8,996            
         d5 <------------ dependence       0,510     0,133     3,838            
         d6 <------------ dependence       0,474     0,135     3,502            
         t1 <----------------- trust       1,000                                
         t2 <----------------- trust       1,010     0,093    10,862            
         t3 <----------------- trust       0,878     0,111     7,899            
         t4 <----------------- trust       0,540     0,143     3,770            
         t7_r <--------------- trust       0,358     0,153     2,344            
         c1 <------------ competence       1,000                                
         c2 <------------ competence       0,908     0,093     9,739            
         c3 <------------ competence       0,759     0,114     6,641            
         c4 <------------ competence       0,834     0,104     7,990            
         c6 <------------ competence       0,651     0,126     5,172            
         satisf <-------- dependence      -0,237     0,154    -1,535            
         satisf <------------- trust       0,537     0,196     2,738            
         satisf <-------- competence       0,427     0,155     2,753            
 
 
Standardized Regression Weights:         Estimate 
--------------------------------         -------- 
 
         d1 <------------ dependence       0,980 
         d2 <------------ dependence       0,869 
         d5 <------------ dependence       0,500 
         d6 <------------ dependence       0,464 
         t1 <----------------- trust       0,921 
         t2 <----------------- trust       0,931 
         t3 <----------------- trust       0,808 
         t4 <----------------- trust       0,498 
         t7_r <--------------- trust       0,330 
         c1 <------------ competence       0,954 
         c2 <------------ competence       0,866 
         c3 <------------ competence       0,724 
         c4 <------------ competence       0,796 
         c6 <------------ competence       0,621 
         satisf <-------- dependence      -0,232 
         satisf <------------- trust       0,495 
         satisf <-------- competence       0,407 
 
 
Covariances:                             Estimate     S.E.      C.R.     Label  
------------                             --------   -------   -------   ------- 
 
         dependence <--------> trust       0,584     0,160     3,647            
         trust <--------> competence       0,546     0,156     3,497            
         dependence <---> competence       0,424     0,151     2,815            
 
 
Correlations:                            Estimate 
-------------                            -------- 
 
         dependence <--------> trust       0,660 
         trust <--------> competence       0,633 
         dependence <---> competence       0,463 
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Variances:                               Estimate     S.E.      C.R.     Label  
----------                               --------   -------   -------   ------- 
 
                          dependence       0,942     0,209     4,505            
                               trust       0,831     0,200     4,166            
                          competence       0,893     0,201     4,433            
                                  e1       0,038     0,068     0,560            
                                  e2       0,239     0,072     3,313            
                                  e4       0,735     0,151     4,875            
                                  e5       0,769     0,157     4,891            
                                  e6       0,149     0,049     3,019            
                                  e7       0,131     0,048     2,759            
                                  e8       0,340     0,078     4,350            
                                  e9       0,737     0,152     4,848            
                                 e11       0,873     0,178     4,912            
                                 e12       0,087     0,044     1,961            
                                 e13       0,244     0,062     3,940            
                                 e14       0,466     0,101     4,621            
                                 e15       0,359     0,081     4,414            
                                 e18       0,602     0,126     4,767            
                                 e19       0,509     0,109     4,684            
 
 
Squared Multiple Correlations:           Estimate 
------------------------------           -------- 
 
                              satisf       0,481 
                                  c6       0,386 
                                  c4       0,634 
                                  c3       0,525 
                                  c2       0,751 
                                  c1       0,911 
                                t7_r       0,109 
                                  t4       0,248 
                                  t3       0,653 
                                  t2       0,866 
                                  t1       0,848 
                                  d6       0,215 
                                  d5       0,250 
                                  d2       0,756 
                                  d1       0,961 
 
 
 
Factor Score Weights 
 
          satisf   c6       c4       c3       c2       c1       t7_r     
          -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
competenc   0,0415   0,0517   0,1111   0,0779   0,1774   0,5478   0,0007 
trust       0,0516   0,0018   0,0038   0,0026   0,0060   0,0185   0,0199 
dependenc  -0,0116   0,0006   0,0014   0,0010   0,0022   0,0067   0,0009 
 
 
          t4       t3       t2       t1       d6       d5       d2       
          -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 
competenc   0,0012   0,0042   0,0125   0,0109   0,0004   0,0004   0,0022 
trust       0,0355   0,1254   0,3738   0,3263   0,0014   0,0016   0,0084 
dependenc   0,0017   0,0058   0,0174   0,0152   0,0192   0,0217   0,1156 
 
          d1       
          -------- 
competenc   0,0153 
trust       0,0592 
dependenc   0,8185 
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Total Effects 
 
          competen trust    dependen 
          -------- -------- -------- 
satisf       0,427    0,537   -0,237 
c6           0,651    0,000    0,000 
c4           0,834    0,000    0,000 
c3           0,759    0,000    0,000 
c2           0,908    0,000    0,000 
c1           1,000    0,000    0,000 
t7_r         0,000    0,358    0,000 
t4           0,000    0,540    0,000 
t3           0,000    0,878    0,000 
t2           0,000    1,010    0,000 
t1           0,000    1,000    0,000 
d6           0,000    0,000    0,474 
d5           0,000    0,000    0,510 
d2           0,000    0,000    0,887 
d1           0,000    0,000    1,000 
 
 
 
Standardized Total Effects 
 
          competen trust    dependen 
          -------- -------- -------- 
satisf       0,407    0,495   -0,232 
c6           0,621    0,000    0,000 
c4           0,796    0,000    0,000 
c3           0,724    0,000    0,000 
c2           0,866    0,000    0,000 
c1           0,954    0,000    0,000 
t7_r         0,000    0,330    0,000 
t4           0,000    0,498    0,000 
t3           0,000    0,808    0,000 
t2           0,000    0,931    0,000 
t1           0,000    0,921    0,000 
d6           0,000    0,000    0,464 
d5           0,000    0,000    0,500 
d2           0,000    0,000    0,869 
d1           0,000    0,000    0,980 
 
 
Direct Effects 
 
          competen trust    dependen 
          -------- -------- -------- 
satisf       0,427    0,537   -0,237 
c6           0,651    0,000    0,000 
c4           0,834    0,000    0,000 
c3           0,759    0,000    0,000 
c2           0,908    0,000    0,000 
c1           1,000    0,000    0,000 
t7_r         0,000    0,358    0,000 
t4           0,000    0,540    0,000 
t3           0,000    0,878    0,000 
t2           0,000    1,010    0,000 
t1           0,000    1,000    0,000 
d6           0,000    0,000    0,474 
d5           0,000    0,000    0,510 
d2           0,000    0,000    0,887 
d1           0,000    0,000    1,000 
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Standardized Direct Effects 
 
          competen trust    dependen 
          -------- -------- -------- 
satisf       0,407    0,495   -0,232 
c6           0,621    0,000    0,000 
c4           0,796    0,000    0,000 
c3           0,724    0,000    0,000 
c2           0,866    0,000    0,000 
c1           0,954    0,000    0,000 
t7_r         0,000    0,330    0,000 
t4           0,000    0,498    0,000 
t3           0,000    0,808    0,000 
t2           0,000    0,931    0,000 
t1           0,000    0,921    0,000 
d6           0,000    0,000    0,464 
d5           0,000    0,000    0,500 
d2           0,000    0,000    0,869 
d1           0,000    0,000    0,980 
 
 
Indirect Effects 
 
          competen trust    dependen 
          -------- -------- -------- 
satisf       0,000    0,000    0,000 
c6           0,000    0,000    0,000 
c4           0,000    0,000    0,000 
c3           0,000    0,000    0,000 
c2           0,000    0,000    0,000 
c1           0,000    0,000    0,000 
t7_r         0,000    0,000    0,000 
t4           0,000    0,000    0,000 
t3           0,000    0,000    0,000 
t2           0,000    0,000    0,000 
t1           0,000    0,000    0,000 
d6           0,000    0,000    0,000 
d5           0,000    0,000    0,000 
d2           0,000    0,000    0,000 
d1           0,000    0,000    0,000 
 
 
 
Standardized Indirect Effects 
 
          competen trust    dependen 
          -------- -------- -------- 
satisf       0,000    0,000    0,000 
c6           0,000    0,000    0,000 
c4           0,000    0,000    0,000 
c3           0,000    0,000    0,000 
c2           0,000    0,000    0,000 
c1           0,000    0,000    0,000 
t7_r         0,000    0,000    0,000 
t4           0,000    0,000    0,000 
t3           0,000    0,000    0,000 
t2           0,000    0,000    0,000 
t1           0,000    0,000    0,000 
d6           0,000    0,000    0,000 
d5           0,000    0,000    0,000 
d2           0,000    0,000    0,000 
d1           0,000    0,000    0,000 
 
 
Summary of models 
----------------- 
 
               Model  NPAR        CMIN    DF           P     CMIN/DF 
    ----------------  ----   ---------    --   ---------   --------- 
       Default model    35     247,518    85       0,000       2,912 
     Saturated model   120       0,000     0 
  Independence model    15     695,999   105       0,000       6,629 
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               Model         RMR         GFI        AGFI        PGFI 
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model       0,126       0,675       0,541       0,478 
     Saturated model       0,000       1,000                         
  Independence model       0,415       0,258       0,152       0,226 
 
 
                          DELTA1        RHO1      DELTA2        RHO2 
               Model         NFI         RFI         IFI         TLI         CFI 
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model       0,644       0,561       0,734       0,660       0,725 
     Saturated model       1,000                   1,000                   1,000 
  Independence model       0,000       0,000       0,000       0,000       0,000 
 
 
               Model      PRATIO        PNFI        PCFI 
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model       0,810       0,522       0,587 
     Saturated model       0,000       0,000       0,000 
  Independence model       1,000       0,000       0,000 
 
               Model         NCP       LO 90       HI 90             
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model     162,518     119,183     213,494 
     Saturated model       0,000       0,000       0,000 
  Independence model     590,999     511,254     678,231 
 
 
               Model        FMIN          F0       LO 90       HI 90 
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model       5,051       3,317       2,432       4,357 
     Saturated model       0,000       0,000       0,000       0,000 
  Independence model      14,204      12,061      10,434      13,841 
 
 
 
               Model       RMSEA       LO 90       HI 90      PCLOSE 
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model       0,198       0,169       0,226       0,000 
  Independence model       0,339       0,315       0,363       0,000 
 
 
               Model         AIC         BCC         BIC        CAIC 
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model     317,518     351,457     479,220     419,439 
     Saturated model     240,000     356,364     794,409     589,443 
  Independence model     725,999     740,544     795,300     769,679 
 
 
               Model        ECVI       LO 90       HI 90       MECVI 
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model       6,480       5,596       7,520       7,173 
     Saturated model       4,898       4,898       4,898       7,273 
  Independence model      14,816      13,189      16,597      15,113 
 
 
                         HOELTER     HOELTER 
               Model         .05         .01 
    ----------------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model          22          24 
  Independence model          10          10 
 
 
 
Execution time summary: 
 
 
          Minimization: 0,110 
         Miscellaneous: 0,861 
             Bootstrap: 0,000 
                 Total: 0,971 
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Appendix 22 
Causal Analysis of the  Explaining Model 
 
Your model contains the following variables 
 
 
             d1                             observed   endogenous 
             d2                             observed   endogenous 
             d5                             observed   endogenous 
             d6                             observed   endogenous 
             t1                             observed   endogenous 
             t2                             observed   endogenous 
             t3                             observed   endogenous 
             t4                             observed   endogenous 
             t7                             observed   endogenous 
             c1                             observed   endogenous 
             c2                             observed   endogenous 
             c3                             observed   endogenous 
             c4                             observed   endogenous 
             c6                             observed   endogenous 
             satisf                         observed   endogenous 
             sgrowth                        observed   endogenous 
 
             ident                          observed   exogenous 
             sbrand                         observed   exogenous 
             assort                         observed   exogenous 
             allow                          observed   exogenous 
             prom                           observed   exogenous 
             advert                         observed   exogenous 
             multi                          observed   exogenous 
             indpdt                         observed   exogenous 
             floorsp                        observed   exogenous 
             employ                         observed   exogenous 
             margin                         observed   exogenous 
 
             dependence                     unobserved exogenous 
             e1                             unobserved exogenous 
             e2                             unobserved exogenous 
             e3                             unobserved exogenous 
             e4                             unobserved exogenous 
             trust                          unobserved exogenous 
             e5                             unobserved exogenous 
             e6                             unobserved exogenous 
             e7                             unobserved exogenous 
             e8                             unobserved exogenous 
             e9                             unobserved exogenous 
             competence                     unobserved exogenous 
             e10                            unobserved exogenous 
             e11                            unobserved exogenous 
             e12                            unobserved exogenous 
             e13                            unobserved exogenous 
             e14                            unobserved exogenous 
             e15                            unobserved exogenous 
             e16                            unobserved exogenous 
 
 
                     Number of variables in your model:   46 
                     Number of observed variables:        27 
                     Number of unobserved variables:      19 
                     Number of exogenous variables:       30 
                     Number of endogenous variables:      16 
 
 
Summary of Parameters 
 
                   Weights  Covariances Variances    Means   Intercepts   Total 
                   -------  ----------- ---------    -----   ----------   ----- 
            Fixed:   19          0          0          0          0         19 
          Labeled:    0          0          0          0          0          0 
        Unlabeled:   26         17         30          0          0         73 
                   -------  ----------- ---------    -----   ----------   ----- 
            Total:   45         17         30          0          0         92 
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NOTE: 
    The model is recursive. 
 
Sample size:    50 
 
Model: Default model 
 
 
Computation of degrees of freedom 
 
                      Number of distinct sample moments:  378 
          Number of distinct parameters to be estimated:   73 
                                     ------------------------- 
                                     Degrees of freedom:  305 
 
    0e 10 0,0e+000 -8,1546e-001  1,00e+004   1,12963868479e+003    0 1,00e+004 
    1e  7 0,0e+000 -4,6126e-001  3,57e+000   8,07678196088e+002   20 3,51e-001 
    2e* 2 0,0e+000 -5,8931e-001  9,18e-001   7,01537367047e+002    5 7,89e-001 
    3e* 1 0,0e+000 -2,5047e-002  8,76e-001   6,18440358844e+002    5 9,24e-001 
    4e  0 6,2e+002  0,0000e+000  8,47e-001   5,93576762093e+002    6 9,20e-001 
    5e  0 2,3e+002  0,0000e+000  8,17e-001   5,92099069055e+002    1 2,73e-001 
    6e  0 3,2e+002  0,0000e+000  1,92e-001   5,89127514149e+002    1 1,18e+000 
    7e  0 3,2e+002  0,0000e+000  1,34e-001   5,88655451723e+002    1 1,14e+000 
    8e  0 3,2e+002  0,0000e+000  4,25e-002   5,88626456928e+002    1 1,05e+000 
    9e  0 3,3e+002  0,0000e+000  3,43e-003   5,88626292426e+002    1 1,00e+000 
   10e  0 3,3e+002  0,0000e+000  2,21e-005   5,88626292419e+002    1 1,00e+000 
 
 
Minimum was achieved 
 
 
Chi-square = 588,626 
Degrees of freedom = 305 
Probability level = 0,000 
 
 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
---------------------------- 
 
Regression Weights:                      Estimate     S.E.      C.R.     Label  
-------------------                      --------   -------   -------   ------- 
 
         sgrowth <------------ ident       0,257     0,138     1,857            
         sgrowth <----------- sbrand       0,329     0,124     2,656            
         sgrowth <----------- assort       0,017     0,137     0,125            
         sgrowth <------------ allow       0,191     0,127     1,507            
         sgrowth <------------- prom      -0,119     0,140    -0,850            
         sgrowth <----------- advert      -0,003     0,139    -0,022            
         sgrowth <------------ multi      -0,032     0,111    -0,293            
         sgrowth <----------- indpdt       0,341     0,111     3,071            
         sgrowth <---------- floorsp      -0,442     0,115    -3,862            
         sgrowth <----------- employ       0,127     0,115     1,109            
         sgrowth <----------- margin      -0,139     0,111    -1,257            
         d1 <------------ dependence       0,522     0,134     3,907            
         d2 <------------ dependence       0,379     0,142     2,667            
         d5 <------------ dependence       1,000                                
         d6 <------------ dependence       1,001     0,085    11,737            
         t1 <----------------- trust       1,140     0,145     7,843            
         t2 <----------------- trust       1,155     0,145     7,967            
         t3 <----------------- trust       1,000                                
         t4 <----------------- trust       0,613     0,172     3,558            
         t7 <----------------- trust      -0,399     0,178    -2,240            
         c1 <------------ competence       1,321     0,197     6,707            
         c2 <------------ competence       1,186     0,195     6,072            
         c3 <------------ competence       1,000                                
         c4 <------------ competence       1,090     0,196     5,555            
         c6 <------------ competence       0,862     0,198     4,345            
         satisf <-------- dependence      -0,139     0,130    -1,068            
         satisf <-------- competence       0,582     0,224     2,601            
         satisf <------------- trust       0,447     0,191     2,335            
         satisf <----------- sgrowth       0,082     0,100     0,821            
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Standardized Regression Weights:         Estimate 
--------------------------------         -------- 
 
         sgrowth <------------ ident       0,238 
         sgrowth <----------- sbrand       0,308 
         sgrowth <----------- assort       0,016 
         sgrowth <------------ allow       0,178 
         sgrowth <------------- prom      -0,109 
         sgrowth <----------- advert      -0,003 
         sgrowth <------------ multi      -0,031 
         sgrowth <----------- indpdt       0,321 
         sgrowth <---------- floorsp      -0,417 
         sgrowth <----------- employ       0,120 
         sgrowth <----------- margin      -0,131 
         d1 <------------ dependence       0,502 
         d2 <------------ dependence       0,365 
         d5 <------------ dependence       0,962 
         d6 <------------ dependence       0,963 
         t1 <----------------- trust       0,920 
         t2 <----------------- trust       0,933 
         t3 <----------------- trust       0,808 
         t4 <----------------- trust       0,495 
         t7 <----------------- trust      -0,322 
         c1 <------------ competence       0,959 
         c2 <------------ competence       0,861 
         c3 <------------ competence       0,726 
         c4 <------------ competence       0,791 
         c6 <------------ competence       0,626 
         satisf <-------- dependence      -0,135 
         satisf <-------- competence       0,428 
         satisf <------------- trust       0,366 
         satisf <----------- sgrowth       0,089 
 
Covariances:                             Estimate     S.E.      C.R.     Label  
------------                             --------   -------   -------   ------- 
 
         dependence <--------> trust       0,312     0,128     2,445            
         trust <--------> competence       0,362     0,119     3,051            
         ident <------------> assort       0,337     0,132     2,550            
         ident <-------------> allow       0,315     0,140     2,242            
         ident <--------------> prom       0,374     0,137     2,725            
         sbrand <-------------> prom       0,214     0,123     1,731            
         sbrand <-----------> assort       0,250     0,129     1,943            
         assort <------------> allow       0,301     0,135     2,222            
         assort <-------------> prom       0,301     0,127     2,361            
         allow <--------------> prom       0,318     0,136     2,334            
         prom <-------------> advert       0,409     0,139     2,936            
         dependence <---> competence       0,305     0,120     2,548            
         multi <------------> indpdt       0,006     0,140     0,044            
         floorsp <----------> employ       0,244     0,144     1,693            
         allow <------------> advert       0,252     0,133     1,899            
         sbrand <-----------> advert       0,217     0,127     1,713            
         ident <------------> advert       0,364     0,136     2,679            
 
Correlations:                            Estimate 
-------------                            -------- 
 
         dependence <--------> trust       0,410 
         trust <--------> competence       0,630 
         ident <------------> assort       0,353 
         ident <-------------> allow       0,330 
         ident <--------------> prom       0,399 
         sbrand <-------------> prom       0,226 
         sbrand <-----------> assort       0,260 
         assort <------------> allow       0,314 
         assort <-------------> prom       0,320 
         allow <--------------> prom       0,338 
         prom <-------------> advert       0,433 
         dependence <---> competence       0,445 
         multi <------------> indpdt       0,006 
         floorsp <----------> employ       0,249 
         allow <------------> advert       0,262 
         sbrand <-----------> advert       0,226 
         ident <------------> advert       0,381 
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Variances:                               Estimate     S.E.      C.R.     Label  
----------                               --------   -------   -------   ------- 
 
                          dependence       0,908     0,206     4,406            
                               trust       0,639     0,190     3,372            
                          competence       0,516     0,178     2,902            
                               ident       0,947     0,188     5,046            
                              sbrand       0,965     0,194     4,968            
                              assort       0,957     0,191     5,009            
                               allow       0,960     0,193     4,985            
                                prom       0,926     0,182     5,079            
                              advert       0,961     0,193     4,994            
                               multi       0,980     0,198     4,950            
                              indpdt       0,980     0,198     4,950            
                             floorsp       0,980     0,198     4,950            
                              employ       0,980     0,198     4,950            
                              margin       0,980     0,198     4,950            
                                 e15       0,590     0,119     4,950            
                                  e1       0,733     0,150     4,886            
                                  e2       0,849     0,173     4,921            
                                  e3       0,072     0,060     1,200            
                                  e4       0,071     0,060     1,168            
                                  e5       0,150     0,052     2,877            
                                  e6       0,127     0,050     2,529            
                                  e7       0,341     0,079     4,325            
                                  e8       0,740     0,153     4,846            
                                  e9       0,878     0,179     4,913            
                                 e10       0,079     0,043     1,826            
                                 e11       0,254     0,063     4,028            
                                 e12       0,464     0,100     4,632            
                                 e13       0,366     0,082     4,454            
                                 e14       0,596     0,125     4,772            
                                 e16       0,525     0,110     4,772            
 
 
Summary of models 
----------------- 
 
               Model  NPAR        CMIN    DF           P     CMIN/DF 
    ----------------  ----   ---------    --   ---------   --------- 
       Default model    73     588,626   305       0,000       1,930 
     Saturated model   378       0,000     0 
  Independence model    27    1141,720   351       0,000       3,253 
 
 
 
               Model         RMR         GFI        AGFI        PGFI 
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model       0,170       0,586       0,487       0,473 
     Saturated model       0,000       1,000                         
  Independence model       0,285       0,297       0,243       0,276 
 
 
 
                          DELTA1        RHO1      DELTA2        RHO2 
               Model         NFI         RFI         IFI         TLI         CFI 
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model       0,484       0,407       0,661       0,587       0,641 
     Saturated model       1,000                   1,000                   1,000 
  Independence model       0,000       0,000       0,000       0,000       0,000 
 
 
 
               Model      PRATIO        PNFI        PCFI 
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model       0,869       0,421       0,557 
     Saturated model       0,000       0,000       0,000 
  Independence model       1,000       0,000       0,000 
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               Model         NCP       LO 90       HI 90             
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model     283,626     218,789     356,262 
     Saturated model       0,000       0,000       0,000 
  Independence model     790,720     692,222     896,808 
 
 
 
               Model        FMIN          F0       LO 90       HI 90 
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model      12,013       5,788       4,465       7,271 
     Saturated model       0,000       0,000       0,000       0,000 
  Independence model      23,300      16,137      14,127      18,302 
 
 
 
               Model       RMSEA       LO 90       HI 90      PCLOSE 
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model       0,138       0,121       0,154       0,000 
  Independence model       0,214       0,201       0,228       0,000 
 
 
 
 
 
               Model         AIC         BCC         BIC        CAIC 
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model     734,626     929,293    1114,800     947,204 
     Saturated model     756,000    1764,000    2724,571    1856,745 
  Independence model    1195,720    1267,720    1336,333    1274,345 
 
 
 
               Model        ECVI       LO 90       HI 90       MECVI 
    ----------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model      14,992      13,669      16,475      18,965 
     Saturated model      15,429      15,429      15,429      36,000 
  Independence model      24,402      22,392      26,568      25,872 
 
 
 
                         HOELTER     HOELTER 
               Model         .05         .01 
    ----------------  ----------  ---------- 
       Default model          29          31 
  Independence model          17          18 
 
 
 
 
Execution time summary: 
 
 
          Minimization: 0,281 
         Miscellaneous: 2,002 
             Bootstrap: 0,000 
                 Total: 2,283 
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